In Summary
Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), popularly known as Al-Shabaab presents a threat to Somalia and broader East Africa countries, especially Kenya. Al-Shabaab routinely attacks Somali citizens, military forces, and its coalitions partners. The Islamist group continue to target security troop’s convoys as well as their military bases.
On operational capability of the Somalia National Army, the forces have not met many of the milestones related to operational capability. The Somalia Transition Plan envisioned that by the end of 2020, the Somali security forces would play a leading operational role, continue to degrade Al-Shabaab, build and hold positions along (major supply routes) and continue to strengthen population centers. Besides, Somali security forces continue to rely on international support for operations, and Al-Shabaab is not degraded to the point where Somali security forces can contain its threat independently.
In the past 30 days, the Islamists militant group has claimed at least 69 attacks in East Africa region (Kenya and Somalia). In the month of October Al-Shabaab claimed at least 73 attacks in both Somalia and Kenya while in September at least 65 attacks were recorded for both East African countries. Resumption of large-scale attacks in theater have been noted. Suicide missions, reinforces with indiscriminate close quarter combat to maximize on casualties have increased in the month of November as compared to October.
Al-Shabaab, an associated force of Al-Qaeda terrorist network has continued to launch attacks with at least two to three attacks being recorded every day especially in the Horn of Africa nation, Somalia. Sporadic attacks have also been reported in Kenya’s frontier counties. Al-Shabaab have overly employed insurgent-style tactics, including ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, and improvised explosive device (IED) operations. According to USAFRICOM’s director of intelligence, the command has observed “a definitive shift” in recent months in Al-Shabaab’s focus to attack both civilians and military targets from both local and foreign coalition forces.
The coming year will bring significant challenges to Somalia. Threat levels in Somalia expected to multiply significantly citing the country’s elections are scheduled for February 2021. The militant group most likely in these the subsequent months towards the election day will exploit every opportunity they may get to wage more attacks, further destabilizing Mogadishu administration, besides other semi-autonomous states.
Kenyan counterterrorism assets also to upscale their operations, especially along the border with Somalia to thwart surprise raids besides preempting occasional threats posed by Al-Shabaab on Kenyan soil. Also, security actors to be keen to act recent intelligence reports on new recruitment grounds in the coastal county of Kwale where youths continue to be sneaked into Somalia.
The crisis in Ethiopia which is also among AMISOM troops’ contributing countries in Somalia threatening the regional security.
Assessment/Observations &Insight
The joint Counterterrorism (CT/COIN) actors seeks to disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to Al-Shabaab and pro-ISIS-Somalia operating in northern Somalia and neighboring countries. But despite many years of sustained Somali, U.S., and international counterterrorism pressure, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. The Al-Qaeda’s affiliated Al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement in many parts of southern Somalia and has demonstrated an ability and intent to attack outside of the country.
From August, September, October through November, Al-Shabaab has launched a number of major attacks on both local and foreign troops in Somalia. Significant uptick in Al-Shabaab’s use of vehicle-borne IEDs against U.S., Somali, and AMISOM forces have been noted during these past months. In August, Al-Shabaab had vowed to concentrate their military operations on all military targets. However, Al-Shabaab has continuously used its propaganda media outlets more frequently to claim and broadcast exaggerations of its attacks.
However, while Al-Shabaab controls less territory than it did a decade ago, the group continues to operate with relative impunity, particularly in areas that lack adequate government administration or security presence. The operational regions for Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains notably active in Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Hiran, Galgadud, Mudug, Middle Shabelle and in the capital Mogadishu and its environs. Kenya is another key target of the Islamist militant group. Mandera, Wajir and Garissa reports sporadic attacks. The militants in northeastern prefectures have especially targeted non-locals, public service vehicles, military and police outposts besides vandalizing critical infrastructures such as communication masts.
Concentrated Attacks: Repeat attacks have concentrated on towns and localities of southern and central Somalia. Resumption of targeted attacks, large scale attacks rapidly resuming in the a number of Mogadishu’s district. Some of towns, villages and localities that have experienced repeat attacks in the past recent months include, Dhusamareb city in Mudug region, Baidoa in Bay region, Afmadow, Hosingow, Abdalla Birole and areas in the vicnity of Kismayo, all these regions are in Lower Juba. Hodan, Wadajir, KM-4, Hamar jajab and Abdi aziz district remains hot spots for Al-Shabaab attacks in the capital. Mogadishu’s neighborhood, Benadir also has been targeted a couple of times. In Lower Shabelle, Lambar 60, Elasha Biyaha, Shalanbood, Barawe, Janale and Afgooye are among key towns and locality that continue to record concentrated attacks in the south. Beledweyne town in Hiran region has also suffered several repeat attacks especially targeting army convoys and defense posts. These towns, villages and localities records at least two to three attacks per week. Localities of Gedo, Bakool, Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle also have recorded a number of attacks but not as many as compare to the aforementioned towns, villages and localities.
Large Cache of Weaponry Looted: Following the recent series of large scale attacks from across the regions of Somalia, Al-Shabaab propaganda media have been able to parade spoils looted/seized in a number of their attacks. For example in the latest attack in Ba’adweyne, Mudug region of Somalia, where the islamist militants overran an SNA operating base, the jihadist propaganda online media outlets promoted photos of that particular raid. They paraded large volumes of weapons seized/looted from the operating base including 5 military vehicles, technicals, small and large weapons. Russian Zu-23mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks, 3 DShK heavy machine guns on pickups and a B-10 anti-tank guns, grenades, AK47 rifles, military fatigues among others essential items were captured in one SNA base.
On another recent raid, Al-Shabaab militants killed a veteran C.I.A. officer in combat and seized his military gears. The killed officer was a member of the C.I.A.’s paramilitary division (Special Ops), the Special Activities Center, and a former member of the Navy’s elite SEAL Team 6.
Lack of socioeconomic opportunities and poor governance: The factors could contribute to increased violent extremist activity in East Africa in the coming months and maybe next few years. The lack of socioeconomic opportunities stems from low or unequal growth, high poverty and unemployment, and limited economic development leaving vulnerable youths being recruited into the militant camps. These conditions are common place and are present in several East African states and may be aggravated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on struggling African economies.
Conclusion
There is a possibility that Al-Shabaab could expand its attacks and terrorist operations in Somalia and escalate terrorist attacks against AMISOM troops with the aim of accelerating their withdrawal from Somalia that is anticipated by end of 2021 and filling the void this will increase its area of control.
Counterterrorism actors in Somalia to come up with counter measures to slow down the persistent and steadily Al-Shabaab menace. Even the country’s most advanced, best trained forces, the Danab forces, are struggling, due to heavy combat losses and attrition, an indication the country’s security is still weak and without support from its partners remains unable to fight and degrade Al-Shabaab.
Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outpost for both Kenya and Somalia. Hard targets remain Al-Shabaab key targets. Change of routine on patrol teams as well as armies’ convoys also encouraged to avoid devastating IEDs/landmines that remains so common weapon of choice by the Shabaab.
An after-action review (AAR) on suspected Al-Shabaab camps in sub sectors of south and central Somalia also highly recommended.
