Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of August 7th – August 14th, 2021: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa Region

Executive Summary

Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), popularly known as Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate is a dangerous enemy that presents a threat to Somalia and broader East Africa countries, especially Kenya.  The jihadist group continue to pose threat with persistent operations on Somali citizens, military forces, and its coalitions partners. The Islamist group continue to target security troop’s convoys as well as their military bases (FOBs).

Al-Shabaab has been keen on political scenarios unfolding in Somalia and its operations greatly pose threat to the much-delayed elections in the Horn of Africa nation. Notably, the Islamist militant group through its pro-media channels has claimed at least 15 operations all recorded in Somalia.

There is a steady pattern witnessed in Al-Shabaab’s operations. The first seven days of August, at least 17 attacks were recorded, all from across the regions of Somalia while the past one week, 15 attacks were recorded. In a number of these attacks, Al-Shabaab has notably targeted AMISOM troops in Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba and also in Bay and Bakool regions. Most of the raids against the targets are notably ambushes and setting up of roadside IEDs with a number of repeat attacks being recorded.

Al-Shabaab still retains control over large areas of rural Somalia and continues to mount attacks in urban centers. Most of these have occurred in Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region close to the capital.

No major incident has also been reported in Kenya’s frontier counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) that are key targets of the Al-Shabaab operations. Nevertheless, Despite the lull witnessed in northeastern prefectures in the past couple of weeks, Kenyan counterterrorism assets also to urged upscale their CT-operations, especially along the border with Somalia to thwart possible surprise raids besides preempting occasional threats posed by Al-Shabaab on Kenyan soil.

It is primary goals that security and intelligence operators in the region to capitalize heavily on countering the return of violent extremism and terrorism to ensure the militant groups do not outbid them besides extending foothold in other areas. Besides, Somali security forces continue to rely on international support for operations, and Al-Shabaab is not degraded to the point where Somali security forces can contain its threat independently. Air support is much need to support of ground partner forces effort to disrupt Al-Shabaab movements, operations and networks.

AS Claimed Attacks (August 7^th – August 14^th)

• On August 7^th, The Al-Qaeda associated Al-Shabaab claimed a heavy attack on a military base of the ‘South West’ administration on the outskirts of Dinsor district, southwestern Bay region of Somalia.
• On August 7^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attack on Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) in Yoontooy, north of Kismayo. No details on casualties were provided.
• On August 8^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked AMISOM troops in general area of Taabdo, Lower Juba region of Somalia. No details on casualties were provided.
• On August 8^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked AMISOM-Ugandan contingent in general area of Shalaambood village, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks on foreign forces via Islamic Radio Andalus. No details on casualties were reported.
• On August 9^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked AMISOM troops in Lower Juba region of Somalia. Initial reports indicate that AMISOM truck was targeted with a roadside IED in the general vicinity of Ras Kamboni, a few kilometers to the Kenyan border.
• On August 10^th, Fierce fighting reported near Danow area of Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region after Al-Shabaab fighters ambush on AMISOM forces. Militants claim to have killed several soldiers from Uganda besides destroying a military vehicle.
• On August 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed an IED explosion operation on the outskirts of Bossaso that killed a Puntland government soldier and wounded several others.
• On August 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed several soldiers of Jubaland administration. Initial reports referenced from credible open sources indicate that Al-Shabaab IED explosions targeted convoy of vehicles carrying Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) in Berhani area on the outskirts of Kismayo. Two vehicles were destroyed in the blast.
• On August 12^th, Al-Shabaab carry out targeted killings in Mogadishu and its neighborhood. The armed militants attacked a police station in the neighborhood of Hodan district Saybiyaano and injured at least three officers.
• On August 12^th, Al-Shabaab carried out another attack at a checkpoint in the Arafat neighborhood of Yaqshid district injured police officers manning the security checkpoint.
• On August 12^th, Al-Shabaab in a targeted operation killed a government intelligence officer in the capital Mogadishu, identified as Max’med Shuute.
• On August 13^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for ambush raid on military base operated by Galmudug administration forces. Initial reports indicate that heavily armed Al-Shabaab fighters operating from the province of Galgadud launched a major attack on a Galmudug military base in Adakibir, about 55km from Adado town. Al-Shabaab claimed to have briefly taken control of the base, seized weapons as the soldiers fled.
• On August 14^th, Al-Shabaab claimed on military bases operated by South West administration in Makundo area in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed to have raided military bases in Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia with artillery shells. One soldier killed and two others wounded.
• On August 14^th, Explosion injures senior officials in Jowhar town. A powerful explosion reported in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region of Somalia targeting soldiers and officials of Hirshabelle administration. Initial reports indicate that the explosion wounded at least four soldiers.
• On August 14^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed a senior mine clearing officer, in outskirts of Ba’adweyne area, Mudug region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab attack also saw a US-trained soldier killed in general Qeycad area.

Assessment/Observations &Insight

Steady and persistent Al-Shabaab operations pose threat to Somalia’s elections. There are reports that though the militant’s operations are notably low-scale, they could derail the much-delayed elections.

There has been political impasse in Somalia and Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab insurgents have greatly exploited a security vacuum, whereby, the militants were able to split even state forces split along clan lines and turn on each other. Now Al-Shabaab leader in a latest audio was heard issuing threats to those planning to take part in the elections.

The trend and intent to strike on military and government besides its allies remains unchanged. The threat levels remain skewed towards Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) for both local and foreign troops. A number of operations have been recorded on FOBs and military convoys in the period under review. Preferred attack types remain the use of IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs. Ambush raids are also gaining traction on the military targets.

Its paramount that joint Counterterrorism (CT/COIN) not to relent on war against the Islamist Al-Shabaab group which US State Department recently designated its two senior leaders. Relevant actors to upscale operations in an effort to disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to Al-Shabaab and also pro-ISIS-Somalia operating in northern Somalia and neighboring countries. But despite many years of sustained Somali, U.S., and international counterterrorism pressure, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and intent to attack outside of the country from low to large-scale operations.

Conclusion

Lack of socioeconomic opportunities and poor governance could contribute to increased violent extremist activity in East Africa and more so in Somalia. The lack of socioeconomic opportunities stems from low or unequal growth, high poverty and unemployment, and limited economic development leaving vulnerable youths being recruited into the militant camps with promise of making livelihood as they fight for a cause. These conditions are common place and are present in several East African states and may be aggravated by the effects of the ruthless COVID-19 pandemic on struggling African economies.

Counterterrorism actors in East Africa region to come up with counter measures to slow down the persistent Al-Shabaab menace especially in Somalia and sporadically spilling into neighboring Kenya.  Following the US withdrawing its troops in Somalia, the country’s most advanced, best trained forces, the Danab forces, continue to struggle, even suffering heavy combat losses and attrition, an indication the country’s security is still weak and without support from its partners remains unable to fight and degrade Al-Shabaab. US has conducted at least three air campaigns against the Islamist militants in the past couple of days signaling that US still is supporting Somalia on war against Al-Shabaab.

Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outpost for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine on patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also encouraged to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Shabaab.

An after-action review (AAR) on suspected Al-Shabaab camps in sub sectors of south and central Somalia also highly recommended. Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to track and monitor the Islamist militant’s activity in the East Africa regions and warns of consistent militant’s increased activity.  The militant’s intentions to strike on hard targets (security forces) in Somalia and in Kenya remains the militant’s ultimate goal. Joint CT and COIN actors should not relent on mounting concerted military pressuring on the Islamists groups in an effort to guard counter-terrorism gains so far made in the region.