In modern intelligence, gathering and sharing frameworks, the fact that Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism underscores the need to increase incentives and sharing programs to increase threat preemption.
When the United States Intelligence CIA informed the US government of possible terror attacks in the coastal resort city of Mombasa Kenya in the 23rd-24th June weekend, a terror attack took place. 3-people died and dozens seriously injured.
This scenario draws out failure in intelligence sharing between allies in war against terror. Kenya has the National Security Intelligence Service, NSIS, as its intelligence gathering organ while the US has the world famous CIA. These two organizations should have shared the intelligence with the CIA providing leads that could have facilitated the preemptive attack on the terror cell by Kenyan authorities.
However, two scenarios play out in this catastrophic event: one, diplomatic constraints and two, intelligence failure at NSIS. Kenya and the US maybe having differences based on various sensitive economic and military reasons and the US may opt withholding vital intelligence to get back. This culminates to intelligence sharing failure with CIA having credible intelligence, which it will not pass to the NSIS for the diplomatic reasons mentioned.
While the above reason is an extreme measure with catastrophic ramifications to an extent of human rights violation, validity and the sense in opting such a policy remains adequate during diplomatic impasses. However, Intelligence sharing could be present with vital information often shared by the CIA and NSIS.
This perspective is supported by the fact that the US depends on Kenya for both regional military and economic reasons. Kenya is home to various American naval, covert intelligence and military operations bases. As such sharing intelligence between CIA and NSIS is mutual and of strategic value to both countries.
This leaves the NSIS and its customers as culpable. Strategic Intelligence identifies different ways in which the NSIS and its customers engage in conscious distortion of information besides the politicization of intelligence as what leads to intelligence failure and subsequent breach of national security. SIN validates the fact that Kenya is always unable to anticipate terror attacks. This problem manifests due to limited speculative capabilities, which lay the foundation for subsequent analytic culture on human intelligence on the speculated threats.
Without speculation and analysis of what factors the speculation, there are serious deficits in the capacity to anticipate and preempt threats. NSIS upon receiving intelligence should have planned to collect and analyze intelligence within time and other constrains.
According to intelligence gathered by Strategic Intelligence; On 23rd June, a popular cafe in the heart of Qansah Dheere district of southwestern Somalia was bombed and 3 people (military personnel) injured. Many people were drinking tea at this popular caf