African continent over the recent years has witnessed a steady growth in jihadists activities posing threat to individual country’s security and stability. In East Africa, the Al-Qaeda official branch Al-Shabaab continue to operate in its home base, Somalia and sporadically extending its attacks to Kenya’s prefectures bordering Somalia. This raises many questions about the factors and causes of this growing threat, its risks and future possibilities.
In the month of August, Al-Shabaab claimed at least 70 attacks in Somalia alone while in past month of July, Al-Shabaab militant group claimed at least 54 attacks in Somalia and six others in Kenya, totaling to 60 attacks in both East African countries which are key targets of the Islamist militants. This is a slightly increase as compared to the month of July.
Al-Shabaab Area of Operation
It is notable that Al-Shabaab controls about a fifth of Somalia territory with relentless efforts to establish control beyond central and southern Somalia theaters which for now remains the group’s main operational areas. Out of these recorded attacks, Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba have taken the largest share of the militant’s activities. Al-Shabaab has conducted and claimed at least 18 attacks in southern Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region, 15 attacks in Lower Juba and 12 attacks in capital Mogadishu.
Bay, Gedo, Middle Shabelle and Hiran have also witnessed increased militants’ activities though the occurrences are not as frequent as compared to the aforementioned regions. In this region the Islamist militants have been favored by the terrain and thick vegetation thus, the group has been able to target security forces by planting IEDs, landmines on roads majorly used by the troops. The militants also have increased guerilla ambush attacks on troop’s convoys as well as their military bases.
The militant group in attempt to establish new battle zones in Somalia have in a number of times staged attacks in Mudug, and Galgaduud regions of Somalia.
Most of these attacks have notably been low-scale and hardly have they captured local and international headlines. However, one attack could have made headlines after Al-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted the convoy of Somalia Chief of Defense Forces, General Odawa Yusuf Rage near Mogadishu’s Tarabunka junction. In August also, the militants in a targeted mission attempted to assassinate Deputy of Somali Security Minister, Abdinasir Said Muse near Taleh junction in Mogadishu’s Hodan district as well as other three government officials in Gedo region of Somalia.
Most of Somalia’s regions remains fluid in the sense that, they are captured by joint counterterrorism assets while the militants in the same zeal fight persistently to regain control and vice-versa. Al-Shabaab militant group typically leaves an area ahead of many offensives targeting their bases and later comes back and recaptures the same territories. Additionally, Somali security forces have also been unable to maintain control of these territories, bringing into question of SNA preparedness to take over the mantle of Somalia’s security in the event foreign troops exits Somalia.
Steady Surge in Militant’s Activities
Apart from demonstrating its capability to conduct attacks, adapt and weather convectional military operations, Al-Shabaab militant group has morphed in both its strategy and tactical capabilities to either match or outmatch military assets and sociopolitical, clan dynamics which the Islamist militant group has continued to exploit.
In the past four months, Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia have not significantly decline, the curve on its campaigns against government forces and coalition partners has remained relatively steady. A few attacks have in the same period have been reported in Kenya’s NEP counties. Though the attacks in Kenya frontiers have been low-scale, they have significant economic repercussions to the area besides the effects on communication, education and health sectors which are militants’ key attack targets.
For instance, in NEP Kenyan counties, the Somali-based militants strategically continue to target critical infrastructures, especially telecommunication BTS masts, in a move that geared towards paralyzing communication within the region, hence giving them ample time to accomplish their attack missions. In the month of July, the Islamists militants conducted at least six attacks in Mandera and Garissa counties. Increased militant’s movements have been reported close to proximity with water points.
Its notable, Al-Shabaab capability to conduct spectacular attacks, such as car bombs, RCIEDs and suicide missions in the capital Mogadishu have significantly diminished but are resuming with low intensity attacks. In the capital, Al-Shabaab has also concentrated on targeted assassinations of government officials.
The use of landmines, roadside IEDs, RCIEDs remains preferred attack types by the Islamists Al-Shabaab. However, guerilla ambushes targeting both local and foreign troops in Somalia are on the rise. The militants have increased guerilla ambush attacks on troop’s convoys as well as their military bases notably in southern Somalia’s Gedo, Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba recording repeat attacks.
Assessment/Observations
The group’s attacks trend-line indicates that the Islamist militant group is carrying at least an attack in a day, but multiple attacks are recorded on weekends (Saturdays and Sundays). In the month of August, just like the other previous months, the militant group has been conducting an average of two attacks per day Somalia targeting Somali police, SNA troops and AMISOM troops, with tempo increasing over the weekends.
IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs remains the militant’s attacks types. However, ambushes and use of mortar are steadily increasing on military bases and their convoys Assassinations have also been witnessed on targeted local government officials especially in the capital Mogadishu. A number of targeting shootings, amputations and executions also witnessed on individuals mostly charged at the Al-Shabaab’s courts, (Those accused of stealing, rape and spying for security assets). The executions and amputations are done on public square with psychological intentions of instilling fears to the locals to desist cooperating with counterterrorism assets.
Indications of The Growing Threat
As part of the assessment and observations, there are a number of indicators to support that Al-Shabaab threat is growing in the East Africa region despite concerted counterterrorism actors mounting pressure on the Al-Qaeda aligned group.
- The intensity and frequency of attacks on military positions in many theaters of Somalia has continued to be witnessed not only in August but in the previous months and past years. The Somali extremists, concentrated it attacks on Somali security forces, their bases, AMISOM FOBs and convoys in a number of theaters in Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Hiran, regions of Somalia.
- Ability to conducted targeted attacks swiftly. There has been a spike in number of executions and targeted assassinations in Gedo, Lower Lower Shabelle, Mogadishu and its environs.
- The development of terrorist propaganda, Al-Shabaab has been able to constantly developed and churn its propaganda strategy by publishing long videos of its operations to promote its core agenda of jihad in East Africa via its media wing.
- Persistent and constant escalation of attacks in an effort to open new fronts and expand its area of control.
- Resilience, flexibility and ability to regroup have seen the militant group morphed despite military interventions against it. Despite the military operations against the militant group, it has been able to fight, seize villages, towns and localities an indicator of strengthened capabilities.
- The growing dominance and control. Whereas there is an ISIS faction operating in northern part of Somalia, it noteworthy that Al-Shabaab remains a formidable threat as compared to the Abdikadir Mumin ISIS-led faction that is also faces threat from the Al-Shabaab.
Regional Threat Matrix, Risks of the Growing Threat
This trend where Al-Shabaab has increased activity of FOBs and troop’s convoys is worrisome as it could easily excite the group’s cells not only in Somalia but also those operating along northeastern and coastal prefectures of Kenya. Its highly likely in the coming days/weeks, fanatical grassroots jihadists who are not only ideologically inspired but with medium militant capabilities such as those operating along the border with Kenya- Somalia (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa) and in the vast Boni forest, Lamu county, Kenya will be activated.
Kenya’s Force Investigation Teams (FITs) throughout June and July August, have reported of increased Al-Shabaab movements close to proximity of Kenya-Somalia border in search of water points besides replenishing of their food/medical supplies.
It’s an observation that in the coming days, Al-Shabaab possibly will establish makeshift camps proximal to water points, a wake-up call to CT-actors to mapped these areas accordingly.
Risks of the growing militant threat continue to pose threat and regional destabilization. The merging and activation of group sleeper cells continues to be one of the potential dangers of the growing threat of the organization across the East African region. The unification subsequently may lead to the opening of new fronts for fighting and expansion throughout the region.
Escalating sectarian violence. The continued clashes between the Al-Qaeda aligned militants would lead to more violence in the areas they already control and the areas they want to expand, thus violence on soft targets (civilians) cannot be ruled out.
As the Somali-based militant group continue to posture and demonstrate its capability to mount attacks across the country and beyond, it’s noteworthy that the Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab is deploying small units, heavily armed to carry on attacks. The military strategy is aimed at achieving their goal of mounting attacks with casualties and at the same time minimizing casualty risks from their side. Also, smaller units are able to get to their target’s locations without much detection or suspicion from security assets and now with steadily resumption of suicide and martyrdom missions, more fatalities cannot be ruled out.
Military/Counterterrorism Interventions
Military and concerted counterterrorism operations are yielding substantial successes against the Al-Qaeda branch in East Africa. However, security and intelligence assets in the East African region faces a huge and challenging task ahead, citing the persistent and steady jihadist’s activities. The increased enemy activities will subsequently and adversely affect individual country’s security and stability. It is primary objective of the security and intelligence services to capitalize heavily on countering the return of violent extremism and terrorism to ensure the terror groups do not outbid them.
To elaborate its successes, the group continue to keep track of its attacks by publishing and spreading of infographics photos and videos of notable raids with casualties in their pro-websites and media. Al-Shabaab has been able to maintain this modern psychological warfare strategy aimed at demoralizing military assets fighting them in region and thus a prolific strategy or approach to counter this is required.
Besides, the strategy is mainly run by group’s propaganda wing is also aimed at amplifying group’s success in theaters, boosting the morale for group’s foot soldiers besides attracting potential jihadists into their fold. To counter this warfare strategy, counterterrorism assets need to come with new strategies such as targeted distributed denial of services (DDOs) to jihadist websites and other online media channels propagating their agendas.
Increasing on surveillance capabilities by the counterterrorism actors will be instrumental in foiling and threat preemption bearing in mind that the militant group also conducts its on surveillance followed by planning and eventual attacks. The primary targets remain local and foreign troops inside Somalia and thus military assets area of responsibility (AOR)to be emphasized on proximity of their operating bases. Military convoys and those involved in supplies to the military bases to occasionally change their routines to minimize the instances of being targeted with ambushes and targeted IEDs, RCIEDs and Landmines.
Conclusion
Al-Shabaab militant group undoubtedly continues to pose a threat to security and stability in the Horn of Africa. Regional and international efforts to combat terrorism need to be stepped up, and the mandate of the African Union Mission to Somalia requires continued support, especially as the Somali army has proved its inability to combat Al-Shabaab without regional and international military support.
