Events Summary
On 30th September 2019, members of Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa stormed a military base belonging to U.S. troops in Somalia.
The Somali based militant group claimed attack on Baledogle military base where US soldiers train commandos in Somalia and launch air strikes against the group including drone strikes.
The militants using a car bomb rammed the gates of the military base before sending their fighters inside where they claimed to have killed U.S. soldiers besides destroying some of their military hardware.
The militant group also claimed to have killed about a dozen Israeli military personnel.
Same day, Shabaab claimed a second attack on Italian peacekeepers in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.
There are a number of other notable recent attacks Al-Shabaab has carried out on heavily fortified complexes in Mogadishu that should not be ignored.
September Notable Attacks Claimed by Shabaab.
On September 2, 2019, Shabaab claimed to have stormed AMISOM’s Ugandan military base in Barawe airport in Lower Shabelle killing 3 Ugandan soldiers.
On September 6, 2019, Shabaab claimed another attack on Ugandan troops. The militants had planted an IED near Dino in Lower Shabelle. Unspecified casualties were reported.
On September 9, 2019, Shabaab claimed 4 attacks. The militant group claimed attack on Burundian army convoy near Balad town in Middle Shabelle region of Somalia. 5 casualties were reported. The militant group claimed another low-scale raid on Burundian military base in Baidoa. Baidoa is capital in the southwestern Bay region of Somalia.
On September 11, 2019, Al-Shabaab claimed three mortar shelling targeting Villa Somalia and Ethiopian Embassy in Mogadishu. Civilian casualties reported. The mortar shelling demonstrated Al-Shabaab capability to adapt and deploy new attack methods in a heavily fortified compounds and complex even on Somalia Presidential palace.
Sunday 22nd September 2019 at around 5:30 am, local time, Al-Shabaab combatants using Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) struck the gate of SNA Forward Operating Base (FOB) in El Salini village of Lower Shabell killing 23 government soldiers..
Claimed Notable Attacks in October.
Al-Shabaab claimed it attacked a Somali government military barracks in Afmadow, Lower Juba and inflicted unspecified casualties.
In Afgooye, Lower Shabelle Al-Shabaab said it assassinated a NISA officer.
Al-Shabaab claimed it assassinated a Somali special forces officer, “Musa (Muse) Abu Bakr Nurow,” and seized his pistol near Seybiyano, Mogadishu; Al-Shabab accused him of participating in U.S. Special Forces raids in Lower Shabelle.
In Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle Al-Shabaab claimed it attacked multiple Somali government military barracks.
Al-Shabaab claimed it assassinated a Puntland finance ministry official in Galkayo.
The terrorist group claimed to have killed two government forces in an ambush assault in Mori area of Afgooye city in southwest of the capital Mogadishu.
The group claimed another raid where it killed three members of Somali security and intelligence forces (NISA) and seized their pistols in a special operation carried out by their operatives in Waberi district of Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab also claimed responsibility of the assassination of a lieutenant of the Somalia government forces identified as Mohamed Osman in the district of Darkinli in the capital Mogadishu.
Observation.
The upsurge of these attacks and others which are under-reported is shocking with little analysis on what they mean for international efforts and what lessons they may provide. Al-Shabaab in the months of September and October has escalated attacks on military bases and convoys from across the regions of Somalia.
Though military troops including the U.S. continue to water down Shabaab attacks as low scale or as foiled most of the times, their frequency and persistence should not be overlooked.
U.S. and Italy deploy a limited number of forces to tackle perceived threats abroad. In an approach referred as remote warfare, the two have focused on supporting local forces (SNA) to do much of the frontline fighting, providing things such as training, equipment and – perhaps most devastatingly in Somalia – air support. This type of engagement for western forces is that it is seen as risk free as western forces do not fight on the frontlines. These attacks, however, challenge this narrative and demonstrate the dangers of their current approach.
Lessons Learned.
Activities undertaken in this way – with little scrutiny, faulty process, and negligible monitoring – are not just morally bad, but are bad strategy. Since the start of the ‘war on terror’, the wars countries like the US and Italy have engaged in have been as much about winning over populations than they have been about capturing and liberating territories. However, contemporary operations look unlikely to deliver victories in either of these objectives.
Emboldening local security forces, without the institutions required for a functioning democracy, is likely to end up alienating more of the Somalia population as they are trapped between militant groups and predatory state officials.
The same is true for U.S. air strikes and ground raids. In its most recent report on U.S. airstrikes in Somalia there have been allegations on civilians’ casualties which AFRICOM has pledged to investigate. This may be one reason why the US is not winning the hearts and minds of Somalia citizenry and despite an unprecedented number of US airstrikes, the US has failed to weaken the group.
Currently, the long-term impacts of western military operations are likely to worsen the very radicalization and violence that they claim to be trying to avoid. AFRICOM publicly commented on the Baledogle incident that it responded this attack with two airstrikes against the militant group. More of the same will not address these issues; instead, western allied forces should adopt a new, considered policy that prioritizes civilian protection.
