Al Shabaab has been exhibiting a change in its tactics, attacks formation, and frequency as well as stealth that indicates that the group has gradually adopted a seemingly more effective attack model. The group has show boldness in its attacks by targeting more high security and high-profile position as compared to previously. During the weekend the group claimed several attacks that occurred across Somalia.
Events
- Al-Shabaab claimed it attacked a Somali government military barracks in Afmadow, Lower Juba and inflicted unspecified casualties.
- In Afgooye, Lower Shabelle Al-Shabaab said it assassinated a NISA officer
- Al-Shabaab claimed it assassinated a Somali special forces officer, “Musa (Muse) Abu Bakr Nurow,” and seized his pistol near Seybiyano, Mogadishu; Al-Shabab accused him of participating in U.S. Special Forces raids in Lower Shabelle
- In Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle Al-Shabaab claimed it attacked multiple Somali government military barracks
- Al-Shabaab claimed it assassinated a Puntland finance ministry official in Galkayo.
Insights
The attacks clearly indicate a worrying pattern that undoubtedly indicates that while the United Nations failed to designate the al-Qaeda affiliated al Shabaab the group has shown resilience and adaptability that elude the SNA troops as well as allied US and AU troops active in Somalia. Al Shabaab which has been active for over two decades has continued to wreak havoc in the East African region and can be traced as the origin of the Islamic State in Somalia.
The frequency and ostensible articulation of the attacks clearly indicate that the groups’ intelligence gathering and planning units have stepped up and appear to always be ahead of the national troops. Their mode of operation indicates eliteness in the execution of the attacks with S.I. Analysts observing that missions that were previously conducted by over 50 fighters are now allocated to small groups of less than 10 fighters. Assassinations are now being incorporated especially against prominent political and security figures as strategic maneuvers to demoralize and dismantle the gains achieved by Somalia’s security apparatus.
It is evident that albeit SNA’s claims of capability building, and strengthened ability to manage Somalia’s security after AMISOM pull-out, they are playing catch-up with a strong and rejuvenated al Shabaab. Al Shabaab has strengthened its grassroots reach with attacks and operations in all regions not just Middle and Southern parts of the country.
Therefore, it is evident that Somalia and SNA are unprepared to adequately deal with Al Shabaab and as AMISOM withdrawal nears, the possibility of al Shabaab reshaping negating the gains achieved by the AU troops is almost guaranteed. As such, SNA should employ tactics that match up with the re-imaged Al Shabaab, curb corruption within its ranks, patch up leaks that trickle information to the terrorists to ensure that efforts injected into fighting the terrorists are not redundant.
