ISCAP-Mozambique Imitating Al Shabaab Tactics As Group Expands, Morphs Into A Lethal Terrorist Organization

Islamic State Central Africa Province’s (ISCAP) militants active in the restive Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique are gradually showing a spike in activity, attacks and reach in the region. The insurgents have made strides towards taking control of the resource-rich region by partially veering away from their recognized mode of operation.

ISCAP which has preferred the use of crude and guerrilla methods to orchestrate their attacks are gradually changing tactics to survive and expand their territory. Like other terror organizations in Africa, the insurgents are adopting techniques and strategies used by groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia. While the tactics are still crude, they appear to have launched the herein mention groups to the status they currently hold as well as aid in the expansion of territory and control.

Notable Strategy Changes By ISCAP In Mozambique Include:

1. Temporary occupancy of areas, villages and towns they attack. During such spells the group has minimized attacks on civilians and instead only attacks government and military infrastructure and businesses that help and transact directly with the Mozambican government.
2. Taking control of strategic transport routes in and out of Cabo Delgado that are used to transport both legal and illegal commodities.
3. Expanding their territory geographically by capturing at least nine out the sixteen districts in the region as opposed to the previous capture of small villages.
4. Working with civilians especially during temporary occupation. This includes helping out residents of the areas and preaching to seek legitimacy and favour with the locals.
5. Distributing food and other supplies to the needy in the society which has in turn gained favour with the residents especially the youth and could be a way of recruiting for the cause.
6. Propagating the groups rhetoric against the Mozambican government while at the same time offering a better representation and leadership for the people of the region to be under the religious rule of ISCAP.
7. Distribution of propaganda material on social media where the group seem to have an operation with clear structure and hierarchy. The videos distributed are shot during the temporary occupation and show a faceless spokesman addressing and preaching to residents giving a semblance of what an ISCAP-Government would look like.

ISCAP seems to morph and is emulating other terrorist organizations that seek to deviate from local-militia-type to fully pledge Islamists groups. It has acquired the ability to continuously test the capability and capacity of the Mozambican security apparatus as evidenced by a series of attacks in March and April in the Mocimboa Da Praia area.

Evidentially, the group has grown both in numbers and capacity to mount attack that deviate from their previous MO that included attacking poorly defended villages, typically at night and with crude weapons to rummage for supplies. Also, the group used to raze houses and behead residents indiscriminately in the previous attacks. The old tactics have been replaced by methods that present a more confident outfit that is willing and able to attack military outpost as well as regions with significant military and private security presence.

The continued attacks on military and government infrastructure has furnished the group’s morale as well as the weapon capability to mount larger and more sophisticated attacks in the region. For instance, the attack in Mocimboa Da Praia is said to have provided the outfit with enough weapons and ammunition to arm two battalions which puts the already strained military and police in the region at a disadvantage against the terrorists.

Intelligence indicates that locals and especially the youth seem to be supporting the group as they appear to offer solutions to the historical problems people in the north have been suffering. Additionally, the group has been peddling the narrative to the residents that an ISCAP government was better than the Mozambican one seeing as they would repurpose the income and resources from the gas and oil in the region to improve the economy for residents thereby offering the economic compensatory scheme the government ‘failed’ to offer. The same was emphasized after the military withdrew and left the residents unprotected in several areas after ISCAP attacked in regions like Quissanga, Muidumbe which are transit routes for human smuggling and heroin trafficking.

ISCAP has always appeared elusive with no clear hierarchy, strategic vision or agenda other than the umbrella ISIS agenda and running the miners out of Cabo Delgado. However, recently the group has been pushing and a jihadist agenda and seeking to create a caliphate in the restive north. Thus, the group has been emulating al Shabaab strategy that relaunched the group after its bayat pledge to al-Qaida. The approach majorly includes winning the support and favour of residents resulting in some manner of legitimacy and is doubled with encouraged or coerced cooperation.

Distinguished Signature Techniques Used By ISCAP In Mozambique That Mirror Al Shabaab In Somalia

1. Temporary occupancy of towns and villages after which both groups withdraw and leave the residents.
2. Attack on weak government infrastructure either for supplies or to make a point that the government is unreliable.
3. Distribution of money, food, medicine and other basic amenities to reiterate that in the areas the government was failing and how the group would address such shortfalls.
4. Record and disseminate propaganda media during and after the occupancy both online and offline.
5. Exploit the temporary occupancy to garner support and recruits especially among the youth as well as seek legitimacy and credibility by speaking to local issues and especially historical injustices and oppression.
6. Hold public forums to argue the role of the government and injustices experienced by residents and how they can and would be remedied. Typically, the issues are political and religious in a bid to lure the people to voluntarily agreeing to the establishment of a caliphate.

Threat Matrix And Insight

• Historically, the residents of the restive north have had economic grievances that have not been adeptly addressed by the Mozambican government and giving ISCAP an avenue to exploit. This can be evidenced by the seeming lack of local benefits for the province despite the rich oil and natural gas reserves location in Cabo Delgado.
• ISCAP is seeking legitimacy and credibility especially seeing as majority of the militants are local and appear to identify with the unique problems of the people of Cabo Delgado. Once the sought-out legitimacy has been achieved the group will enjoy free movement within the areas with little to no resistance from the locals.
• The group seeks to create a rift between the Mozambican government and military and the residents as a way to control the region and encourage cooperation with the misguided notion of fighting a common enemy. The same will increase the trust for the group by residents seeing as government counterterrorism measures do not look kindly to terrorist sympathizers.
• Moreover, the success and frequency of the temporary occupations shows that the government is ill-equipped to protects the Cabo Delgado residents, leaving a vacuum that needs to filled making ISCAP poised to take over the security and thereby triggering submission and cooperation to the terror organization.
• The rugged terrain and lack of enough transit routes in the province means that the group can expands its territory exploiting the familiarity of the geography. Also, the group are well positioned to take advantage of the transit routes, expand its financial capability by controlling as well as having a lucrative stake in the both legal and illegal trade. Therefore, giving the group a protected source of income.

S.I. Analysts had indicated that IS-Somalia had been given mandate over ISCAP and as such the current change in strategy and boldness in their attacks is clear evidence of the influences of the Somalia province. It is evidence mainly because IS-Somalia splintered from al Shabaab and is headed by a former al Shabaab commander and as such the similarity in expansion strategy. While IS-Somalia has used different tactics in Somalia, the techniques are proving successful in Mozambique a move that could propel the outfit to the list world’s most lethal terror organizations alongside al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria.