Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of September 10th – September 17th, 2021: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa (Kenya and Somalia)

Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), popularly known as Al-Shabaab, is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda terrorist network operating in East Africa and with its home-base in Somalia. The jihadist group continue to persistently wage attacks from low to large-scale operations mostly targeting hard targets. However, civilians are often caught in the militant’s daily attacks.

Although counterterrorism efforts have significantly pushed back Al-Shabaab’s territorial control in parts of Somalia, for some time neither the Somali government nor Al-Shabaab itself have been able to change the basic dynamics of the conflict, or progress it toward its logical conclusion.

Al-Shabaab has benefited from political instability within the government and uncertainty around the future of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  The Islamist militant group has maintained its capacity to generate revenue, perpetrate attacks and make limited territorial gains.

Despite the Somalia government’s progress in concerted efforts towards deepening stability in areas under its control, it has found retaking, holding and stabilizing new areas increasingly difficult and as both warring sides continue to fall short of achieving decisive victories, the devastating human cost of the conflict continues to mount on the weak Federal Government of Somalia.

In the past one week, at least 15 attacks have been claimed by the Somali based Al-Shabaab militant group. Notably all attacks have happened in Somalia. No incident has been recorded for Kenya, another key target of the Islamist militants. That notwithstanding Kenyan multi-security agencies should not relent rather should upscale countermeasures to avert any possible threat that could emanate from the Islamists militants.

AS Recently Claimed Attacks (September 10^th – September 17^th)

• On September 10^th, a brief raid claimed by Al-Shabaab was successfully thwarted by AMISOM forces operating on Kuday island military base. Residents reported that they heard artillery shelling and gunfire from both sides but no casualties were reported.
• On September 10^th, Al-Shabaab militants claimed to have attacked SNA troops on patrol in the general vicinity of Siin Dheer area, Lower Shabelle, west of the capital Mogadishu. Heavy gunfire was heard from both sides as per local sources.
• On September 11^th, Soldiers and officials from the self-proclaimed ‘Jubbaland’ administration were killed and others wounded in an IED explosion in an area of ​​Lower Jubba. According to local sources, the blast that happened between Abdalla Birole and Kismayo left at least six soldiers and wounded four others, including a former commander named Hussein Dahir Agaweyne.
• On September 11^th, Al-Shabaab fighters targeted AMISOM troops in Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Initial reports gathered from corresponding open sources indicated that, Al-Shabaab jihadists attacked a convoy of Ugandan troops as they were traveling between Number 60 and Buufow in Lower Shabelle. The troops were on their way to their base in Shalaambood area on the outskirts of Marka when they were ambushed. The militants claimed responsibility saying they managed to seize supplies besides injuring some soldiers.
• On September 11^th, suspected Al-Shabaab assassins killed a senior government official identified as Abdi Risaq Ahmed Elmi alias Cardoofe in one of the neighborhoods of Las Anod, the capital of Sool region, Somalia. This is not the first time a Somaliland administration official has been killed in Las Anod as per local sources.
• On September 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have mounted an ambush raid on AMISOM makeshift military bases operated by Ethiopian troops in Hudur and Wajid districts. No casualties were reported from the two low-scale operations.
• On September 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed an attack on Somali government troops’ base in general vicinity of Janale bridge, Lower Shabelle. A few casualties reported from the ambush operation.
• On September 13^th, Al-Shabaab claimed an operation against foreign troops in Kolbiyow military base, Lower Juba region of Somalia. No casualties were reported in the brief attempted raid.
• On September 14^th, A huge suicide bombing was reported between Halane camp and General Dhegabadan military academy in Mogadishu’s Wadajir district. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, noted the operation targeted a gathering of Somalia army and killed 11 soldiers and wounded 16 others.
• On September 14^th, Heavy clashes between Al-Shabaab fighters and ANA troops was reported near Abdalla Biroole village, about 55Km southwest of Kismayo town, the capital of Somalia’s Jubaland state. No details on casualties were provided.
• On September 14^th, Al-Shabaab responsibility for killing a Somali police officer in a targeted attack in the vicinity of Afgoye, some few kilometers west of the Somalia capital Mogadishu.
• On September 15^th, at least ten mortar rounds targeted on African Union troops’ base in Burane area near Mahaday town of Middle Shabelle region of Somalia.  It is unclear the casualty that resulted from the mortar attack claimed by Al-Shabaab.
• On September 15^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have assassinated a Somali government soldier in general vicinity of Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia. Open sources reports indicate that, Al-Shabaab assassins raided the soldier’s residence in Baidoa, killing him and wounded another officer.
• On September 15^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for killing a soldier from the ‘South West’ administration, in the general vicinity of Qansahdheere district of Bay region, Somalia.

Assessment, Analysis & Insights

The Al-Qaeda associated jihadist group, Al-Shabaab continue to claim responsibility for the attacks their attacks through their various online propaganda media channels. Notable, the militant latest series of attacks are directed on military troop’s convoys as well as their operating bases. Somalia government officials, Somali Police as well as civilians have suffered a number of attacks in the period under review.

AMISOM, in collaboration with Somali national forces, has continued its efforts to recover territory and secure transit corridors for humanitarian groups and other actors. However, its effectiveness has been beset by domestic challenges for AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) as well as international concerns. International support for the regional force is waning, there are limited airstrikes US and Kenyan forces that used to destroy Al-Shabaab havens besides disrupting their movements.

In Somalia, the power tussle between the President Farmajo and country’s Prime Minister Roble. Al-Shabaab keenly follows such event unfolding, exploits such opportunities when the government leaders are at loggerhead to wage attacks. Such power tussles and crisis always works to the advantage of Al-Shabaab citing even the country’s forces sometimes tend to take sides.

Notably, Al-Shabaab preferred attack types remains the use of IEDs, SVBIEDs and roadside IEDs, however, ambush raids have become very common in Somalia citing the country poor state of roads besides the militants exploiting the terrain and thick to mount surprise operations against military convoys and troops. Assassinations are always directed on key individuals mostly working for the government or security forces.

The militant activities have been recorded largely for Somalia regions. However, counterterrorism operators in East Africa region, especially Kenya should not relax citing the calmness witnessed in the past couple of weeks, rather they should intensify on patrols, intelligence gathering, collaborate with locals especially those in perceived terror prone counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu). Change of routine besides increased surveillance encouraged on Kenya and Somalia counterterrorism operators.

Ramped up kinetic operations against Al-Shabaab hideouts should be encouraged in an effort to mount pressure against the militant group that notably has remained resilient despite concerted counterterrorism operations by Somali forces supported by coalition partner forces.

Al-Shabaab’s organizational strengths remain and continue to allow the movement to destabilize East Africa. Understanding Al-Shabaab’s Islamist ideological origins, evolution, and appeal in East Africa as well as its organizational strategies and conduct can help explain why the group remains successful and provide policy implications for countering enduring threats in the region.

Tackling the challenges of radicalization can greatly stem down Al-Shabaab’s lifeline. Al-Shabaab continue to replenish its fighters through its continuous recruitment. Vulnerable youth from East Africa and beyond continue to fall prey of Al-Shabaab radicalization and eventual recruitment into the terror outfit. Lack of socio-economic opportunities, lack of education leads to poverty, and unless these main drivers into radicalization are dealt with decisively, then countering violent extremism and terrorism will remain a myth.

Conclusion

Countering the main root causes to radicalization among the youth will be a milestone towards defeating terrorism in East Africa region and beyond. Al-Shabaab has learnt the art of luring the vulnerable, the dissatisfied youth in the region into joining the jihadist group for ‘economic’ gains besides fighting the so-called jihad for a course.

• Its should be a collective responsibility for individual governments in the region to come up programmes that will help in countering violent extremism especially on the youth. That way, youth who previously would have been idle on social media where the militants usually cast their nets would become more elusive as get engaged on other important tasks of their individual nation building.
• By cracking and destroying on jihadist networks, especially online channels that offers them platform to conduct online recruitment besides brainwashing vulnerable youths. Online platforms also continue to offer jihadist a thriving pad to promote their perceived successes against governments and security forces. Al-Shabaab media continue to thrive and promote warfare propaganda in an effort to attract potential recruits.
• Militant threat remains skewed towards military troops especially in the Horn of Africa nation. As such, measures such as change of routine by military convoys, scouting and increased air and ground surveillance, much encouraged.
• Joint CT and COIN actors urged not to relent on mounting concerted military pressure on the Islamists groups in an effort to disrupt and weakening their network besides their plans; thus, already gains made against the militant group will be preserved and sustained denying the group fertile grounds as well as local support to thrive.

Strategic Intelligence (S.I) will continue to track and monitor the Islamist militant’s activities in East Africa regions in an effort to provide actionable intelligence towards thwarting and disrupting militant’s activities in the region.