A surprise memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has continued to aggravate tensions in the Horn of Africa, a region already in turmoil. Somaliland, a former British colony lying along the Gulf of Aden, proclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991. Its independence is not recognised by any country, but it has attracted significant foreign investment, partly because of its strategic Berbera port. On 1 January, Somaliland said it had agreed to lease land to Ethiopia to build a naval facility on its coast in return for the latter’s recognition of its statehood. The deal has angered Somalia, which considers Somaliland to be part of its territory and worries that regional giant Ethiopia will impinge upon its sovereignty. The resulting crisis could escalate, as Somalia is rallying international opposition to the deal, while Ethiopia and Somaliland appear determined to plough ahead. Observers, and indeed Somali officials, fear the dispute may play into the hands of Al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgency in Somalia, and further polarize the region.
Details and Ambiguities of the Deal
So far, the preliminary accord’s details are opaque, with Ethiopian and Somaliland officials offering different accounts of its contents. First, Ethiopian officials have suggested that the new facility will have both military and commercial purposes. Yet Somaliland insists that Ethiopia will build only a naval base, continuing to use the Berbera port for trade. The size of the area under discussion is also unclear. While the two sides originally announced that Ethiopia would lease 20km of coastline, a top Ethiopian official later said the deal covers 20 sq km of land and sea. Even the facility’s location is vague. Some claim that it will be situated at Lugaya, close to the Djiboutian border. Others say it will be close to Berbera. By some accounts, the deal provides for Hargeisa to obtain shares in Ethiopian state-owned enterprises such as Ethiopian Airlines. Though Ethiopia has not publicly committed to recognizing Somaliland as an independent state, many Somaliland officials, including President Muse Bihi, claim that it promised to do so under the accord. Given that Somaliland would be unlikely to move ahead with such an explosive initiative without extracting the prize of official recognition, it seems clear that the two signatories understand the memorandum as a port-for-recognition swap.
Significance for Ethiopia and Somaliland
Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy and Somaliland’s Bihi have presented the deal as a major win for their respective national goals: restoring sea access, on Ethiopia’s side, and gaining international recognition, on Somaliland’s. With some 120 million people, Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked nation, having lost its coastline when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Over the last two decades, successive administrations have stressed that the country is over-reliant on neighbouring Djibouti’s port, which handles the bulk of Ethiopian trade. But, before the January memorandum, the closest Ethiopia got to port ownership was a 2017 agreement with Somaliland under which Addis Ababa was to take a 19 per cent share in Berbera. The deal fell through, reportedly because Ethiopia failed to make timely payments. Abiy’s ascent as prime minister gave the aspiration to restore sea access a new push. He and his close-knit team of advisers have long signaled that he views sea access as part of the legacy he wants to leave the country. The prime minister has also made clear that he envisions Ethiopia as a future naval power.
Reactions and Dangers of Further Escalation
The announcement infuriated Somalia, which recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia and immediately declared blocking the accord a national priority. On 6 January, President Mohamud signed a parliamentary bill declaring the deal “null and void”, though this step was mostly rhetorical. Opposition to the deal spread quickly among the public as well, and government officials participated in a protest march in the Somali capital on 11 January. Mogadishu’s most hostile move so far came six days later, when it denied air traffic clearance to an Ethiopian Airlines flight carrying a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Hargeisa for discussions about the memorandum. Somalia is angry about more than the idea that Ethiopia might recognize Somaliland’s independence. It accuses Addis Ababa of meddling in its internal affairs, initiating discussions about an affair of state with Hargeisa without even notifying Mogadishu in advance. Despite the torrent of condemnatory statements, the Somali government has thus far acted cautiously vis-à-vis Ethiopia. It has refrained from cutting political or economic ties with Addis or from undertaking military preparations. Its approach probably reflects the asymmetry in its overall relations with Ethiopia, which has sent thousands of troops to fight Al-Shabaab, both as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and as a separate contingent.
The recent tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, exacerbated by Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland, have prompted Ethiopia to seek alternative port options. With Somalia maintaining a hardline stance and refusing direct talks until Ethiopia rescinds the controversial agreement, Ethiopia has turned to Kenya’s Lamu port. The port, initially designed to serve landlocked countries like Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, has faced delays in completion, but Kenya is now eager to expedite its construction and related infrastructure projects to facilitate smoother trade flows. Kenya and Ethiopia have agreed to enhance security, review tariffs, and accelerate infrastructure development to accommodate Ethiopian cargo. The move comes as Ethiopia faces international condemnation for its plans to establish a port and military training facility in Somalia, a move strongly opposed by the Somali government.
Efforts to mediate the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia by Kenya and Djibouti have so far been unsuccessful, with Somalia insisting on the withdrawal of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland before engaging in direct talks. Ethiopia, on the other hand, has expressed its commitment to the agreement, which would see it gain access to a port and naval base in Somaliland in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Despite the impasse, Kenya’s back-channel diplomacy, supported by President William Ruto, continues, indicating a willingness to mediate and find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As tensions persist in the region, the involvement of regional actors like Kenya and Djibouti will be crucial in de-escalating the situation and fostering dialogue between the parties involved.
Conclusion
The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland could spell further friction in an already troubled Horn of Africa. Even if the deal collapses, the question of sea access for Ethiopia will remain a divisive issue that is likely to resurface soon. Abiy is bent on restoring it, and he has a penchant for unilateral action. Another major concern is that the feud could become the latest front for proxy shadowboxing in the Horn of Africa, echoing previous bouts of competition among Gulf powers in the region. The deal could drive a wedge between two emerging blocs – on one hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies, including Eritrea and Djibouti, all of which are situated on the Red Sea; and the UAE, Ethiopia and their allies, on the other.
Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia should strive to de-escalate tensions. Despite aggressive rhetoric, all three parties have so far avoided rash decisions. They should continue to show restraint. All the external actors trying to mediate, including IGAD and the AU, should make sure to coordinate efforts so that they do not work at cross-purposes. For Addis Ababa, the moment is likewise opportune: its economy is in deep distress and relations with many neighbours are deteriorating. Pushing ahead with the deal amid such stiff regional opposition would carry major risks. Outside actors should encourage the parties to engage in such discussions rather than use the dispute to further their own interests.
