Bi-Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of February 1st – February 14th, 2022: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

The Al-Qaeda affiliate militant group, Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) commonly known as Al-Shabaab continue to wage small to large scale attacks in East Africa, especially in Kenya and Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s attacks on civilian and government targets have often been dramatic, from suicide bombs or explosive-laden trucks to complex attacks involving a combination of vehicle borne and person borne IEDs as well as active shooters.

Surge in Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia has been noted amid election crisis and predominately skewed towards local and foreign military assets. In the period under review, attacks have steadily increased with at least 2 attacks being recorded on daily basis especially in the war-torn Somalia. In the first two weeks of February 2022, at least 40 attacks have been recorded for Kenya and Somalia. However, many of those attacks have been recorded for Somalia, the home-base for the Al-Qaeda associated force. Kenya on the other hand has recorded a number of operations claimed by the Islamist Al-Shabaab targeting frontier counties neighboring Somalia.

The Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab militants still retains control over large swathes of rural Somalia and persistently mount attacks in urban centers a confirmation of the group’s resilient despite counter-operations on the group by coalition security operators and hurriedly claiming credit for the overly exaggerated operations for warfare purposes. Areas of operations in Somalia repeatedly remains, Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Hiran and Middle Shabelle.

For Kenya, another key target of the Islamist Al-Shabaab, the militant group continue to stage low-scale attacks, notably planting IEDs/landmines on roads majorly to target security assets on patrol missions. The militant group is keen on disrupting peace in the frontier counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) where they claim are Muslim land in their propaganda warfare.

Citing the witnessed upsurge in Al-Shabaab activity, counterterrorism operators for Kenya and Somalia urged upscale their CT-operations, (patrols, surveillance and scouting of security defense posts as well on critical infrastructures) to pick on enemy movements/signature especially for the persistent map localities and regions and be able to thwart possible surprise raids.

AS Recently Claimed Attacks:

Week 1: February 1^st – February 7^th

• On February 1^st, a huge IED blast targeted Ethiopian army convoy at Kalabayr area in Somalia’s Hiran region, near Ethiopian border. One military vehicle reportedly destroyed, resulting unknown casualties.
• On February 1^st, Al-Shabaab militants announced the execution of a man who they accused of spying for the Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF) working for AMISOM and the Southwest regional troops. Al-Shabaab media reported that Nunow Sanweyne, 34, was executed by the firing squad in front of the locals at Bula-Fulay town in the Bay region of the Southwest state.
• On February 1^st, Al-Shabaab assassins shot dead a Somali government soldier in the vicinity of Tabelaha Sheikh Ibrahim, Mogadishu.
• On February 1^st, Al-Shabaab attack reported in villages of Bosaso, Sanaag region targeting Puntland forces. On February 5^th, counterterrorism operations were launched to secure the villages.
• On February 2^nd, 4 people killed after miraa van hit an IED along Wajir-Geriley road in Wajir county, NEP Kenya. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
• On February 2^nd, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media reported that its assassins conducted an assassination operation killing a Somali National Army and Somali Federal Government (SFG) official in two separate operations in Karaan district, western Mogadishu.
• On February 3^rd, Al-Shabab militants claimed to have probed an AMISOM operated base in El Wak, Gedo region of Somalia. Heavy exchange of gunfire heard and militants were successfully repulsed as per local sources. The Feeble probing attack from distance was for propaganda purpose.
• On February 4^th, On the outskirts of Mogadishu, the Mujahideen forces targeted a convoy of government security troops who were leaving Mogadishu for Bilidoogle base. Al-Shabaab bomber struck shortly after noon in front of the defense post in the outskirt of Mogadishu, killing five officers and wounding six others.
• On February 4^th, Reports from Burane area on the outskirts of Mahaday district of Middle Shabelle indicated that an IED explosion targeted foreign troops, especially those from the Burundian contingent on patrol operation. One soldier killed and a number wounded as per local sources.
• On February 4^th, A civilian bus/vehicle ran over an Al-Shabaab improvised explosive device near Abdi Dhore, Kismayo district in the Lower Jubba region of southern Somalia. The IED killed several people and wounded three.
• On February 5^th, Al-Shabaab fighters launched overnight attack on SNA operated base in Garasbaley, near Mogadishu, warring sides exchanged heavy gunfire. Al-Shabaab said it killed 1 soldier and wounded 4 others.
• On February 5^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have captured Dinsoor, Bay region, southwestern Somalia. The Islamist militants reportedly overran South West Forces’ bases in the town, killing 10 soldiers.
• On February 6^th, several rounds of mortars reportedly hit an Ethiopian army base in Dinsor town in Somalia’s Bay region. Huge fire engulfed the base after the attack as per local sources. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, saying it killed 2 ENDF soldiers, injured 5 others and destroyed military property.

Week 2: February 7^th – February 14^th

• On February 7^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have launched a direct gun attack on SNA convoy on the outskirts of Kismayo, Lower Juba killing at least two soldiers and wounding four others, besides setting one military vehicle on fire and looting rifles.
• On February 9^th, Al-Shabaab claimed credit for mortar shelling of an election center in Barawe, Lower Shabelle, southern Somalia. Corresponding local sources reports indicated that the mortars hit nearby residential areas, killing at least four people and wounding nine others.
• On February 9^th, at least three people were killed and seven others wounded in a bomb attack on a café shop/restaurant in Somalia’s Bosaso town. Al-Shabaab – an Al-Qaeda – linked group claimed the responsibility for explosion.
• On February 10^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for suicide bomb at Mogadishu’s El-Gabta junction, Hamar Weyne district saying it targeted delegates selecting the upcoming Lower House MPs. The terrorist group claimed to have killed 6 delegates and 3 police officers escorting them.
• On February 10^th, at least four killed in IED attack in Sangailu, Holugho sub-county of Garissa, NEP Kenya. The four dead were part of 6 people who were in the vehicle that was travelling from Masalani to Holugho when the incident happened. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.
• On February 11^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have shot dead SNA officer identified as Abdullahi Abdi Nur in Hodan district of Mogadishu.
• On February 11^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a brief ambush attack on SNA checkpoint in the Iftin neighborhood of Yaqshid district, Mogadishu. No details on casualties were provided.
• On February 11^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have assassinated one SNA soldier in the general vicinity of Daynile Mogadishu.
• On February 11^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the assassination of a senior SNA official identified as Mohamed Isaq in a special operation in Dharkenley district of Mogadishu.
• On February11th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for public execution of a Somali National Army soldier in Gambole, Middle Shabelle, southern Somalia.
• On February 12^th, Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting security troops convoy near Mangai Village, Lamu County, southeastern Kenya.
• On February 12^th, Al-Shabaab fighters attempted probe on Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) thwarted in Afmadow district, Lower Juba. No casualties were reported.
• On February 12^th, Al-Shabaab forces claimed to have trampled on the SNA manned checkpoint in general area of Adale, Middle Shabelle, killed two government soldiers and seized their two rifles.
• On February 13^th, the Mujahideen forces claimed responsibility for attack on Somali government troops in general vicinity of Mahaday, Middle Shabelle injuring three soldiers.
• On February 13^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have launched a major offensive against the African Union base in Arbacow, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. No details on casualties were provided.
• On February 13^th, Al-Shabaab militant group claimed series of operations against military positions and bases in Janaale and the areas of Siin Dheer, Alamada, Lafole and awdheengle, all in Lower Shabelle region of Somalia.

Assessment/Observations & Insights

• Attack patterns in Somalia remains almost the same, mostly occurring in central and southern Somalia. Most these attacks are notably repeat attacks especially the ones targeted at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and military convoys. Ethiopian troops operating under the mandate of AMISOM have severally been ambushed and their bases probed.
• Notably, threat levels thus continue to be skewed towards military operating bases and their patrols convoys besides military convoys on supply missions especially for Somalia. Most of the raids against the targets are notably ambushes and setting up of roadside IEDs with a number of repeat attacks being recorded. Assassination attempts on key officials also witnessed in Mogadishu and its environs as well as resumption of suicide operations.
• Thus, counterterrorism (CT) operators in East Africa region and broadly those operating under AMISOM mandate must remain on high alert, to upscale surveillance on their respective areas of responsibility (AoR)/sectors especially in Somalia. Collaboration between citizenry of individual countries encouraged in an effort to share intelligence besides intercept and thwart terrorist activities.
• The public, once aware of the threats, are supposed to take precautions. These include avoiding crowded public spaces and avoiding specific areas where prior attacks have occurred. Members of the public should perceive these alerts and react to them in a positive rather than negative way. The primary responsibility of securing oneself begins with the individual thus act decisively; note some unusual activity or individuals, report to the security authorities. Citizen’s accountability also means that they can work with law enforcement agencies including; police, the military and intelligence agencies so that information can be given in a timely manner to avert terrorist acts.
• It is also the primary responsibility of any state to provide basic security. The government should take additional security measures. Measures include additional installation of surveillance cameras, scanners, security barriers, and enhancing visible policing. Despite persistent and relentless target by the Islamist Al-Shabaab, Kenya counterterrorism agencies/operators lauded for their robust CT approach especially along the porous border with Somalia significantly stemming down their activity.
• Nonetheless, its notable a robust security response risks unintended consequence. For example, certain areas can become viewed as hotspots of terrorism. Communities in these areas can be unfairly profiled as suspects. This has a tendency of increasing suspicion and distrust, including intolerance between communities to the advantage and exploitation by the Islamist militants.
• Finally, resumption of airstrikes against the enemy positions (camps/dens) much recommended to disrupt the witnessed militants buildup and movements in theater; especially for Somalia.

Conclusion

Despite many years of sustained counterterrorism pressure, Somali forces supported by allied AMISOM partners and the U.S, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and intent to strike outside of the country from low to large-scale attacks.

Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to track and monitor the Islamist militant’s activity in the East Africa regions and forecast of consistent militant’s increased activity in Kenya and Somalia in the coming days, weeks and months.

Thus, continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting recommended several meters away from forward operating bases/police outpost for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine /tactic by the patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also highly recommended to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Al-Shabaab.

The militant group’s intentions to strike on hard targets (security forces) in Somalia and in Kenya remains the militant’s ultimate goal. Thus, joint CT and COIN operators should not relent on mounting concerted military pressuring against the Islamists groups in an effort defeat and annihilate them, besides to guard counter-terrorism gains so far made in the region.