Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of October 1st – October 14th, 2021: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

The Al-Qaeda associated militant group commonly known as Al-Shabab persistently continues to wage attacks both in Somalia and in neighboring Kenya. The militant group notably continue to primarily target military positions (convoys, patrol units and FOBs), government officials besides civilian targets.

In the course of its violent operations on the above-named targets, the Al-Qaeda official branch in East Africa Al-Shabaab determinedly wages attacks using a range of tactics ranging from the use of gunmen, IEDs, drive-by shootings, targeted assassinations, ambushes, and raids, among others. Also, the Islamist militant group is known to use stoning, amputations, and beheadings to punish and intimidate those in its area of control who do not abide by its interpretation of its strict sharia law.

While an uphill task, ending the group’s ability to successfully carry out attacks would deal a blow to Al-Shabaab’s capabilities.  However, counterterrorism operators need to always rethink strategies, changing on their daily routines and combat strategies as often as possible. Counterterrorism forces will need to make hard targets harder to strike by re-inventing on strategies that will mostly involve locals, human intelligence (HUMINT) driven.

Al-Shabaab remains active, controlling large areas of rural and urban swathes of central and southern Somalia. In past twos week, at least 25 attacks were recorded with the war-torn and Al-Shabaab home-base, Somalia taking the largest share of at least 24 attacks. This is a notable surge.

No major incident reported on Kenya, especially the border prefectures with Somalia. Only one terror incident was reported in the past two weeks, where suspected IED blast was reported in Lamu county near the Kenya-Somalia border. However, Kenya’s multi-agencies on security matters urged to remain vigilant. All concerned counterterrorism assets to remain on high alert, security to be beefed on all defense outposts along the common border with Somalia, surveillance to be increased to pick on enemy movements and scouting routine to be revised to avoid surprise ambush raids of defense posts in the frontier regions.

AS Recently Claimed Attacks: 1^st October – 14^th October

Week 1

• On October 1^st, Reports from Doonka village on the outskirts of Afgoye district of Lower Shabelle indicate a landmine hit a vehicle belonging to Abdi Bile, the deputy commander of 7^th DF Battalion. The senior official escaped assassination attempt alongside his three bodyguards with slight injuries. 
• On October 2^nd, Al-Shabaab claimed attack on an AMISOM base in Burcolow on the outskirts of Barawe district of Lower Shabelle. No details on casualties were provided.
• On October 2^nd, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility on brief attempted raid on AMISOM military base operated by Ugandan troops in Awdheegle district, Lower Shabelle. Two soldiers wounded in ambush raid.
• On October 3^rd, Explosion claimed by Al-Shabaab injured a government official in Bardhere district of Gedo region. Initial reports indicate that landmine planted on the road targeted a senior official of Bardhere airport who was slightly wounded in the blast alongside his two bodyguards.
• On October 4^th, Daynile district commissioner narrowly escapes assassination attempt. Heavily armed Al-Shabaab militants attacked a convoy of Daynile district commissioner in the vicinity of n Elsaqir area of ​​Daynile district, Mogadishu. His bodyguards sustained injuries and one of the convoy vehicles was burnt.
• On October 5^th, Al-Shabaab executed two men by firing squad in Jamame district of Lower Jubba, southern Somalia in latest killings targeted at people believed to be against their divisive agenda.
• On October 5^th, two regional members of parliament were injured on Tuesday night in a grenade attack in Jowhar, town, the regional administrative capital of Hirshabelle. The two lawmakers identified as Abdirahman Idow and Mohamed Dheere were injured after a hand grenade was reportedly hurled at the house of Jowhar mayor where the lawmakers were in.
• On October 6^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for assassination of two Somali police officers ear the main market in Wadajir district of Mogadishu. The two officers were identified as Hassan Dacar and Ali Dahab. Their pistols were also seized by the terrorist assassins.
• On October 6^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked SNA military base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. No details on casualties were provided.
• On October 7^th, Al-Shabaab claimed a brief attempted raids on AMISOM military bases in Tabto and Abdalla Birole, Lower Jubba region of Somalia. No details on casualties were provided.

Week 2

• On October 9^th, Al-Shabaab claimed mortar shelling on SNA military base on the outskirts of Kismayo, causing unknown number of casualties.
• On October 9^th, Al-Shabaab suicide bomber struck shortly after noon infront of a police station in the general vicinity of Somalia’s capital Mogadishu, killing two police officers and wounding three others.
• On October 10^th, Al-Shabaab attempted ambush on AMISOM troops military base operated by Kenyan troops in Hosingow, Lower Jubba successfully thwarted. No casualties were reported.
• On October 10^th, Al-Shabaab claimed attack in Marere on the outskirts of Afgoye, Lower Shabelle. The roadside bomb blast targeted a US-trained SNA troops, killing three soldiers and wounding two others.
• On October 10^th, Al-Shabaab hurled a grenade at a checkpoint manned by SNA in general vicinity of Janale, Lower Shabelle. At least two soldiers were killed and several others were injured in the blast.
• On October 10^th, Al-Shabaab claimed an IED explosion in general vicinity of Kismayo town, Lower Jubba targeting an intelligence officer.
• On October 11^th, Al-Shabaab car bomb exploded in the general vicinity of Daynile district of Mogadishu targeting a senior government official. Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed NISA official and his two bodyguards. A military technical vehicle was also destroyed.
• On October 11^th, Al-Shabaab assassins shot dead a senior Somali government official in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.
• On October 11^th, at least three Somali people were killed and several others wounded when an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber blew himself up at a busy restaurant in Mogadishu’s Yaqshid district frequented by local youths.
• On October 12^th, at least six KDF officers were wounded in a suspected Al-Shabaab IED attack in Lamu. The Team was on routine patrol between Milimani and Baure in the Boni Forest when their vehicle drove over an IED
• On October 14^th, Jubbaland administration official killed in Afmadow, Lower Jubba. Initial reports indicate that the Islamist militants in a planned attack assassinated a senior Jubbaland official at his residence in Afmadow at night.  
• On October 14^th, Somali troops Killed in Lower Shabelle region. Initial reports indicate that at least two SNA soldiers were killed at a bridge in general vicinity of Janale.
• On October 14^th, Al-Shabaab through Radio Andalus claimed responsibility for attack on Federal government soldiers in Elasha Biyaha, Lower Shabelle. One soldier reportedly killed as per local sources.

Assessments/Observations & Insights

Nearly a dozen attacks reported all from the regions of the Horn of Africa nation. As per SI. Forecast, threat levels largely remain skewed towards forward operating bases (military bases) both for local forces and AMISOM troops in the period under review.

The militants also in the past few days increased activity targeting on military operating bases especially from across the localities in central Somalia.

Al-Shabaab’s biggest threat to peace in Somalia and the broader East Africa region is their frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), especially vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambush raids and targeted suicide operations. Al-Shabaab’s attacks in recent years increasingly rely on IEDs and VBIEDs, making them the weapon of choice and a modus operandi for the terrorist group. The trend to use explosives and suicide bombing maybe reinforced indiscriminate firing are on notable increase.

Al-Shabaab has continually deployed suicide bombers with the express intention of targeting specific enemies. Resumption of large explosions in the Somalia capital Mogadishu noted. Busy joints such as teashops/restaurants especially in the capital Mogadishu are prone targets of the Islamist militants. In the period under review the Islamist militant’s suicide bomber targeted a busy restaurant in Mogadishu frequented by local youths causing at least six fatalities. Targeted attacks are also being directed on checkpoints manned by Somali security forces within Mogadishu prefectures.

Strategic Intelligence (S.I) assets have warned of increased militant activities especially in southern regions of Somalia, and towards the border prefectures with Kenya. Though attacks have notably been low scale in the first two weeks of October 2021, these militant onslaughts cannot be downplayed or ignored since mostly have been skewed towards military assets (hard targets).

The Al-Qaeda aligned group mostly is carrying operations in areas perceived under its control. At least an attack in recorded in the urban and rural areas in south and central Somalia and persistently, Al-Shabaab operatives carries out frequent operations in the capital Mogadishu and its environs.

Engaging in counterintelligence operations and disrupt Al-Shabaab’s suicide bombing training programs is among the key strategies towards degrading the capability of the jihadist group. As such, intelligence gathered from field operations should explicitly seek to collect, centralize, and vigorously exploit battlefield information shedding light on the internal contours of the group’s suicide bombing program, which occurs in their various training and logistical camps.

Al-Shabaab has also sharpened their ability, both intelligence and military to track and target visiting officials, government officials, high value targets as well military convoys. Thus, gaining greater insight into how it gathers and collects intelligence on which its acts and gains significant levels of success is paramount and then engaging in counterintelligence campaigns against the group would serve to protect moving targets.

Conclusion & Recommendations

• The terrorist war in Somalia and broader East Africa will be a long war. The conflict in the war-torn country is primarily an ideological war. The Islamist militants notably continue to exploit climate, vegetation and poor road especially in Somalia to stage ambush raids.
• Climate change is regularly highlighted as a key driver of ongoing conflict and state fragility in Somalia, with researchers suggesting that shifting climatological patterns fuel violence in myriad ways.  Rising temperatures, reduced rainfalls favors Al-Shabaab to in terms of planting landmines and roadside IEDs.
• Al-Shabaab jihadists time and again benefit from climate-induced livelihood loss and food insecurity through recruiting vulnerable individuals by offering food, protection and regular payments.
• Al-Shabaab has proved adept at exploiting these localised clan tensions by drawing support from internally displaced persons separated from traditional kinship and familial support networks.
• Notably, explicitly, Al-Shabaab militants deliberately exploit the Federal Government of Somalia’s lack of state capacity and inability to effectively respond to natural disasters, filling critical governance gaps by providing emergency relief and establishing drought committees following successive rainfall deficits.
• Thus, the solution for such a conflict, therefore, cannot be won sorely by military intervention. Continued cooperation and knowledge-sharing among local and foreign partners especially in the war-torn Somalia remains imperative towards winning this war.
• Reliable financing and troop contributions for AMISOM’s operations, intelligence-sharing, and local capacity-building of Somali authorities are equally important citing that they weak forces are poised to take the country’s security once the foreign partner forces exit Somalia.
• Internal wrangling in Somalia politics and clannism gives Al-Shabaab an opening to exploit divisions in the security and further its violent agenda.
• Surveillance both aerial and ground encourage. Scouting several meters away from FOBs/defense posts perimeter encouraged in order to pick on enemy signature when approaching.
• Collaboration with locals much encouraged. Human intelligence (HUMINT) from locals in prone regions and localities is key towards stemming down Al-Shabaab notable successes in their operations.

This, it’s important to undertake countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts that addresses the employment of counter-radicalization, counter-messaging, and countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns is an important step in curbing increasing operations of ambushes and suicide bombing. Any attempted intervention that does not address the reasons that young men and women may join Al-Shabaab or any other violent extremist group will remain incomplete.

Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to monitor and track the jihadist activities in East Africa and beyond. The groups capability on carrying out repeat attacks on military, convoys and government officials have sharpened. Thus S.I. reports that, the threat and intent on waging attacks against hard and also on soft targets by the Islamist Al-Shabaab remain unchanged.