The Terrorists at the Gates to the Capital City Mogadishu Looking Down the Dead Defenders and their Flag is not only ghastly, but a warning to UNSC; Any rushed & poorly thought decision on Somalia will have catastrophic ramifications .
While military defeats are nothing but temporary setbacks, the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM) served the Somali National Army (SNA) a crushing and humiliating defeat by overrunning El-Salini camp 55 kilometers (34 miles) southwest of the capital Mogadishu. Approximately 39 Soldiers were killed while over 60 others were wounded. This is not the first defeat, El-Salini has been attacked severally, but this particular defeat is significant to both AMISOM and AFRICOM, the key players in securing the failed state besides other critical players such as Qatar, Turkey, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the United Nations Security Council. It is significant since El-Salini is one of the main gates to the capital Mogadishu, hence a strategic defense position militarily. The defeat is again significant since the base housed a Turkish trained and armed unit of the Somali Army, thus questioning the skills and capability transferred to the SNA b the Turks. Strategic Intelligence has critically analyzed the attack alongside recent ones to provide more insight to key players in Somalia, particularly AMISOM, AFRICOM, and the UNSC.
A Decisive Defeat of the Turkish Military Strategy & Capability or Covert Supply of Arms?
The overrunning of the Turkish armed and trained SNA El-Salini base is a decisive defeat since it has happened when Somalia as a State has an Army; previously, Somalia was a state without an army. At El-Salini, the Al-Qaeda affiliate captured a significantly huge cache of Turkish weapons including assault rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, and machine guns. The terrorists also captured technical vehicles and military uniforms. Such military failure has shook the AMISOM, AFRICOM, & the UNSC besides Somalia to its very foundation. Perhaps most disturbing is the failure of senior military leadership that has been demonstrated in the past decade. The generals demonstrated either shocking hubris, gross incompetence, or both. The Turks have trained, organized, and equipped the Somali Army primarily to destroy enemy forces that look and act very much as SNA do. They are, ideally, suited for a war of attrition. Unfortunately, these skills are not being demonstrated rather are being applied by the enemy, the Al-Qaeda affiliate.
Perhaps we should look at these events from a reverse angle. Intelligence reports by various credible OSINT & SOCMINT sources (such as Nordic Monitor) claimed that operatives of Turkey’s spy agency (MIT) sent $600,000 to Al-Shabaab in Somalia underlining the fact that Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) is directly and indirectly funding the terror group. It is possible MIT through Turkish Military Intelligence has SNA belligerents in its payroll as deep ops operatives who double as soldiers and Al-Shabaab operatives making it easier for the terrorists to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance and subsequent spectacular attacks. SNA and NISA are deeply infiltrated by Al-Shabaab and worse ‘Al-Qaeda assets’, this is red flag.
Politically Motivated SNA Deployment in Jubbaland, a Stupid Priority
In jihadi symbolism, El-Salini is one of the key gates to the Capital City of Somalia. The soldiers trained by Turkey were a symbol of impregnable defense. The terrorists, in their photography raised their flag outside the gates of the city, a warning they’d come to take it sooner or later. In one photo, the flag of the defenders, the Somalia Army, lay on the ground, discarded and dusty, a symbolizing how the city defenses scattered and fell. All these are symbols of the terrorist’s victory. Despite the highly repressive political climate in Somalia, there was uproar by both public, analysts, and policy makers after the attack. President Farmaajo deployed 700 Turkish trained troops to Gedo region of Jubbland State. The objective was to militarily and politically threaten President Ahmed Madobe of Jubbaland and coerce him to realign his political policy with that of the FGS. Deploying troops to Gedo was all but swashbuckling. The President has ignored the fact the Harakat Shabaab Mujahideen might be battered and bruised on the battlefield, but because they’re in it for the long haul, and that’s the truly profound about military strategy and objectives. Somalia’s Central Government showed off its military might in Gedo, but there were few surprises, it has been challenged by both friend and foe further complicating its strategic objectives. War is not always about killing, rather winning hearts and minds of both friend and enemy, that’s the greatest battle and win, the latter is the worst defeat and further poses immeasurable threats to the army.
UNSC; shall we lift the Arms Embargo on Somalia?
Lifting the arms embargo on Somalia will be catastrophic. Literally, the Horn and East African Region will be splattered with cheap weapons sold by agents of the terror group after capturing them from the Somali Army troops. Newly captured weapons will be supplied to the fighters and the old weapons recalled and sold into the robust black market. The aftermath is that, previously shy insurgents and secessionists in the region particularly in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya will get a lifeline and ably challenge convectional military troops. That will be catastrophic. It will destabilize the regions security and economy. Small arms will find way to the hands of criminal gangs and political outfits subsequently orchestrating crimes against humanity and insecurity. Allowing Somalia to acquire arms will have catastrophic ramifications on the regions security and economy further tilting the geopolitics. Not until a time when Somalia will have a proper army with a clear mission and objective besides a focused political leadership at the helm, currently, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo is a ticking time bomb, whose missions will certain blow away every recent gain by the struggling state. And is it even possible for AMISOM to exit Somalia if SNA cannot defend itself on the long-term? How will neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya manage the instability that will come with AMISOM exit?
