Executive Summary
Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), popularly known as Al-Shabaab is a dangerous enemy that presents a threat to Somalia and broader East Africa countries, especially Kenya and Ethiopia. The Al-Qaeda affiliate continue to routinely wage attacks on Somali citizens, military forces, and its coalitions partners. The Islamist group continue to target security troop’s convoys as well as their military operating bases.
On operational capability of the Somalia National Army, the forces have not met many of the milestones related to operational capability. The Somalia Transition Plan envisioned that by the end of 2020, the Somali security forces would play a leading operational role, continue to degrade Al-Shabaab, build and hold positions along (major supply routes) and continue to strengthen population centers. Besides, Somali security forces continue to rely on international support for operations, and Al-Shabaab is not degraded to the point where Somali security forces can contain its threat independently.
In the past 30 days, the Islamists militant group has claimed at least 72 attacks in East Africa region (Kenya and Somalia). In the first week of January 2021, at least 10 attacks were recorded, second week at least 19 attacks, third week recorded at least 20 attacks, while fourth week at least 23 attacks were recorded against civilians and military targets.
Resumption of large-scale attacks in theater have been noted. Car bombs, landmines and other roadside IEDs have increased from across the regions of Somalia. Ambush raids on military convoys and military bases in central and southern Somalia becoming frequent and are reinforced with indiscriminate close quarter combat to maximize on casualties.
Al-Shabaab, an associated force of Al-Qaeda terrorist network has continued to launch attacks with at least two to three attacks being recorded every day especially in the Horn of Africa nation, Somalia. Sporadic attacks have also been reported in Kenya’s frontier counties especially in Mandera County NEP. Al-Shabaab have overly employed insurgent-style tactics, including ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, and improvised explosive device (IED) operations mostly linked with local cells in northeastern counties of Kenya.
This years, Al-Shabaab poses to bring significant challenges to Somalia. Threat levels in Somalia expected to multiply significantly citing the country’s elections are scheduled for February 2021. The militant group most likely in these the subsequent months towards the election day will exploit every opportunity they may get to wage more attacks, further destabilizing Mogadishu administration, besides other semi-autonomous states.
Also, notable, is the recent release of a 55-minute video by the Islamist Al-Shabaab documenting the events of January 5th, 2020 Manda Bay attack on US base in Lamu, Kenya. The militant’s media (Al-Kataib) documented how the Manda Bay attack was planned and orchestrated with the fighters receiving instructions from the group’s leader Ahmed Umar, also known as Abu Ubaidah. Counterterrorism actors in the region need to be on high alert citing the release of the video which is seen in counterterrorism lens as instilling morale on other group’s foot soldiers to emulate those fighters who took part on the U.S. Manda Bay raid. Last year Al-Shabaab fighters also released a 7-minute-long video of the attacker of DusitD2 complex in Nairobi in which left more than 20 people dead.
The Gedo crisis factor, also expected to play out a very critical role on the war against Al-Shabaab citing Kenya and Ethiopia are key contributors of troops within AMISOM supporting the Federal Government Forces. There seem to be rivalry brewing and engineered within Somali security forces fronting Kenya and an enemy. This move if not properly addressed will break operational cohesion and opening space for Al-Shabaab to thrive.
Kenyan counterterrorism assets also to upscale their operations, especially along the border with Somalia to thwart surprise raids besides preempting occasional threats posed by Al-Shabaab on Kenyan soil. Also, security actors to be keen possible recruitment grounds, especially in upper and lower prefectres of NEP Kenya as well as in the coastal counties (Lamu and Kwale) where youths continue to be sneaked into Somalia.
Assessment/Observations & Insights
The joint Counterterrorism (CT/COIN) actors seeks to disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to Al-Shabaab and pro-ISIS-Somalia operating in northern Somalia and neighboring countries. But despite many years of sustained Somali, U.S., and international counterterrorism pressure, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and intent to attack outside of the country.
From August, September, October November through December last year, Al-Shabaab launched dozens of major attacks on both local and foreign troops in Somalia. Significant uptick in Al-Shabaab’s use of vehicle-borne IEDs and ambush raids against U.S., Somali, and AMISOM forces. In August, Al-Shabaab had vowed to concentrate their military operations on all military targets. However, Al-Shabaab continuously use its propaganda media outlets more frequently to claim and broadcast exaggerations of its attacks.
However, while Al-Shabaab controls less territory than it did a decade ago, the group continues to operate with relative impunity, particularly in areas that lack adequate government administration or security presence. Southern Somalia which covers Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba and Middle Juba have witnessed increased militant activity. The militants through their pro-media wing have claimed at least dozens of attacks in these localities and towns of southern Somalia. However, assessment reports by security experts at Strategic Intelligence (S.I) have shown Al-Shabab’s territorial control remains fluid.
In Somalia, the home base of Al-Shabaab, security situation is worsening. The country has been in the past few months been engaged in geopolitical tiff with her neighbor, Kenya. Mogadishu has been on the onslaught blaming Nairobi of meddling with its internal affairs more so on the upcoming national election slated for February 2021. Nairobi has however distanced itself from those allegations terming them as baseless and untrue. In the month under review, once again Mogadishu accused Nairobi of supporting Jubaland forces in Gedo region whereby Somali National Army troops have been deployed. The troops clashed in Beled Hawo prefectures close to the Kenyan border.
Citing the above crisis engineered by Farmajo’s administration and aided by the Chief of Somalia National Army, we can only forecast a surge in attacks in Somalia’s southern regions in reference the political void being created and unto which Al-Shabaab will be keen to take advantage to wage more attacks. The dispute with Jubaland is the latest flashpoint in the struggle between Mogadishu and the federal states.
Kenya is another key target of the Islamist militant group. Mandera in the first month of 2021 has been singled out as the most targeted country of Kenya’s northeastern prefectures. A number of attacks have been recorded in localities of Mandera where Al-Shabaab have vandalized telecommunication masts. The militants in northeastern prefectures have especially targeted non-locals, public service vehicles, military and police outposts besides vandalizing critical infrastructures such as communication masts in an effort to cut-off communication besides economic sabotage purpose.
Lack of socioeconomic opportunities and poor governance continue to greatly contribute to increased violent extremist activity in East Africa and especially in Somalia where political dynamics are based on clannism and on which Al-Shabaab always is positioned to manipulate to its advantage.
The lack of socioeconomic opportunities stems from low or unequal growth, high poverty and unemployment, and limited economic development leaving vulnerable youths being recruited into the militant camps. These conditions are common place and are present in several East African states and may be aggravated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on struggling African economies.
Conclusion
There is a possibility that Al-Shabaab could expand its attacks and terrorist operations in Somalia and escalate terrorist attacks against AMISOM troops with the aim of accelerating their withdrawal from Somalia and subsequently increase its area of control. So far, the United States has already withdrawal its troops from Somalia maintaining only a limited presence in the war-torn nation.
The effects of U.S. withdrawal of its troops are yet to be felt in the coming days and months citing, they were actively involved in supporting the weak Federal Government forces as well as training their Special Forces Unit (Danab). Counterterrorism actors in Somalia to come up with counter measures to slow down the persistent and steadily Al-Shabaab menace. Even the country’s most advanced, best trained forces, the Danab forces, are struggling, due to heavy combat losses and attrition, an indication the country’s security is still weak and without support from its partners remains unable to fight and degrade Al-Shabaab.
Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outposts for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine on patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also encouraged to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Shabaab.
The risks associated with failure to resolve the standoff over Gedo, or ignoring it and allowing it to fester, are considerable. Already the dispute over the Jubaland election has dragged on for nearly a year. Tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland as well as several other regions are jeopardising the country’s planned elections and distracting from efforts to fight Al-Shabaab.
