Executive Summary
March 2025 witnessed sustained Islamic State-linked insurgent activity across East and Central Africa, with notable developments in Mozambique, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Islamic State in Mozambique (ISM) displayed continued mobility and aggression along key coastal and inland corridors, combining attacks, abductions, and ideological outreach with maritime extortion tactics. In Somalia, Islamic State Somalia (ISS) maintained pressure in the Bari Mountains, challenging Puntland authorities through coordinated IED attacks and armed engagements, despite counteroffensives reclaiming territory. Meanwhile, the DRC saw an intensification of sectarian violence by the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), particularly targeting Christian communities in North Kivu and Ituri, underlining the group’s operational resilience and deepening humanitarian crisis.
• 27th Mar– two Christians were captured and executed by ISM between Mbau and Chinda in Mocimboa da Praia (MDP).
• 26TH Mar– ISM terrorists captured and executed three Christians between Mbau and Chinda in MDP.
• 27th Mar– ISM militants set up a roadblock and captured and executed a Mozambican soldier on the N380 Between Nova Zambézia and Congresso, Macomia District.
• 25th Mar– ISM militants set up a roadblock and clashed with Mozambican troops on the N380 near Chai area in Macomia.
• 22nd Mar– Several people were injured after ISM ambushed a local militia in a cement truck the N380 near Chai area in Macomia.
• 24th Mar– one person was captured and executed by ISM militants in Chinda along the N380 in MDP.
• 19th Mar– ISM militants captured circa 40 Fishermen, off Ilha Tambuzi Island in MDP.
• 17th Mar- more than 40 homes were razed to the ground in Ib, Meluco district following an armed assault by the ISM terrorists.
• 13th Mar– ISM terrorists detonated an IED on Mozambican Army forces in Kitrago in Macomia.
• 4th Mar– One person was captured and brutally executed by ISM Militants in Chibau area in MDP.
SOMALIA
• 23rd Mar– Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants detonated a roadside IED targeting an ambulance transporting Puntland soldiers in Bari Mountains in Puntland.
• 24th Mar– ISS militants targeted Puntland Forces’ Base in Dhaban-Qooxle Area of Xabley, Ufeyn District, Bari Mountains, Puntland.
• 18th Mar- ISS militants detonated an IED targeting Puntland forces in Cal Miskaat, Bari Mountains in Puntland.
• 10th Mar- Puntland Forces conducted a search operation ISS in Bari Mountains, Puntland.
• 02nd Mar– ISS militants conducted an armed assault targeting the Puntland Forces in Kasabli Village Near Tasjiic in Puntland.
D.R. CONGO
• 27TH Mar- Five terror suspects were committed to the International Crimes Division of the High Court in Uganda to stand trial on charges of aggravated trafficking in children and terrorism.
• 19th Mar- ISCAP militants captured and executed two Christians along the RN4 in Ngerega area in Ituri Province.
• 18th Mar- ISCAP militants captured and executed 2 Christians in Maiba in Lubero district in North Kivu.
• 12th Mar- ISCAP militants captured and executed several Christians in Idohu area in Ituri Province.
• 12th Mar- ISCAP militants captured and executed 4 Christians in Maiba in Lubero district in North Kivu.
• 08th Mar- several people were injured following an ISCAP attack in Kassiro in Lubero region in North Kivu.
• 08th Mar– ISCAP militants attacked Christians in Nkohi area in Lubero region of North Kivu.
• 05th Mar- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against innocent civilians in Tchabi region in Ituri province.
• 06th Mar- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Taboura Near Mavivi region in Ituri province.
• 07th Mar– ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Mavivi region in North Kivu province.
• 07th Mar- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Masakoke area in Lubero region.
• 03rd Mar- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese military in Maiba area in Lubero district.
• 3rd Mar- ISCAP militants ambushed Congolese military troops in Kasanga area of Lubero district.
• 3rd Mar– several Christians were injured in armed assault by ISCAP terrorists in Totolito in North Kivu.
INSIGHTS AND ANALYSIS
MOZAMBIQUE
The security landscape in Cabo Delgado remains precarious despite a recent lull in insurgent activity. While there were fewer incidents overall during the past two weeks, several key events highlight the persistent threat posed by the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISM). Notably, insurgents launched coordinated attacks on villages close to Mocímboa da Praia, killing civilians, looting, and kidnapping locals, including women and children. In Chibau, less than 5 km from Mocímboa da Praia town, at least one person was killed, and several were abducted. Though four children were later released, this episode underscores the continued risk to civilians in areas previously considered relatively secure.
ISM continues to demonstrate mobility along the coastal corridor of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia, moving by boat with apparent freedom. There were confirmed sightings of insurgents arriving by sea in multiple villages, where they demanded food and money. In some cases, they held fishermen for ransom, as seen in incidents off Tambuzi island and near Pequeué, suggesting that insurgents are sustaining themselves through maritime raids and extortion. This persistent coastal activity signals a gap in maritime patrols and coastal defense.
Alongside acts of violence, ISM also engages in ideological outreach, with the group claiming through its al-Naba newspaper that it has conducted a “preaching tour” promoting Ramadan fasting. This occurred in several villages, including Licobe in western Macomia. Such activities blend insurgent control and ideological influence in contested spaces.
On land, ISM continues to engage in both direct clashes with security forces and targeted acts of terror. In Meluco, the group has maintained an active presence, attacking villages like Iba, where they killed a civilian and burned dozens of homes. An earlier ambush near Nguida led to the deaths of several insurgents, but retaliation soon followed. On 22 March, ISM ambushed a cement truck on the N380 highway, killing a local militia member and injuring civilians. The group also attempted to kidnap passengers from other vehicles in the same area, indicating an effort to assert control along this key transport corridor.
The security response, however, appears fragmented. While Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) patrols have managed to disrupt some insurgent actions, including preventing abductions along the N380, local militias have complained about slow response times and poor coordination. Meanwhile, the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) have not launched a significant offensive since December 2024, and their clashes with ISM have been limited, with ISM often initiating attacks. Despite these threats, some government officials are advocating a softer stance. The district administrator of Mocímboa da Praia, Sérgio Cipriano, suggested insurgents may be seeking to return home due to hunger and called on communities to receive them with openness and dialogue. However, this message of reconciliation stands in contrast to the ongoing violence and seems premature given ISM’s continued operational activity in the region.
At the national level, President Daniel Chapo has taken a much more forceful position on domestic unrest, calling for violent policing of demonstrations and equating protestors with insurgents and armed militias. Since his inauguration in January, state forces have repeatedly opened fire on demonstrators, raising concerns about disproportionate use of force. Interestingly, this assertiveness contrasts sharply with the state’s cautious stance toward ISM, revealing a possible inconsistency in the government’s approach to internal security threats.
Internationally, the conflict in Cabo Delgado continues to attract scrutiny. The Netherlands and France have both launched investigations into human rights violations tied to the liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in Palma, where security forces allegedly committed abuses during and after the 2021 ISM assault. Meanwhile, the U.S. Export-Import Bank recently reapproved a $4.7 billion loan for the TotalEnergies-led LNG project, signaling ongoing international financial support despite the security and human rights concerns.
To enhance local security, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in collaboration with Japan, has launched a new initiative to strengthen community policing and border security in Cabo Delgado. The plan includes constructing and rehabilitating police stations and establishing community-based platforms to improve trust between civilians and security forces.
Yet, even as international stakeholders push for stabilization, the situation remains volatile. A U.S. embassy security alert for southern Tanzania in late March suggests that insurgent movements may be reemerging across the border, an area where some of the original militants had roots before the insurgency spread into Mozambique.
In summary, while Cabo Delgado is not experiencing the same level of violence as during the peak years of the insurgency, ISM remains active, mobile, and tactically adaptive. With limited state offensives, fractured responses, and growing humanitarian needs, the region faces continued instability and risks a protracted low-intensity conflict without a coherent and balanced security and reintegration strategy.
D.R. CONGO
In March 2025, the security landscape in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was marked by a disturbing escalation of violence attributed to the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), commonly known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Operating with increasing boldness and brutality, ISCAP intensified its campaign of terror, targeting Christian communities and military outposts across the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu. This surge in violence has underlined not only the group’s operational resilience but also the chronic vulnerabilities of the DRC’s security apparatus.
One defining feature of ISCAP’s operations during the month was its renewed focus on religiously motivated violence. The deliberate targeting of Christian civilians, often in remote and poorly defended villages suggests a calculated effort to sow sectarian fear, destabilize local populations, and erode the government’s credibility. The attacks were often marked by the capture and public execution of victims, signaling a shift in ISCAP’s propaganda strategy: from clandestine insurgency to performative terrorism aimed at gaining attention and legitimacy within the broader Islamic State network.
Geographically, ISCAP maintained a stronghold in areas stretching across the Lubero territory in North Kivu and several hotspots in Ituri, particularly along key transport routes such as the RN4. These areas not only provide natural cover due to their dense forests and mountainous terrain but also offer access to smuggling corridors and routes connecting to Uganda. This strategic depth has allowed ISCAP to sustain its cross-border logistical networks and evade pressure from Congolese and Ugandan joint military operations.
Although regional military efforts have intensified especially with the continuation of Operation Shujaa, the joint DRC-Uganda offensive there is little evidence to suggest that ISCAP’s core leadership or supply chains have been decisively disrupted. On the contrary, the group’s ability to carry out simultaneous attacks in multiple provinces indicates a decentralized but well-coordinated structure, possibly supported by external funding and ideological links to global jihadist movements.
The humanitarian toll of the violence is also deepening. Thousands have been displaced from affected areas, further stretching the already limited capacity of humanitarian agencies operating in eastern Congo. The psychological impact of sustained violence, particularly the trauma inflicted on Christian communities repeatedly targeted in gruesome assaults, could leave lasting scars and erode prospects for local reconciliation.
Looking ahead, there are several possible trajectories. First, the frequency and intensity of attacks may increase in the short term as ISCAP seeks to expand its territorial influence and retaliate against military pressure. With the Congolese government preoccupied by political transitions and regional diplomacy, ISCAP could exploit institutional distractions to entrench itself further. Second, the targeting of religious minorities might evolve into more systematic campaigns of ethnic or sectarian cleansing, particularly in mixed communities where tensions already simmer beneath the surface.
A longer-term risk lies in the potential regionalization of the conflict. Given ISCAP’s operational overlap with parts of western Uganda and its historical ties to extremist elements across East Africa, there is a possibility that the group may attempt to expand its ideological footprint or recruit transnational fighters. This could prompt a wider security crisis involving other Great Lakes states.
In conclusion, March 2025 has reaffirmed that ISCAP remains one of the most dangerous non-state actors in the eastern DRC. Its adaptability, brutal tactics, and ideological motivations present a multifaceted threat that cannot be neutralized by military means alone. A comprehensive strategy combining targeted security operations with community resilience programs, regional cooperation, and counter-radicalization efforts will be essential to prevent further deterioration and to restore a semblance of stability in the region.
SOMALIA
In March 2025, Somalia’s security landscape was notably impacted by the activities of Islamic State Somalia (ISS), particularly in the Puntland region’s Bari Mountains. The month witnessed a series of confrontations between ISS militants and Puntland forces, highlighting the persistent volatility in the area.
The month commenced with Puntland’s Dervish Force capturing an ISS base in Buqa Caleed within the Cal Miskaad mountain range on March 1. This operation aimed to disrupt ISS’s foothold in the region. Subsequently, on March 2, ISS militants launched an armed assault on Puntland forces in Kasabli village near Tasjiic, underscoring their intent to retaliate and maintain influence.
The confrontations escalated on March 10 when Puntland forces conducted a search operation targeting ISS in the Bari Mountains. This proactive measure led to ISS militants detonating an improvised explosive device against Puntland forces in Cal Miskaat on March 18, resulting in casualties among the security personnel. On March 19, ISS militants targeted a Puntland forces base in the Dhaban-Qooxle area of Xabley, Ufeyn District, further intensifying the conflict. The series of attacks culminated on March 23 when ISS militants detonated a roadside IED targeting an ambulance transporting Puntland soldiers in the Bari Mountains.
These incidents underscore the persistent threat posed by ISS in Puntland, despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts by regional forces. The group’s tactics, including the use of IEDs and assaults on security installations, reflect a strategic intent to challenge Puntland’s authority and destabilize the region. The frequency and coordination of these attacks indicate ISS’s resilience and operational capacity within the Bari Mountains.
In response to the escalating threat, Puntland forces have intensified their counter-operations, achieving significant territorial gains against ISS. A notable offensive led to the recapture of approximately 250 square kilometers and 50 bases from ISS control, marking one of the most substantial campaigns against the group in recent years. This operation resulted in the deaths of 85 ISS militants and 17 Puntland soldiers, highlighting the high stakes and intensity of the conflict. Puntland authorities have called for increased international support to sustain these gains and address the influx of foreign fighters bolstering ISS ranks.
Furthermore, the United States has played a pivotal role in supporting Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts. On February 1, 2025, U.S. airstrikes targeted ISS operatives in northeastern Somalia, resulting in significant militant casualties and the disruption of their operations. These strikes underscore the strategic importance of international collaboration in combating ISS’s influence in Somalia.
Despite these efforts, ISS continues to exploit the complex socio-political landscape of Somalia, including leveraging illicit activities such as gold mining in the Cal Miskaad mountains to fund its operations. The group’s ability to adapt and sustain its activities poses ongoing challenges to regional stability and underscores the necessity for sustained, coordinated counterterrorism strategies.
In summary, March 2025 was marked by a series of confrontations between ISS and Puntland forces, reflecting the enduring volatility in Somalia’s security environment. While regional and international efforts have yielded significant gains against ISS, the group’s persistent activities highlight the need for continued vigilance and collaborative strategies to achieve long-term stability in the region.
CONCLUSION
Across all three regions, Islamic State affiliates continue to adapt and operate with strategic intent, exploiting terrain, local grievances, and state fragility. While security forces have achieved limited tactical gains, the lack of sustained, integrated counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts leaves affected populations vulnerable. Maritime security gaps in Mozambique, porous borders in the DRC, and transnational fighter flows in Somalia each represent critical pressure points. Addressing these threats requires not only military action but also a robust strategy combining regional coordination, community-based resilience, counter-radicalization programs, and accountability for human rights abuses. Without such a comprehensive approach, the threat posed by these gro
