Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for the Month of April 2025

Executive Summary

In April 2025, Islamic State affiliates intensified operations across East and Central Africa, with Mozambique’s IS-Mozambique (ISM), Somalia’s ISS, and DRC’s ISCAP all escalating attacks. ISM demonstrated a shift toward economic self-sufficiency through targeted ambushes, ransom kidnappings, and looting of artisanal mining sites, while also re-entering Niassa province for the first time since 2021. Somalia’s ISS surged attacks across Puntland, deploying suicide bombers, IEDs, and assassinations—highlighting both tactical sophistication and ongoing weaknesses in local force mobility. Meanwhile, ISCAP maintained a brutal, ideologically-driven campaign in eastern DRC, executing civilians along key corridors and repeatedly striking poorly defended communities. Across all three theaters, a lack of timely state response, weak local deterrence, and persistent intelligence gaps enabled Islamic State factions to retain tactical initiative.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 29^th Apr- Insurgents crossed the Lugenda River and attacked the Mariri Environmental Centre in Mecula district, killing six Mozambican soldiers, wounding others, and capturing weapons.
• 24^th April- Insurgents also stole five land cruisers, five guns, motorbikes, fuel and supplies before burning the luxury Kambako hunting camp in Hunting Block B of the Niassa Reserve.
• 19^th Apr – ISM Militants led an armed assault on civilians and security forces, and beheaded them, in Kambako and Mariri Safari Resorts Along the Lugenda River in Cabo Delgado/Niassa Province.
• 19^TH Apr- insurgents attacked the luxury Kambako hunting camp in Niassa Reserve, beheading two guards and taking nine hostages, two of whom managed to escape after the site was occupied for at least five days.
• 14^TH Apr- insurgents attacked a village in Nangade district, stealing food and forcing civilians to carry it into the bush, with further insurgent movement observed near Lijungo on 16 April.
• 14^th Apr- ISM militants launched an armed attack on Mozambican militia forces and Christian civilians in Ncole, Ancuabe District.
• 14^TH Apr- ISM militants led an armed assault on Christians in Nanjua, Ancuabe district.
• 14^th Apr- ISM insurgents attacked and burned over 60 homes in the village of Ngura.
• 13^th Apr- ISM insurgents attacked and burned the village of Ncole; set fire to two churches and “dozens” of homes.
• 12^TH Apr- ISM terrorists set up a roadblock and burned 3 vehicles between Montepuez and Pemba districts.
• 12^th Apr- Two trucks were burned, and passengers including two Chinese nationals were taken hostage by ISM along N14 highway between Nanjua and Muaja, with ransom demands ranging from 10,000 to 200,000 meticais.
• 09th Apr– ISM insurgents ambushed a FADM patrol on the road to the village of Cobre on the Macomia coast.
• 08^th Apr– ISM rebels captured and executed a Christian on N380 in Ntotwe, Mocimboa da Praia (MDP).
• 07^th Apr– A primary school teacher was killed in an attack on the village of Ntotwe, less than 20 km from MDP.
• 05^th Apr– insurgents attacked Namoro village, approximately 50 km north of Montepuez town on the R698 to Mueda; burned homes and kidnapped several people.
• 02^ND Apr– ISM rebels captured and executed a Christian in Muaja, Ancuabe District.
• 01^st Apr- Insurgents attacked Nonia and Miegane villages, burning over 20 homes in Nonia and killing 6 members of the Naparama militia in Miegane, where three more homes were also set on fire.

SOMALIA

• 26^th Apr- Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants clashed with Puntland Defense Forces Near Grioso, Puntland.
• 26^th Apr- ISS militants detonated suicide vest targeting Puntland Forces meeting before the start of military operation in Puntland.
• 25^TH Apr- several Puntland troops were injured after ISS detonated an IED on theor patrol between Shebaab and Gaatir Oodan, in Jalil Valley in Puntland.
• 23^rd Apr- ISS Led an armed assault on a Puntland Defense Force patrol in Tuur Masale in Jalil Valley in Puntland.
• 23^rd Apr- ISS militants detonated an IED targeting a Puntland Forces Patrol between Daray-Madobe and Dandamale in Jalil Valley in Puntland.
• 22^nd Apr- Puntland forces announced to have neutralized twenty ISS militants during clashed in Bari Region, Puntland.
• 20^th Apr- ISS rebels clashed with Puntland Defense Forces patrol near Qara Village in Jalil Valley.
• 20^th Apr – ISS militants targeted a Puntland Defense Forces truck with an improvised explosive device (IED) near Jaatir Uden village in the Jalil Valley.
• 20^TH Apr- ISS carried out a targeted assassination of Local Security Advisor Farah Kaidij in Lasanud, Laas Canood.
• 19^TH Apr- ISS militants clashed with Puntland Forces Patrol near Dandamale in Jalil Valley in Puntland.
• 18^TH Apr- ISS terrorists clashed with Puntland Forces in Miraale Valley, Bari Region.
• 18^th Apr- 5 ISS suicide bombers targeted Puntland targeted a Puntland Forces’ Central Camp in Wadi Arar (El Arare) in Bari region.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

• 15^th Apr- ISCAP militants captured and executed two Christians in Ofaye Otto Maber in Ituri province.
• 14^th Apr- ISCAP led an armed assault on Christians in Kokola, North Kivu; several people were injured.
• 12^th Apr- ISCAP militants captured and executed four Christians near Oicha in North Kivu.
• 09^th Apr- ISCAP militants captured and executed one Christians in Kasoko village in North Kivu.
• 08^th Apr- ISCAP conducted an armed assault against Christians in Eringeti area of Ituri Province.
• 07^th Apr- ISCAP militants attacked and injured several Christians in Kasoko village in North Kivu.
• 07^th Apr- ISCAP militants captured and executed Christians in Kasoko village in North Kivu.
• 06^th Apr– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed three Christians in Ofay Otto Maber area in Ituri Province.
• 06^th Apr– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed one Christian in Mambelenga area in Ituri Province.
• 05^th Apr– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed three Christians in Ofay Otto Maber area in Ituri Province.
• 04^th Apr– ISCAP rebels attacked Christians along the RN4 in Ofaye Otto Maber In Ituri.
• 03^rd Apr– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed Christians on the RN4 in Idohu in Ituri Province.
• 03^RD Apr– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed a Christian in Kididiwe area in North Kivu Province.

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

MOZAMBIQUE

In the month of April, ISM demonstrated an increased reliance on local financing mechanisms, using both road ambushes and attacks on artisanal mining sites to raise funds. This marks a clear shift toward self-sustaining operations, likely prompted by a lack of significant external funding. Along the N380 road, ISM conducted kidnappings that reportedly brought in over US\$3,000 through mobile money transfers. The success of these operations suggests ongoing vulnerabilities in Mozambique’s mobile money registration systems, where insurgents exploit lax identification requirements and agent complicity. Despite mobile network operators’ efforts to tighten controls, the volume and decentralization of mobile money activity make real-time monitoring and enforcement challenging.

In Meluco district, ISM expanded its targeting of artisanal mining communities, raiding sites in Ravia, Majua, and Mitepo. These incidents signal a shift from earlier, non-violent interactions with miners—such as buying supplies in early 2023—to outright extortion and looting. While mining attacks can yield resources like gold, the strategy carries clear limitations. Illicit gold sales are slow and require transporting the product to distant locations such as Montepuez, Nampula, or across the border into Tanzania. Moreover, violence leads to depopulation of mining areas, as seen in Ravia, where over 3,000 people fled following attacks—potentially reducing future gains unless ISM establishes sustained control.

April also saw ISM continue small-scale ransom operations in coastal areas. Near Tambuzi Island, insurgents captured fishing boats for the third time this year and secured ransom payments. In another case in Meluco’s Sitate village, they seized a vehicle and demanded payment for its return. These actions follow a pattern of low-effort, mobile operations focused on generating quick income.

Meanwhile, ISM’s incursion into Niassa province with the attack on the Mariri environmental center marks the group’s first return to the area since 2021. The move appears calculated, possibly intended to reconnect with old recruitment networks across the Tanzanian border. The security response was slow, and ISM remained operational in the area for up to 10 days. While the material value of the Mariri attack was likely low, its propaganda value and psychological impact were significant.

These patterns in April suggest ISM is diversifying its local financing strategy, exploiting weak oversight in financial systems and targeting unprotected, high-mobility civilian areas. The lack of sustained external pressure and uneven security responses continue to create operational space for the group across multiple provinces.

In a growing controversy over Rwanda’s military presence in northern Mozambique, allegations have surfaced suggesting that the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) are failing to effectively counter insurgent attacks by Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants. A senior figure in Mozambique’s Local Force, a government-backed militia, has accused RDF troops of consistently arriving hours after attacks, even when stationed nearby, leaving civilians vulnerable to continued violence. The concern is particularly acute along the strategic N380 highway, a key route for both the local population and the multi-billion-dollar LNG project in Palma. Despite a significant presence of both Rwandan and Mozambican forces in the area, evidence indicates that insurgent activities continue unabated, raising questions about the readiness and responsiveness of the RDF. Critics argue that while Rwanda’s military mission in Cabo Delgado was initially seen as successful in protecting civilians, recent delays in military response may be undermining the safety of both local communities and vital economic infrastructure.

D.R. CONGO

Throughout April 2025, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has demonstrated a sustained and coordinated campaign of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu and Ituri provinces. The group’s operational tempo has sharply increased, with multiple executions, abductions, and assaults on civilians, predominantly Christians, across both regions. This reflects both a strategic territorial intent and an ideological objective to dominate and destabilize local communities through terror.

The data shows a disturbing pattern: ISCAP militants carried out over a dozen distinct attacks between April 3rd and 15th, targeting key transit routes like the RN4 and repeatedly striking the same villages such as Kasoko and Ofaye Otto Maber. This repetition suggests weak local deterrence and poor mobility of Congolese security forces. ISCAP’s tactics, comprising capture and execute operations, armed raids, and mass targeting of non-combatants, underscore a systematic campaign to instill fear and displace communities perceived as religious or ideological adversaries.

The dual-theater focus on both Ituri and North Kivu illustrates ISCAP’s expanding geographic footprint and growing logistical capacity. Their operations appear synchronized and intelligence-led, as attacks often occur on successive days and in proximate locations, evading any meaningful security counter-response. The sheer brutality, public executions and repeat targeting, points to an emboldened insurgency.

The persistent inability of state forces to protect civilians, especially along key infrastructure routes like the RN4, risks accelerating displacement, deepening sectarian divides, and providing ISCAP with a recruiting narrative. In the absence of a coordinated regional counterterrorism effort and localized stabilization mechanisms, ISCAP’s grip on parts of eastern DRC may further entrench, complicating broader peace-building and humanitarian efforts in the Great Lakes region.

SOMALIA

Islamic State Somalia (ISS) has significantly escalated its operations in Puntland, particularly across the Jalil and Miraale Valleys and the broader Bari region. A concentrated wave of militant activity has included ambushes, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations. These actions point to a deliberate strategy aimed at destabilizing local governance and challenging the momentum of the Puntland Defense Forces (PDF) and their international counterterrorism partners.

ISS has demonstrated enhanced operational coordination, striking patrols and convoys with IEDs along key transit routes and initiating direct assaults on military targets. Notably, the use of five suicide bombers in an attack on PDF’s central camp in Wadi Arar reflects a high level of tactical investment and a shift toward high-impact martyrdom operations. The targeted killing of a local security advisor in Laas Canood further reveals the group’s capacity to conduct politically symbolic violence beyond rural conflict zones.

These incidents unfolded alongside the fourth phase of a counterterrorism campaign led jointly by Puntland and international coalition forces. Despite reported ISS casualties during clashes in Bari, the group’s sustained attacks indicate persistent capability and operational depth. The geographical focus on remote valleys suggests ISS is exploiting terrain familiarity and limited state presence to maintain its insurgency.

At a strategic level, the indictment of a foreign national in Europe for disseminating ISS propaganda and planning hijrah to Somalia underscores the group’s transnational recruitment pipeline. Somalia continues to serve as both an operational base and ideological magnet for global jihadist networks.

This pattern of intensified activity reveals critical intelligence gaps and underscores the need for improved surveillance, better force mobility, and coordinated regional pressure. Without these, ISS is likely to retain the initiative across key parts of Puntland.

CONCLUSION

April 2025 confirms a troubling trend; Islamic State franchises in East and Central Africa are adapting, entrenching, and expanding. In Mozambique, ISM’s reliance on ransom and illicit resource extraction marks a pivot toward sustainability over scale, exploiting gaps in mobile money regulation and rural security. In Somalia, ISS has matured into a nimble, high-impact insurgent force capable of staging complex attacks in rapid succession, undermining Puntland’s counterterrorism posture. In the DRC, ISCAP’s relentless executions and synchronized assaults reveal not just brutality, but strategic coherence aimed at permanent territorial destabilization.

Despite different local dynamics, all three groups exploit the same systemic weaknesses; under-resourced local forces, delayed responses, and fragmented regional coordination. Their ability to operate with relative impunity across border regions underscores the urgency of unified regional security strategies. Without enhanced intelligence-sharing, robust mobile patrol capacity, and reinforced civilian protection, Islamic State affiliates will continue to evolve; converting weak governance into operational advantage and protracted insecurity into long-term presence.