The latest violent clash between Somali Military elements (SNA) and belligerents of the Jubbaland Security Forces (JSF) on 25th January 2021, at Bulla Hawo flashpoint, a trading center that lies right across Kenya’s border with the fragile Somalia has the Federal Government (FGS) and its patrons agog and diplomats aflutter with speculation. The view of either, is important to the immediate diplomatic opportunity. It is not about the usual trite ideas about winning wars and the context of offence and defense, rather another fissure in the East Africa Region. Apart from such a glaring possibility, a full blown ethnic conflict is likely to manifest, in the event of an escalation. Subsequently, if the specter of ethnic strife is raised, the fragile Horn country will suffer a more burdening decline. Director David Goldman provides fresh insight on the crisis and lays bare IGAD Mission findings that indicts Mogadishu.
Somalia devolves into a collection of de facto regional groupings or better, ‘the Federal Member States’, and has undergone some extraordinary demographic adjustments in the recent past. Perhaps these adjustments were unforeseen, if not politically underestimated, thus factoring a desperate attempt by the current FGS Regime to assert and consolidate supreme control. To reclaim at least some control of particular FMS who’ve significantly benefited structurally and economically from these demographic adjustments, FGS fell short of soft-power strategies thus got stuck with lame military action and awfully underwhelming bellicose diplomacy, all which aren’t panaceas for such conflict.
Perhaps the problem, wholly, should have been confined to domestic politics, unfortunately it morphed to a regional geopolitical and diplomatic conflict, one which is capable of causing upheaval at both the United Nations Security Council and the European Union Caucus. Already, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, is deeply embedded in the conflict with member states attempting to reverse the unfortunate escalation and its significantly negative ramifications.
Describing the Conflict, and the IGAD Findings.
Late 2020 Somalia announced it’d would suspend diplomatic relations with the neighboring Republic of Kenya. The deterioration in relations between the two neighborly states was sparked by 5 violations cited by the outgoing FGS leadership. FGS Followed through the threats and severed ties with Nairobi by recalling its entire mission. In announcing the diplomatic and trade freezes, Mogadishu cited loudly, Kenya’s alleged creation, training, and support for armed groups that they consider illegitimate, specifically the Jubbaland Security Force (JSF) under the command of Abdirashid Janaan, perhaps the only crucible of the conflict from a threat lens prism. The intention of severing diplomatic and bilateral ties was intended to put economic pressure on Nairobi as a deterrence.
With Somalia apparently staring at a terminal decline again, it is a security concern for the countries in East Africa. Prevention begins with avoiding the escalatory ladder thus the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD during its 38th summit, took up the case and subsequently mandated Djibouti President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, to investigate the 5 violations. Of the 5, only the airspace violation was found plausible. The claim that Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) AMISOM Contingent was abandoning duty and was violating the territorial integrity of Somalia was found false and unfounded. IGAD considered unjustified the ostracism against the KDF acting on behalf of AMISOM.
Jubbaland Federal Member State administration and its security forces (JSF) is the epicenter of the conflict, however though, the claims by FGS about Nairobi supporting the Ahmed Madobe administration were found overwhelmingly false and that the Jubbaland Security Forces (JSF) were a legitimate security force and had played a very key role in combating terrorism. JSF was formed after an agreement in London 17th May 2017 wherein a Somali security architecture was adopted allowing maintaining armies of the ‘regions’ in addition to the regional police. The Commission during the fact finding mission located them inside the Somali territory indicting Somalia of making false claims about Kenya. FGS had claimed that the JSF was stationed inside Kenya, yet the claims were false. The commission’s further noted it is true the Federal Government of Somalia is sovereign, however, it cannot help but be considered disproportionate and unproductive because the two countries intimately linked politically, humanely, and economically. The commission thus recommended more diplomatic efforts to be deployed at the highest level in order to reconcile the two neighbors. With Nairobi exonerated and Mogadishu indicted of false claims and unwarranted diplomatic behavior.
What was the purpose of swashbuckling? It is a zero sum game and if not, a costly long-term diplomatic blunder for the Somali’s. Their bargaining power declined tenfold and they will always be looked down for being untrustworthy and careless. Domestically, they did not win public support and that is the truly profound aspect of the problem.
What Next? A Return of Diplomatic Ties or an Escalation?
Bulla Hawo is now a Geopolitical and Security Flashpoint with several political and security tripwires. Such border flashpoints are unstable largely due to sensitive sociopolitical dynamics, and often birth regional conflicts, for example; the Al-Fashaqa farmlands that have pit Sudan against Ethiopia. This crucible of conflict needs a lasting solution. The FGS and Jubbaland FMS must end the hostilities. The integration of JSF in the SNA Architecture will provide a nuanced counterbalance; and that is a Fairly good balancing act.
These type of conflict are often solved through diplomacy despite their length and breadth. Sociopolitical alliances in Somalia’s FMS will change, so will FGS Admins, heralding new relations that will span across and beyond its borders. For posterity and Somalia’s prosperity, bellicose diplomacy must be abandoned. Such aggressive postures often expose the center to external interference and the state to subversion. Subsequently, a decay in domestic stability and decline is inevitable. It is upon the FGS to restart bilateral and diplomatic ties with Nairobi.
This conflict has ultimately played an important role in shaping the foreign policy orientations of the East African countries. The new orientation leans towards ramping up military and economic cooperation with each other to avert similar future scenarios. While Kenya is generally viewed as a regional super-power, it is described as a rival, ‘quietly’ and a looming threat and maybe Mogadishu fell for such geopolitical myths and related conspiracies, if it as client state.
But there is a problem, a small blow to the Kenya – Somalia trust. To Mogadishu, the tiff was another short term tactical win at a high cost to Kenya’s long-term strategic position in the region and this is a significant bilateral and diplomatic problem to say the least. Nairobi’s new policy will be hinged on deterrence. Nairobi’s grand strategy will focus actions to bolster cohesion in borderline communities, weaken opponents’ resolve and internal cohesion, strengthen relationships with allies’ and attract uncommitted states — to end conflicts on favorable terms without sowing seeds for future conflicts in an era of blunt trust and pragmatic military posturing. It’ll be about deterrence and it means a lot of things alltogether.
