Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of July 1st – July 10th, 2021: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) persistent attacks in Somalia underline the threat the militant group continues to pose in the country and to it immediate neighbors. The Islamist militant group’s operations continue to target military, government officials and civilians.

The first ten days of July suggest a notable surge in militants attacks directed on hard targets. Attempted assassinations and ambush raids on government officials also noted. Al-Shabaab in the same period under review notably carried out a suicide mission and IED raids both on security forces and on civilian targets.

 The Al-Qaeda aligned Islamists Al-Shabaab continue to maintain a vibrant propaganda media, the Al-Kataib from which the group continue to hurriedly claim responsibility, mostly exaggerating on the operations outcome. Through Al-Kataib media, Al-Shabaab continue to promote it operations, displaying photos mostly of their perceived ‘successful’ operations.

Also, Al-Shabaab is active on social media channels from which they also continue to promote their operations by sharing widely on the outcomes of their attacks. This warfare strategy is always aimed at boosting the morale of the poor foot soldiers, portraying them as heroes and subsequently to appeal to potential wannabe jihadists into joining Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab remains active, controlling large of rural and urban swathes of central and southern Somalia. Lower Shabelle, Gedo, Lower Juba, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle regions remains frequent areas of operations for Al-Shabaab. In the capital Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab notably continue to steadily upscale attacks targeting on security forces outposts and civilians’ targets such as restaurants and coffee shops.

In the period under review, at least 17 attacks were recorded, all from across the regions of Somalia. In a number of these attacks, Al-Shabaab has notably targeted AMISOM troops in Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba and also in Bay and Bakool regions. Most of the raids against the targets are notably ambushes and setting up of roadside IEDs.

Kenya frontiers counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) which are also key targets of Al-Shabaab attacks remain on high alert with no major incidents connected to the Islamist militants being reported. However, counterterrorism operators urged to remain vigilant, collaborate with locals from the aforementioned regions and localities for any actionable intelligence they may get in an effort to preempt persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

AS Claimed Activities: 1^st July – 10^th July

• On July 1^st, reports from the outskirts of Kismayo indicate that a heavy attack was carried out on a base of the Jubbaland administration in Bar Sanguni area by Al-Shabaab fighters. No details on casualties were reported.
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• On July 2^nd, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a deadly suicide bomb attack that targeted a popular coffee shop near Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency headquarters (NISA) in Mogadishu. The militant group through its propaganda media Al-Kataib reported to have killed 15 people including spy agents, police and military personnel.
• On July 2^nd, Al-Shabab militant claimed killing four AMISOM soldiers in an attack in the southern Somali town of Dhobley, Lower Juba region of Somalia. The militants hastily claimed responsibility for the attack through the group’s affiliated propaganda media channels.
• On July 3^rd, Al-Shabaab claimed a brief raid that targed on AMISOM-Burundian troops in general area of Miirtaqwo, Middle Shabelle region of Somalia. No details on casualties were reported.
• On July 4^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed eight government soldiers in the outskirts of Dhuusamareb, the administrative capital of the Galguduud region of Somalia. Somali army troops also claimed to have repulsed the ambush raid and killing a number of Islamist militants.
• On July 3^rd, Al-Shabaab claimed to have ambushed a convoy of Somali army troops between Luuq and Dolow, Gedo region and killed at least two SNA soldiers, wounded three others besides destroying their vehicle.
• On July 5^th, Al-Shabaab claimed multiple raids against SNA and foreign troops in southern Somalia. The militants claimed to have carried series of heavy raids on military bases in Qoryooley district and the areas of Number 60, Danow and Barire all in Lower Shabelle region of Somalia.
• On July 5^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked AMISOM-Ethiopian troops’ base in general area of Bardhere, Gedo region of Somalia.
• On July 5^th, Al-Shabaab claimed similar raids on ENDF troops in Burhakabo, Bay region as well as well as in Dinsor of the same region but no casualties were reported as a result of these attacks.
• On July 6^th, Al-Shabaab attempted probe on AMISOM troops near Abdalla Birole, on the outskirts of the coastal town of Kismayo repulsed. No casualties were reported.
• On July 7^th, Al-Shabaab reportedly retook the strategic towns of Ba’adweyne and Wisil in Mudug region less than 24 hours after being captured by Somalia govt forces. SNA retreat following deadly clash with Al-Shabaab militants.
• On July 8^th, Al-Shabaab claimed via its media that its assassins assassinated a government official identified as Abdullahi Mohamed Amin, one of the district commissioners in Afgoye district.
• On July 8^th, separately Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for launching major operations that targeted Somali government forces and AMISOM troops’ bases in Bula Marer district in Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. No details on casualties.
• On July 9^th, two civilians travelling on a vehicle were killed in a roadside explosion in Qeycad area, Mudug region. The roadside IEDs believed to have been planted by Al-Shabaab militants targeting security forces’ convoys or patrols teams.
• On July 9^th, Al-Shabaab targets AMISOM-Ugandan troops in the general vicinity of Danow, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed to have targeted the foreign troops with a roadside/landmine on a major road joining Afgoye and Wallanweyn districts of Lower Shabelle.
• On July 10^th, Car bomb blast targets a convoy carrying Mogadishu police commander Colonel Farhan Qarole near Banadir junction. The commander reportedly survived the attack, four of his bodyguards were killed and five others wounded. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.

Assessment/Observations & Insights

Increased Al-Shabaab activity has been noted especially in central Somalia. Citing the recent clash in Ba’adweyne from where Somali army troops briefly recaptured the strategic supply town, notably Al-Shabaab managed to retake it back with government troops retreating following an intense clash with the militants.

Intelligence assets reports of Al-Shabaab maintaining the biggest logistical and training bases in Mudug region is the coastal town of Harardhere. This partially explains the militants increased operations in the region. Joint counterterrorism operators urged to re-strategize and raid on these militant’s bases in an effort to stem down the steady surge of jihadist activity in the region besides in the neighboring regions.

Al-Shabaab style of attack hasn’t changed. Its war is largely asymmetrical, where it also relies on hit and run attacks, assassinations, and grenade attacks citing the group exploiting poor Somali roads and thickets/vegetations.

The militants’ weapons of choice have ranged from improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), to deploying suicide bombers to target security forces, public installations, and government officials.

While most of the recent attacks can be described as low intensity, they cannot be ignored as they are largely persistent, disruptive, and daring. For example, the ones that have been targeting government officials, military bases, convoys and at times on military/police chiefs.

The Islamist Al-Shabaab fighters have sustained their operations. The persistent attacks have further strained and frustrated the military response being carried out by the Somali National Army (SNA), which is backed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops) besides other foreign troops. More interventions need to be put in place to support the weak Federal Government forces who are poised to take charge of the country’s security, once foreign troops finally exit.

Conclusion

Today’s terrorism threat landscape is more complex, more dynamic, and more diversified than it was some years ago. As such, counterterrorism operators in East Africa region and especially those countering the Islamist insurgents in Somalia need to rethink their strategies citing Al-Shabaab military and intelligence strategies have sharpened over the years. Timely intelligence gathering and sharing is pivotal towards securing/thwarting terrorist related incidents in the region.

Threat skewed towards military operating bases and their convoys. Targeted attacks and assassinations remain unchanged towards government officials and towards civilians perceived as spies by the militant group.

 Social media and other online forums are increasingly being exploited by terrorist outfits in an effort to spread violent extremist narratives and activity, besides luring potential recruits and countering and destroying their channels/networks would be of paramount importance.

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operators in the region, especially in Kenya and Somalia encouraged to scale-up surveillance both ground and airborne on the proximal of all military operating bases and all security defense posts to timely pick on enemy signatures in an effort to decisively preempt and thwart possible surprise attacks in the future.

Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to monitor and track the jihadist activities in East Africa and beyond. The groups capability on carrying out repeat attacks have sharpened, and threat and intent on waging attacks against hard and also on soft targets remain largely unchanged.