Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of August 14th – August 21st, 2021: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa Region

Executive Summary

Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), popularly known as Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda official branch operating in East Africa and with it home-base in Somalia continue to present threat to the Horn of Africa nation and broader East Africa countries especially, Kenya citing its geographical position/proximity that its neighboring Somalia.

The jihadist group that is headquartered in Jilib, in the southern Middle Juba of Somalia continue to pose threat with persistent operations on Somali citizens, military forces, and its coalitions partners. The Islamist group continue to target security troop’s convoys as well as their military bases (FOBs).

Notably, the militant group through its pro-media channels has claimed at least 15 operations all recorded in Somalia. Attack patterns in Somalia remains almost the same. Most the attacks are repeat attacks especially the ones targeted at Forward Operating Bases.

Al-Shabaab has notably targeted AMISOM troops in Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba and also in Bay and Bakool regions. Mudug region has become the epicenter of attacks in the month of August. Ba’adweyne in Mudug region has record several repeat attacks in the past three weeks of August. Mogadishu also remain among the top target spots for the Al-Shabaab operations, recording quite a number of attacks per week.

 Most of the raids against the targets are notably ambushes and setting up of roadside IEDs with a number of repeat attacks being recorded. Assassination attempts on key officials also witnessed in Mogadishu and its environs.

Al-Shabaab militants still retains control over large areas of rural Somalia and persistently mount attacks in urban centers a confirmation of the group’s resilient despite counter-operations on the group by coalition security operators.

Kenya’s frontier counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) that are key targets of the Al-Shabaab operations have witnessed calmness. No major incident making into the headlines have been reported so far. Nevertheless, Despite the lull witnessed in northeastern prefectures in the past couple of weeks, Kenyan counterterrorism assets also to urged upscale their CT-operations, (patrols, surveillance and scouting of security defense posts as well on critical infrastructures) especially along the border with Somalia to thwart possible surprise raids besides preempting occasional threats posed by Al-Shabaab on Kenyan soil.

AS Claimed Attacks (August 14^th – August 21^st)

• On August 14^th, Al-Shabaab attempted probe on AMISOM military base operated by Ethiopian troops in Hudur, Bakool region of Somalia was successfully thwarted. However, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack saying a number of soldiers were injured.
• On August 15^th, Al-Shabaab Somali army troops in the capital, Mogadishu. At least three people were killed and others injured in the gun fight including Ismail Buur, the deputy police chief of Suuqa Hoolaha.
• On August 15^th, a powerful explosion in Middle Shabelle region targeting soldiers and officials from the Hirshabelle administration reported. Corresponding open sources reports indicate that the IED explosion claimed by Al-Shabaab injured a senior security official of Jowhar and his bodyguards.
• On August 16^th, Heavy attacks targeting on foreign military bases and allied forces reported in Southern Somalia. Initial reports from Baidoa indicate that artillery shells claimed by Al-Shabaab were fired at the military base near Baidoa airport. No details on casualties were provided.
• On August 17^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have overrun a military base operated by Galmudug forces. Corresponding open sources reports indicate that the fighting that lasted for several hours took place in Qeycad area under Ba’adweyne district, Mudug region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab propaganda media affiliated channels claimed to have killed several soldiers besides capturing three vehicles.
• On August 17^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacks for Landmine explosion that Mohamed Abukar Afrah (Bidaar), the Garasbaaleey district commissioner, and two of his bodyguards were killed in a landmine explosion. Two other people were injured in the blast. Afrah was appointed 3 months ago after his predecessor was killed in an explosion, claimed by Al-Shabaab.
• On August 19^th, A heavy explosion claimed by Al-Shabaab reported in the capital Mogadishu. An Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated explosives near a popular restaurant frequented by security operators in Habar Khadijo, Mogadishu. Casualties reported.
• On August 19^th, Sheikh Abubakar and Hussein Bereey, the top officials of Huriwa district administration, narrowly escaped assassination attempts claimed Al-Shabaab. One bodyguard was killed and two others wounded.
• On August 19^th, A Somali police officer was killed by Al-Shabaab suspected assassins in Mogadishu’s Kaaran vicinity.
• On August 20^th, Al-Shabaab clash with troops of South West administration in the vicinity of Gofgadud Burey, a town on the outskirts of the city of Baidoa, Bay region. The troops were trying to stop illegal collection of Zakat in the area by the Islamist militants. Casualties reported from both sides.
• On August 20^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a car bomb explosion that happened in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, killing at least two people and wounding several others.
• On August 20^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack that targeted Somali army base in Sabid area of Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab propaganda Radio Andalus reported that Al-Shabaab fighters attacked two government operated bases near the bridge in Sabid.
• On August 21^st, Al-Shabaab fighters launched a major attack on an AMISOM military base operated by Ethiopian troops (ENDF) in Wajid district, Bakool region of Somalia.
• On August 21^st, Al-Shabaab claim a low-scale attack that targeted AMISOM troops on patrol in general area of Ras Kamboni, Lower Juba region of Somalia. No casualties were reported.

Assessment/Observations & Insight

Notably, an average of at least one or two attacks are recorded from across the regions of Somalia. Regions mostly targeted include the capital and the ones in central and southern Somalia where the militant group maintains quite some control. Though the militant’s operations are notably low-scale, they pose threat to already counterterrorism gains made in the war-torn country.

The trend and intent to strike on military and government besides its allies remains unchanged. The threat levels remain skewed towards Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) for both local and foreign troops. A number of operations have been recorded on FOBs and military convoys in the period under review. Preferred attack types remain the use of IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs. Ambush raids are also gaining traction on the military targets.

Its paramount that joint Counterterrorism (CT/COIN) not to relent on war against the Islamist Al-Shabaab group which US State Department recently designated its two senior leaders. Relevant actors to upscale operations in an effort to disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to Al-Shabaab and also pro-ISIS-Somalia operating in northern Somalia and neighboring countries. But despite many years of sustained Somali, U.S., and international counterterrorism pressure, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and intent to attack outside of the country from low to large-scale operations.

Its notable of how Al-Shabaab propaganda media celebrated the takeover of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital by the extremist Taliban. Al-Shabaab has lauded the takeover raising the questions whether there is any working relation, or what the takeover of Kabul means to the future of jihad in East Africa region.

Al-Shabaab is the Al-Qaeda most active branch in Africa. There are other affiliates including Al-Qaeda branch in the Maghreb (AQIM) and AQAP operating in Yemen. Its notable, usually Al-Shabaab celebrates operations of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates. The celebrations of Taliban taking over Kabul is no exception citing, for many years Taliban has been collaborating with Al-Qaeda covertly. There are many Al-Qaeda fighters embedded within Taliban, besides, between 1996 and 2001 saw the Islamist group form ties with Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, providing their fellow fundamentalists with safe-haven base from which they could orchestrate the devastating attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, which killed 2,996 people and left 25,000 injured.

The two terrorist groups remain interlinked, with Al-Qaeda’s current leadership continuing to consider Afghanistan the “seat of the anticipated caliphate” and the Afghan Taliban chief its “caliph-in-waiting,”. Al-Qaeda has quite a number of training bases in Afghanistan and this can only mean while the two-jihadist organization have different ambitions, they maintain a close working relation.

The Kabul takeover could impact the future of jihad in East Africa region and beyond. The somali-based militant group affiliated to Al-Qaeda might want to prove themselves by intensifying operations in an effort of taking over towns and localities emulating and inspired by Taliban. Furthermore the two jihadist groups; Al-Shabaab and Taliban generally share a desire to apply Islamic law (Sharia).

Conclusion

An after-action review (AAR) on suspected Al-Shabaab camps in sub sectors of south and central Somalia also highly recommended. Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to track and monitor the Islamist militant’s activity in the East Africa regions and warns of consistent militant’s increased activity.

Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outpost for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine on patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also encouraged to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Shabaab.

The militant’s intentions to strike on hard targets (security forces) in Somalia and in Kenya remains the militant’s ultimate and desired goal. Joint CT and COIN operators should not relent on mounting concerted military pressuring on the Islamists groups in an effort to guard counter-terrorism gains so far made in the region.