The new administration in Somalia has waged war on the Al-Qaeda affiliate in the East African country, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) targeting the terrorists outposts in the country’s heartland. Throughout the ongoing counter terrorism operations, there are conflicting stories of success in the battlefield; neither has much supporting public evidence. On the other hand, the terror group that has re-modelled its structures and reads from the Taliban script is putting up a resistance by orchestrating multiple terrorists’ attacks across the country and overrunning the Somali Army camps and capturing SNA arms and logistical capabilities. The terror group is also outbidding the Government making its resistance more subtle and the operations complex and enduring.
What is the principle objective of the counter terrorism campaign against the Al-Shabaab terror group?
The end game in most CT operations is to destroy the terror group to ensure it doesn’t exist in any effective form whereby its shattered remnant is left to issuing empty threats and statements. This means destroying its leadership, military capabilities, theological capacity, and sociopolitical networks. Counter Terrorism is pronged 3-ways: tactical, operational, and strategic. We can see some good efforts by GOS in the areas of ‘sociopolitical network and military capabilities but the net gains are underwhelming (poor kinetic and reactive means of; tactical & Operational counter terrorism).
The terror group’s capacity to conduct multiple attacks across the country remains intact while its leadership, theological capacity, and sociopolitical mettle is seemingly intact. SNA has been outsourcing firepower and force multipliers from local clan militia in Central Somalia, particularly the Hawiye sub-clans (strategic counter terrorism). These militia have inferior military capabilities and have zero background in counter insurgency operations and CQB contact in theater making them sitting ducks against the somewhat organized terrorists. These battlefield facts cannot be discounted and worse, the failure to understand these dynamics will make international partners anxious about the campaign.
Most importantly, every counter terrorism operation is critical, the global fraternity is seeking a common ground in countering the persistent threat, hence what Somalia is doing is part of the global initiative. Terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to state as well as well as in the service of state interests and in Somalia, it is directed against Government for purpose of political change, as such, victims of terrorism here are of little or no intrinsic value to the perpetrators. This begs the question: What will current CT Ops by GOS achieve from these kinetic operations on the short & medium term? Can the particular operation reach+attain a tempo that can support and sustain tactical and operational counter-terrorism measures?
Outbidding Operations by Al-Shabaab against SNA: Quantity of Violence
The Government of Somalia, GOS adopted a unique model of warfare in current CT Operations where it is leveraging on the domestic militia to multiply its violence against the Al-Shabaab terror group. Interestingly, the competition on the quantity of violence between SNA and Al-Shabaab is favoring the terror group more. The outbidding focused on having local communities deploy their militia to violently engage and subsequently destroy the terrorist outposts and networks in Central Somalia. During such combat, the government would deploy military troops to support the militia. During the initial stages, we observed some levels of success but the quality of violence is on a steady decline in past 3 weeks. It is critical in such operations that competition should have an observable effect on the quality of violence. The tactical and strategic aspects of the effort show SNA using information on the tactics and targets of clan militia attacks is leading to more severe or “shocking” types of attacks from the terrorist group (Reference made to multiple overrunning of camps and capture of large cache of sophisticated weapons and military trucks besides massacre of both militia and Somali Army Forces in Hiraan. Other incidents include Kismayu Tawakaal attack and possible attacks on ATMIS FOBS in the AOR).
In their ‘Outbidding Operation’, the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia has exploited the domestic condition wherein the general population is uncertain about who between GOS and them, best represents their interests. Historically, the clans have heavily relied on the terror group for food aid, giving the terrorists an edge. Citizens often support the group that best aligned with their own interests. The terror group has exploited this card, using the West as the greatest enemy and the SNA as its stooge thus declaring themselves zealots. They are tactically dragging clans into confrontations have an incentive to signal that they are zealots rather than sellouts. GOS needs psychological warfare support to outbid the terrorist group. Most profound is SNA to win the battle of hearts and minds of the Somali public. With heavily armed clan militias from the Hawiye and Rahanwayne swearing fealty to the terrorist group and declaring the Somali Army as an enemy and stooge of the United States, winning the war will bog them down and the enduring battles will remain endless.
