Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for June-July 2026

Islamic State affiliates remained operationally resilient across Somalia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during June and July 2026 despite sustained counterterrorism pressure. ISM retained the ability to conduct attacks, IED operations and civilian intimidation across Cabo Delgado. ISS remained constrained in Puntland but continued asymmetric attacks from the Cal Miskaad and Jalil Valley areas. ISCAP demonstrated the broadest geographic reach, sustaining frequent attacks across North Kivu, Ituri and Haut Uele, with increased civilian targeting and signs of operational dispersal. Across all three theatres, Islamic State elements relied increasingly on mobility, asymmetric tactics and exploitation of security gaps rather than sustained territorial control.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 29^th July– Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants clashed with Mozambican Army Forces in Netia, Quissanga District, Cabo Delgado Province; several casualties were reported.
• 24^Th July– ISM militants captured and beheaded a Mozambican “Spy” in Cogolo, Macomia District.
• 24^th July- ISM led and armed assault against Rwandan forces, leading in armed clashed that led to several dead and wounded in Cogolo area in Macomia District.
• 20^th July- Two unarmed Christians were captured and beheaded by ISM terrorists in Muaja area in Ancuabe district.
• 09^th July– ISM militants clashed with Mozambican Army in Quiterajo area if Macomia district.
• 09^th July- at least one Mozambican soldier was killed following clashed with ISM militants in Catupa area in Macomia district.
• 06^TH July- ISM terrorists clashed with Mozambican troops in Catupa area in Macomia district.
• 05^th July– ISM terrorists led an armed assault against the Mozambican troops near Catupa area in Macomia district were several soldiers were reportedly killed.
• 04^th July- ISM terrorists led an armed assault against the civilian populace in Criação, Muidumbe District.
• 04^th July- ISM terrorists led an armed assault against the Christians in Nantidola area in Mocimboa da Praia (MDP).
• 23^rd June- ISM terrorists led an armed assault against the civilian populace in Nanjololo neighborhood of Macomia.
• 23^rd June- ISM terrorists led an armed assault against the Mozambican troops in Nambao area of Macomia.
• 05^th June- ISM militants captured and executed a Mozambican Militiaman Near Nacole, Ancuabe District.
• 04^TH June- ISM Militants captured and beheaded a Christian in Mariri area in Ancuabe District.
• 04^th June- ISM terrorists detonated an IED targeting Rwandan Army Forces between Limala and Mbau in MDP district.
• 03^RD June- ISM terrorists clashed with Mozambican Naval forced near Quiterajo area in Macomia district.
• 03^rd June- ISM Militants captured and beheaded a Christian in Nanoni area in Ancuabe District.
• 01^st June- ISM terrorists detonated an IED targeting Rwandan Army Forces in Limala area in MDP district.
• 01^st June- ISM terrorists detonated an IED targeting Rwandan Army Forces in Cogolo area in Macomia district.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

• 29^th July- Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) militants led an armed assault on Christians in Monguiko, Ituri Province.
• 29^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese militia forces in Monguiko, Ituri Province.
• 26^th July- ISCAP terrorists orchestrated an armed assault on Congolese troops in Mungbere in Watsa District of Haut Uele Province.
• 25^th July- ISCAP terrorists conducted an armed assault on Christian population in Makumu area in Ituri.
• 24^th July- ISCAP terrorists kidnapped and beheaded at least 10 Christians in Lukaya along the RN44 in Mambasa, Ituri province.
• 22^nd July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians, killing 15 in Jabanda, Ituri Province.
• 22^nd July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians, killing 15 by beheading them in Makumu area in Ituri Province.
• 21^st July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese militia forces leading to the death and wounding for several of them in Mambao, Ituri Province.
• 20^th July- At least 10 Christians were killed after ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Soma Village in Ituri Province.
• 15^th July- ISCAP militants clashed with Congolese troops in Tibi Village located in Mambasa area in Ituri.
• 16^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Kalibo area in North Kivu Province.
• 16^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Mununzi locality in North Kivu Province.
• 16^th July- at least 12 people were killed following an ISCAP-led an armed assault on Christians in Mangina area in Noth Kivu Province.
• 14^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Mangina locality in North Kivu Province.
• 14^th July- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed 5 Christians in Beni, North-Kivu Province in a growing trend.
• 13^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack against Congolese troops near Beni in North Kivu Province.
• 14^th July- Suspected ISCAP militants assassinated 9 Christians, then ambushed government forces, killing 3 in Mulekera, Beni District.
• 13^th July- Suspected ISCAP rebels captured and executed 3 civilians in Mbutaba area in Beni, North-Kivu.
• 08^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack and clashed with Congolese troops near Makimbi area of Beni in North Kivu Province.
• 07^th July- ISCAP terrorists detonated an IED targeting Congolese Militia Forces near Tibi, Ituri Province.
• 06^th July- ISCAP terrorists detonated an IED targeting Congolese Militia Forces near Tibi, Ituri Province.
• 06^th July- ISCAP rebels clashed with Congolese troops in Mungbere area of Watsa District in Haut Uele Province.
• 02^nd July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack and clashed with Congolese troops in Betongwe area in Wamba District in Haut Uele Province.
• 01^st July- at least three Congolese soldiers were killed after ISCAP terrorists ambushed their positions in Mungbere, Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 06^th July- ISCAP terrorists detonated an IED targeting Congolese Militia Forces in Bangwe in Ituri Province.
• 04^th July- ISCAP terrorists detonated an IED targeting Congolese Militia Forces near Tibi, Ituri Province.
• 04^th July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack and clashed with Congolese militia forces near Tibi area in Ituri Province.
• 03^rd July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack and clashed with Congolese militia forces near Tibi area in Ituri Province in a second consecutive attack.
• 03^rd July- ISCAP militants led an armed attack and clashed with Congolese militia forces near Tibi area in Ituri Province.
• 29^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians between Bangwe and Tibi area in Ituri Province.
• 29^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Oulombou and Itimbo in Mambasa Ituri Province.
• 29^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Congolese troops between Bangwe and Tibi area in Ituri Province.
• 27^TH June- ISCAP terrorists slashed with Congolese militia forces in Bomozika area in Ituri.
• 25^th June- ISCAP terrorists militants led an armed assault on Christians on Kamango Road, North-Kivu.
• 23^rd June- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed 8 Christians in Mungbere, Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 21^st June- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed a Christian between Kamango and Beni areas in North-Kivu.
• 20^th June- ISCAP terrorists captured and beheaded a Christian in Mayangose area in Ituri.
• 16^th June- One soldiers was killed and several others injured after an ISCAP attack in Mungbere area in Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 12^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Kidi-Bwi locality in Beni in North-Kivu.
• 10^th June- ISCAP militants captured and executed one Christian trough a beheading in Vimba area in Beni North-Kivu Province.
• 09^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Congolese troops in Vimba area in Beni North-Kivu Province.
• 09^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Army Forces on the RN4 in Bahaha, Ituri Province.
• 21^st June- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed a Christian between Kamango and Beni areas in North-Kivu.
• 06^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Congolese Armed forces near Makwangi in Ituri province.
• 02^nd June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Sikwaila area in North-Kivu.
• 02^nd June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Sikwaila area in North-Kivu.
• 02^nd June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Mbau area in North-Kivu.
• 05^th June- ISCAP terrorists militants captured and executed 4 Christians Near Oicha, North-Kivu Province.
• 04^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Ndubala Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 03^rd June- ISCAP terrorists captured and beheaded 6 Christian in Mungbere area in Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 01^st June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Defuro area in Haut Uele Province.
• 01^st June- ISCAP militants clashed with Congolese in Mungbere area in Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.
• 01^st June- Suspected ISCAP militants assassinated a Congolese Colonel identified as Oliver Bangulu in Watsa District, Haut Uele Province.

SOMALIA

• 08^TH July– Suspected Islamic State Somalia (ISS/Abnaa ul-Calipha) conducted an armed assault targeting Puntland Forces located in Cal Miskaad Mountains in Puntland.
• 24^th July– ISS Militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) destroying several communication towers erected by Puntland Security Forces in Shibab Village in Jalil Valley.
• 18^th June– ISS detonated a roadside IED targeting Puntland Forces Patrol in Sheebaab village in Jalil Valley in Bari region.
• 03^rd June- ISS militants conducted two attacks (Double-Tap) IED and Ambush on Puntland Forces, in Jalil Valley, Bari Region.

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

MOZAMBIQUE

The security situation in Cabo Delgado during June and July 2026 indicates that Islamic State Mozambique retained a significant operational capability despite sustained pressure from Mozambican and Rwandan forces. ISM did not demonstrate an effort to hold major population centres or openly contest government control. Instead, the group continued operating through dispersed cells, temporary positions and movement corridors linking Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe and Ancuabe. Macomia, particularly Catupa, Quiterajo and Cogolo, remained a key operational area, with repeated engagements indicating that ISM continues to use the area as a defensive and logistical zone.

During the reporting period, ISM demonstrated an ability to operate across geographically separated areas while maintaining pressure on security forces. The repeated use of IEDs against Rwandan forces around Limala, Mbau and Cogolo, together with clashes involving Mozambican forces near Quiterajo and Catupa, indicates an adaptive approach focused on disrupting security operations without becoming fixed in direct engagements. IEDs and ambushes allow relatively small insurgent elements to delay, channel and impose costs on superior forces while preserving manpower and freedom of movement.

Activity in Ancuabe and other southern districts also demonstrates that military pressure in northern Cabo Delgado has not prevented ISM from conducting short-duration operations outside its principal areas of concentration. The group’s ability to move between northern and southern operating areas remains important because it provides access to remote communities, informal economic networks and potential sources of supplies and revenue. This mobility reduces the likelihood that pressure in one district will independently degrade the wider insurgent network.

July showed continued direct confrontation between ISM and state-aligned forces around Catupa, Quiterajo, Netia and Cogolo. The frequency of clashes suggests that security forces were placing greater pressure on ISM positions and movement routes. However, continued attacks following these engagements indicate that military pressure has not eliminated the group’s operational infrastructure. ISM’s ability to regenerate activity through smaller cells suggests a fragmented structure capable of absorbing tactical setbacks without losing overall operational continuity.

Civilian targeting remained a central component of ISM activity. The killing and beheading of Christians, execution of a suspected informant and attacks against local populations indicate an effort to intimidate communities, restrict cooperation with security forces and control information. Such selective violence also supports the group’s freedom of movement by discouraging communities from providing intelligence or logistical support to government forces.

The maritime dimension remains an important vulnerability. Activity around Mocimboa da Praia and the wider Cabo Delgado coastline provides ISM with alternative movement and logistical routes when pressure increases inland. This complicates government operations because security forces must simultaneously protect population centres, roads, military positions, maritime approaches and strategic infrastructure. Continued coastal activity therefore provides ISM with additional options for evading counterinsurgency pressure.

Overall, ISM remained under sustained pressure but was not operationally neutralized. The group increasingly appears to be relying on small-unit attacks, IEDs, ambushes, civilian intimidation and mobility rather than attempts to seize and hold territory. Rwandan military involvement has constrained ISM’s ability to openly control large areas, but the persistence of attacks demonstrates that the insurgent network retains sufficient manpower, logistical access and freedom of movement to remain viable.

The principal indicators for the coming period are ISM activity around Catupa and Quiterajo, movement between Macomia and southern Cabo Delgado, renewed activity around mining areas, IED attacks against Rwandan and Mozambican forces, maritime activity and increased civilian coercion. A sustained reduction in these indicators would suggest degradation of the insurgent network, while continued activity across multiple districts would indicate that ISM retains the capacity to absorb counterinsurgency pressure.

SOMALIA

The security situation in Somalia during June and July 2026 remained characterized by persistent militant activity, fragmented security structures and uneven counterterrorism pressure. For Islamic State Somalia, the operating environment in Puntland continued to reflect survival and adaptation rather than territorial expansion. ISS retained the ability to conduct coordinated attacks against Puntland forces despite sustained counterterrorism operations, particularly around Jalil Valley and the wider Cal Miskaad area.

The June attacks demonstrated a continued emphasis on asymmetric warfare. The double-tap IED and ambush on 03 June, followed by another roadside IED attack on 18 June, indicate that ISS continues to prioritize security patrols and movement routes rather than attempting to hold exposed positions. The repeated use of Jalil Valley also indicates that ISS retains familiarity with the terrain and established movement patterns, providing an advantage in selecting locations for attacks and withdrawal.

The July assault against Puntland forces in the Cal Miskaad Mountains and the destruction of communication towers in Shibab Village demonstrate an effort to disrupt the wider security architecture supporting Puntland operations. Targeting communications infrastructure can complicate command and control, delay reinforcement and reduce surveillance effectiveness in remote areas. This indicates that ISS is seeking to impose costs beyond direct attacks on personnel.

ISS nevertheless remains under considerable military pressure. Puntland operations have reduced its ability to operate openly across the Cal Miskaad mountain complex and forced surviving elements into smaller and more concealed formations. The current pattern is therefore more consistent with an effort to preserve an insurgent foothold than with a clear territorial resurgence. The principal risk is that reduced operational pressure could allow ISS to rebuild manpower, logistics and local support networks.

The wider Somali security environment remains complicated by the continued presence of Al-Shabaab and political tensions between the Federal Government and Puntland. Al-Shabaab continues to maintain substantial operational capacity across south-central Somalia, requiring security forces and international partners to divide resources between two jihadist threats. Political and security disagreements between Mogadishu and Puntland further complicate intelligence sharing, force coordination and the development of a unified counterterrorism approach.

Overall, ISS remained operationally constrained but capable of conducting sporadic asymmetric attacks. Its continued presence in Jalil Valley and Cal Miskaad demonstrates that the group retains sufficient organizational capacity to exploit difficult terrain and localized security gaps. The immediate threat is more likely to manifest through IED attacks, ambushes and attacks against infrastructure than sustained territorial offensives. However, the group’s survival under pressure remains strategically significant because prolonged security gaps could facilitate regeneration.

D.R. CONGO

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remained highly volatile during June and July 2026, with Islamic State Central Africa Province maintaining a significant and increasingly dispersed operational presence across North Kivu, Ituri and Haut Uele. ISCAP, locally associated with the Allied Democratic Forces, continued to rely on mobility, small-unit attacks, ambushes, executions, IEDs and raids rather than sustained territorial control. This operating model has allowed the group to maintain pressure despite FARDC and UPDF counterinsurgency operations.

During June, ISCAP activity remained concentrated around Beni, Mambasa and Mungbere, while attacks across Ituri reinforced the group’s ability to operate along the wider Beni-Mambasa axis. The repeated targeting of Christians indicates that civilian intimidation remains a central component of ISCAP’s strategy. Attacks against lightly protected communities can generate displacement, disrupt economic activity and undermine confidence in government protection while requiring fewer resources than sustained attacks against fortified military positions.

The emergence of Mungbere and surrounding areas of Watsa District as recurring areas of ISCAP activity is particularly significant. Activity in Haut Uele during both months demonstrates that the group has expanded beyond its traditional operating areas around Beni and southern Ituri. This suggests that counterinsurgency pressure may be displacing elements geographically rather than eliminating the threat. The creation of temporary operating corridors allows ISCAP to exploit gaps in security coverage while avoiding dependence on a single sanctuary.

July recorded a marked increase in the tempo and geographic breadth of ISCAP activity. Repeated attacks around Mambasa and Tibi occurred alongside violence in Beni and further activity in Haut Uele. The use of IEDs against militia forces near Tibi demonstrates continued access to relatively low-cost asymmetric tactics, while simultaneous direct assaults, ambushes and civilian attacks indicate tactical flexibility.

The increasing frequency of attacks against Christian communities also has a broader security effect. Beyond causing casualties, such attacks can generate fear, displacement and disruption of local livelihoods. The combination of killings, kidnappings and attacks against isolated settlements therefore places additional pressure on government forces by expanding the number of communities requiring protection across a large and difficult operating environment.

The wider conflict environment further benefits ISCAP by stretching FARDC and partner forces across multiple theatres. Continued military pressure and fighting involving AFC/M23 and associated forces in North and South Kivu require significant government resources, limiting the ability to maintain persistent security coverage across remote areas. ISCAP can exploit these gaps and move between operating areas when pressure increases.

The overall trend points toward an ISCAP threat that is becoming more geographically dispersed while retaining its core operational characteristics. The group does not require sustained territorial control to remain viable. Its ability to move between North Kivu, Ituri and Haut Uele, attack security forces and civilians, and establish temporary operating areas allows it to absorb military pressure while preserving its insurgent capability.

The principal security concern for the coming period is continued ISCAP activity in Haut Uele and potential movement toward Tshopo, alongside renewed violence around Beni and Mambasa. Key indicators include attacks outside established operating areas, movement along interprovincial corridors, increased IED use, attacks against isolated communities and evidence of improved coordination among dispersed cells. Unless cross-provincial intelligence sharing and sustained security coverage improve, ISCAP is likely to continue exploiting gaps created by the wider conflict environment. The dominant trend is therefore operational dispersal, persistent civilian targeting and continued pressure on overstretched state security forces.