The defeat of the Islamic State in the Middle East led to the establishment and declaration of several Wilayat in Africa among them Somalia known as Abnaa Ul Calipha (ISS) and the Central Africa Province (ISCAP). For the better of the year, the groups have been stepping up their operations in Somalia, Mozambique, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) respectively. The insurgencies have morphed from local militias to ruthless and brutal terrorist organizations that seek to establish an Islamic caliphate in their respective territories while at the same time furthering the core ideology of ISIS-central. However, in the past few weeks, a considerable lull in all the groups’ activities and operations in their respective countries have been observed as a trend that can be attributed to many factors among them stepped COIN efforts by government security apparatuses.
Evolution of ISCAP
The inception of ISCAP in Mozambique can be traced to oppressed youth in a resource-rich region that appears not to benefit locals rather line the pockets of oil companies and government officials. Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado which has a huge Muslim population has had a lot of political grievances with the Mozambican government with locals feeling deprived of their rightful share in the spoils of the natural resources available in the province. Further, the deprivation has translated to the province being inadequately catered for politically, socially, economically, and recently security due to ill-equipped and few military personnel.
In Mozambique, intelligence indicates that the group has been receiving recruits from across the East Africa region as well as its recruitment drives in Cabo Delgado. S.I. analysts previously connoted that an exhibited change in tactics by the group was geared at seeking legitimacy and gaining favor with local youth and communities at large. Before the military intervention and response to the terror activities in the majority of the districts, most attacks are temporary occupancy where the group razed government buildings without attacking the residents and as such could be contributing factors to recruitment and a surge in the number of attacks. It is important to note that the residents of the restive north have had economic grievances that have not been adeptly addressed by the Mozambican government and thus giving ISCAP an avenue to exploit. This can be evidenced by the seeming lack of local benefits for the province despite the rich oil and natural gas reserves location in Cabo Delgado.
COIN strategies and efforts
In the past fortnight, a considerable quiet has been observed in Mozambique with attacks by ISCAP being almost absent. The lull can be credited to the fact that while DAG’s security contract was renewed, the police and military have been mounting attacks on ISCAP’s bases as well as sweeping the districts for sympathizers and enablers. These efforts have matched the terrorists’ especially seeing as their significant kinetic and aerial support to attack and counterattack efforts by the terror organization. While there were allegations that the government forces have been mistreating the locals, torturing them for information, looting, and other heinous crimes instead of protecting the residents, the reports have been refuted and the majority of the detained residents released after questioning and determining their innocence. It is important to note that the detention of suspect sympathizers is crucial to collecting the necessary data to full the intelligence gaps that the troops have and in curating effective counterinsurgency strategies specific to Cabo Delgado.
Despite the Mozambican military having serious shortcomings in terms of operation ability and intelligence gaps, counterinsurgency strategies in the past few weeks have proven effective and been credited for the lull in attacks. Additionally, the militants have moved from their showy attacks to guerrilla-like attacks that are swift and often involve the kidnappings of women and girls. The kidnappings are a clear indicator that the foot soldiers have been injured and ISCAP requires women and girls to tend to the wounded fighters. The successes by the Mozambican forces can be lauded as swift and despite various allegations of corruption and brutality yielding the desirable effects of pushing the militants into hibernation. Therefore, kidnapping and seeming hibernation of the group translates to the group either having a lot of wounded soldiers or a huge number that requires to be tended by the women and girls as they train in anticipation of future attacks.
South Africa Taking ISCAP Threat Seriously
Recently, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) members and especially South Africa have taken a keen interest in the security situation in the restive north as intelligence has revealed that the group has active members recruited from neighbouring countries. South Africa has expressed a hastened need to send support to Mozambique to avoid a repeat of the spread of the Jihadist movement as seen in the Sahel, Maghreb, and the Lake Chad region where small groups expanded and became transnational terrorist organizations. Last month, Islamic State published an editorial on its al-Naba online bulletin in which it warned, in Arabic, that if South Africa intervened militarily in Cabo Delgado this ‘may result in prompting the soldiers of the Islamic State to open a fighting front inside its borders! – by the permission of God Almighty.’ The direct threat to South Africa ought to be taken seriously seeing as the group’s actual capability is elusive and unknown and triggering attacks within the region could heighten the threat and destabilize the region. Islamic State has sleeper cells in South Africa and has recruited South Africans into its ranks. Some of these extremists fought with the group in Syria, some are involved in Cabo Delgado, and others are lying low in various cities in the country.
Hibernation and Possible cells in Uganda and Tanzania
Tanzania has in the past asserted that it is necessary to unite the defense and security forces of both countries to combat terrorism at the borders. Tanzania has been a hub for jihadists with various affiliations and it would be risky for Tanzania to fail to band up with Mozambique in fighting ISCAP. The presence of Tanzanian nationals within the ranks of ISCAP offers motivation for both the hundreds of online Tanzanian youths who’ve shown sympathy and willing to join other jihadists fronting attacks against the government of Tanzania. The same is true for Uganda which has also heard members for the ADF the other half of ISCAP and the al-Qaeda affiliated al Shabaab from Somalia. Intelligence has revealed that there are actively recruiting and training cells in Uganda where there is a sizable presence of ADF. Early, In the metamorphosis of ISCAP in Mozambique, there was a huge percent of Ugandan fighters, and as such the threat continues to grow as the group continues to expand and gain momentum. While the risk of spreading across Tanzania and Uganda is still minimal, strengthening regional intelligence sharing and reinforce early response mechanisms are the primary steps of ensuring the group does not expand further.
