The Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia Harakat Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM) has conducted several low-scale terrorist attacks in Kenya’s North Eastern Prefecture. The group targeted critical infrastructure including Camp Simba, an American Military aerial surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) base at Kenya Navy Base at Manda Bay in Lamu and 3 telecommunication base transmission masts (BTS). Unarmed government workers, particularly teachers, non-local workers, and innocent civilians have been killed by the terrorists in the prefecture. These terrorist events are of significant interest to counter terrorism experts at Strategic Intelligence and perhaps many others across the world. Kenya’s counter terrorism strategy for the past 5 years has been spectacularly robust if not best internationally. The East African powerhouse had weathered terrorism and significantly downgraded the Somali based terror group, but these strategic gains are taking a beating.
Grassroots Jihadists and Terrorists Deep Cover Terror Assets
Grassroots jihadists are tiny yet a stubborn threat. Kenya is facing a blend of both grassroots jihadists and transnational terrorism. Grass-roots jihadist networks in Kenya represent a launch-pad for the transnational jihad besides taking up the role of influence network. These tiny cells are the new recruiting agents for the parent group thus making detection of suspects joining the terror group difficult. Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency are almost one and the same thing, hence Kenya’s deployment of small counter-terrorism teams to near permanent military presence in NEP is a blend of robust COIN & CT. However, this has not mitigated the risk posed by grassroots jihadists and the gradual entry of small terror cells that provide material and tactical support to the latter.
Over the past 2 years, the terror group Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen intelligence wing, Amniyaat, successfully inserted cells in the flashpoints and facilitated them to assimilate thus became deep-cover assets capable of conducting espionage and facilitating small terror cells. These terror cells over the same period spied on weaknesses of the NEP social political and economic situation besides the security architecture. The group also identified areas where cells would establish micro-operating bases. Destroying these cells requires robust counter-intelligence capabilities and significant investments particularly in SIGNIT & HUMINT.
Blending counter terrorism and counter intelligence capabilities will help track and trace influence networks and the deep-cover cells and subsequently destroy the cells. Such success will degrade the terror group’s capability to continue outbidding Government and demonstrating dominance in the prefecture. The contamination of public transport networks in the area and destruction of critical infrastructure will decline as the support and influence networks will collapse.
