Executive Summary
Al-Shabaab, the Somali-based Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa, has ramped up attacks as global attention focuses on defeating the deadly coronavirus (COVID-19). In Somalia, the militant group continue to exploit the current political stalemate to wage more attacks from across the regions of the war-torn nation. Al-Shabaab’s sustained attacks in Somalia underline the threat the militant group continues to pose in the county and beyond.
East Africa slowly is destabilizing on several fronts, placing key countries at great risk. Somalia is a chronically semi-failed nation whose own Salafi-jihadi insurgency embedded within local conflicts has spilled into Kenya and now poses a growing threat to Ethiopia, which recently descended into internal conflict.
The militant group primary targets include military convoys, operating bases, government facilities and key officials. However, the militant group’s prolonged insurgency has left thousands of civilians in misery in Somalia, a country which has been without a stable government since 1991.
In the month of February, 2021, series of attacks have also been reported in southern and central regions of Somalia; especially in Lower Jubba, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Mudug and Bakool parts of the country. Increased militants’ activity has been reported in the country’s capital Mogadishu.
The militant group has also waged a few attacks in Kenya. Northeastern prefecture counties of Kenya bordering Somalia also continue to suffer sporadic low-scale attacks from the Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab cells. The militant group in the month under review has conducted attacks in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir counties of Kenya. The targets have been critical infrastructures such as communication masts and security patrol units, especially Kenya Police Reservists. Al-Shabaab attacks targeting security forces, civilians mostly non-locals, public service vehicles, and government installations in northeastern Kenya have continued to unfold. Counterterrorism operations in the regions however have stemmed down the militant’s frequent activities as compared to some years back.
In the past 28 days of February, the Islamists militant group has claimed at least 52 attacks in East Africa region (Kenya and Somalia). In the first week of February 2021, at least 9 attacks were recorded, second week at least 16 attacks, third week recorded at least 12 attacks, while fourth week at least 15 attacks were recorded against civilians and military targets. February attacks declined citing in January, 72 attacks were recorded.
Assessment/Observations & Insights
In the Horn of Africa nation, most of the attacks, the militants have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted on roads to strike the military and police convoys on patrol. The consequence over the years has been deadly with dozens of soldiers and police officers losing their lives. Civilians have also borne the brunt of terrorist attacks.
Ambush raids as well as targeted attacks have also gained traction in Somalia. Target of key military officials and key government officials have been recorded in the month under review. The Islamist militant in daring attacks also raided Dhusamareb, Galgadud region of Somalia targeting top Somalia leaders who had a meeting to resolve political dreadlock following delayed elections in the country. Among those in attending including president Farmajo, Prime minister and leaders of the region states.
In the mapped areas, more of repeat attacks have been observed. In the capital Mogadishu, attacks targeting hotels and restaurants frequented by security forces and government officials are always on Al-Shabaab radar. Security checkpoints are also other key targets of Al-Shabaab.
Ambush raids on military convoys and forward operating bases in southern and central regions of Somalia continue to be reported. The mentioned regions comprise about a fifth of the total Al-Shabaab operational areas and thus they experience repeat attacks.
Change of routine by military convoys on major routes advised to deviate from targeted IEDs, RCIEDs and landmines attacks. Although Al-Shabaab is thought to be in disarray due to the onslaught by AMISOM troops and other forces, persistent, repeat attacks indicate that the militant group can still coordinate attacks and produce reliable intelligence on military movements especially in Somalia.
Since 2011, when the Kenyan Defense Forces entered Somalia—the base of the Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa, small-scale terror assaults have been recorded especially in the frontier regions bordering Somalia. Intelligence actors in Kenya have warned of budding local cells embedded in these areas. They are the ones which are being activated to lead attacks in the respective areas since they are aware of the regions/areas’ geography and terrain. They are conversant on main roads used by security units and also by public service vehicles, thus they better placed to stage the witnessed ambush at specific, identified points.
Increased surveillance and local collaboration to pick the enemy signatures encouraged in Kenya’s lower and upper northeastern prefectures. Locals encouraged to volunteer furnishing security assets with any intelligence that subsequently may help thwart besides preempt terrorist threat. The sporadic, though low-scale attacks are lending credence to suspicions that the militant group has existing cells in the NEP region which it is using to radicalize and recruit Kenyan youths. Isiolo is also another region in northern Kenya that intelligence assets have warned of a terror hotspot. Recruitment, radicalization and financing of terror activities are notably increasing in Isiolo.
Counterterrorism actors in East Africa need strategies viable to stem down group’s recruitment in their respective country’s besides narrowing down group’s ways of raising revenues. The group raises revenue through local taxation, extortion and delivery of basic services to boost its war chest. Increased recruitment and revenue are critical for the group, which needs to maintain funds and fighters for regional expansion. Unless both local and international security agencies tackle the two, Al-Shabaab will continue to wreak havoc while benefiting from its operations in the region.
Use of air support in this war is of essence. However, Al-Shabaab keeps on changing its military strategies. With the increasing number of airstrikes previously, Al-Shabaab has responded by avoiding gathering its fighters in large groups. Its fighters have also been moving in small units of three or four people to avoid detection. Gathering in large numbers has been forbidden by Al-Shabaab leadership, unless the group is preparing to launch a major attack.
The United States has welcomed the sanctioning of Al-Shabaab leaders by the UN Security Council. The three are deputy leader Abukar Ali Aden, commander of Jaysh Ayman Moalim Ayman and Mahad Karate, ex-deputy leader and a powerful figure in the terrorist group. They are responsible for numerous acts of terrorism in Somalia and Kenya.
Conclusion
The Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab has continued its pattern of violence, however, attacking government installations and buildings in the smaller towns and other areas. The group has assassinated senior government officials and politicians, and kidnapped foreigners, including aid workers. It has employed the use of roadside IEDs, VBIEDs, and suicide bombers to disrupt life in the town and southern Somalia.
Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outposts for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine on patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also encouraged to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab militant group undoubtedly continues to pose a threat to security and stability in the Horn of Africa. Regional and international efforts to combat terrorism need to be stepped up, and the mandate of the African Union Mission to Somalia requires continued support, especially as the Somali army has proved its inability to combat Al-Shabaab without regional and international military support.
The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern and central Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and continued intent to attack outside of the country. The military campaign, however, has not succeeded in completely defeating and dismantling the terror group. Neither has it significantly diminished its ability to strike, thus concerted joint counterterrorism (CT AND COIN) efforts need to be upscaled.
