Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Review for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of June 1st – June 30th, 2025: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

The month of June 2025 witnessed a disturbing resurgence of terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab group in Kenya and largely in Somalia, highlighting the group’s enduring threat across the Horn of Africa. A total of 51 recorded incidents reflect the group’s sustained capacity to stage asymmetric warfare, with Somalia bearing the brunt of the violence. Al-Shabaab, which has entrenched itself in central and southern Somalia, continues to pose a grave threat not only to Somali state-building efforts but also to Kenya’s border security and regional stability.

Somalia experienced the highest concentration of attacks, with government forces, including the Somali National Army (SNA), local allied militias, and African Union forces under ATMIS, emerging as the primary targets. In at least 36 incidents within Somalia, Al-Shabaab aimed at government military posts, convoys, and infrastructure. These attacks often involved ambushes, IEDs, hit-and-run raids, and mortar fire. Kenya, on the other hand, recorded 15 incidents, primarily targeting Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTU), and General Service Unit (GSU) patrols, especially in northeastern counties bordering Somalia.

The attack types employed by Al-Shabaab during this period ranged from complex raids and ambushes to the widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). Small arms fire, mortar shelling, and occasional suicide bombings were also reported. IEDs remained the weapon of choice, especially in Lamu, Mandera, and Garissa counties of Kenya, where roads were rigged with explosives targeting security patrols and transport convoys. In Somalia, the group leaned more on coordinated assaults and mortar attacks on Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), reflecting its deep understanding of the terrain and ability to mobilize fighters swiftly.

In Kenya, the most prone areas during the review period were Lamu County—particularly the Boni Forest axis—Garissa (near Hulugho and Liboi), and Mandera County. These regions remain vulnerable due to their proximity to the Somalia border, difficult terrain, and limited government presence. For Somalia, Hirshabelle and Galmudug states emerged as the most targeted, especially in districts like Mahas, Ceel Dheer, and Moqokori. The Hiran and Lower Shabelle regions largely remained volatile, with strategic locations such as Bariire and Awdheegle witnessing intense clashes.

These patterns underscore the persistent operational reach of Al-Shabaab, which, despite military pressure, continues to destabilize vast regions through guerrilla tactics, propaganda, and the exploitation of porous borders. The group’s capacity to adapt and strike in both rural and urban settings demonstrates its resilience and strategic intent. The continued attacks are a stark reminder of the need for coordinated counterterrorism operations, improved intelligence-sharing between Kenya and Somalia, and stronger community engagement to undermine Al-Shabaab’s local support and recruitment networks.

Terrorism Events: June 1^st – June 30^th

1. June 30, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants launched another attack on the Baay-Burjeed military base, located approximately 13 kilometers outside Baidoa, according to local reports.
2. June 29, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants captured the village of Ceel-Qoxle from Macawisley fighters, located approximately 13 kilometers from Moqokori town in the Hiiraan region.
3. June 28, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants clashed with Somali Special Forces in Bulo Haji outside of Kismayo, Lower Juba, Somalia.
4. June 28, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants carried out a kangaroo court and executed five “spies” in El Buur, Galgaduud, Somalia.
5. June 28, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali intelligence forces in Bardera, Gedo, Somalia.
6. June 28, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somalian militia member in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia.
7. June 27, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somali militia forces in the outskirts of Baidoa, Bay, Somalia.
8. June 26, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED on Somali security forces in Yaqshid District, Mogadishu, Somalia.
9. June 26, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Somali militia forces in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia.
10. June 26, 2025: An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in Mogadishu’s Bakaro Market, targeting a security checkpoint located in the vegetable section of the commercial hub. Preliminary reports confirmed multiple casualties.
11. June 25, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants took control of Cel Qoxle after militiamen fled near Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
12. June 25, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Somali intelligence services in Beled Hawo, Gedo, Somalia.
13. June 25, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on government militia forces and took control of multiple villages around Yasooman, Hiran, Somalia.
14. June 25, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia forces near Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
15. June 25, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Somalian militia forces in Adale, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.
16. June 23, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault and took control of two Somali militia bases in Baidoa, Bay, Somalia.
17. June 22, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somali intelligence officer in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
18. June 22, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia forces near Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
19. June 22, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants took control of Ceel-Qooxle, a strategically located area in the eastern Hiran region, following a fierce battle earlier in the day.
20. June 19, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on a Somali militia encampment in Wajid, Bakool, Somalia.
21. June 18, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED on Somali militia forces in Ceelwaaq, Gedo, Somalia.
22. June 17, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants used an IED to target and destroy a Kenyan military convoy near Mount Komuli, Kenya-Somalia border.
23. June 17, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants attempted to assassinate the Chief of Defense Force, Major General Odowaa Yusuf Rageh, in Adale, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.
24. June 17, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated a suicide bomb targeting an African Union convoy in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
25. June 16, 2025: Two Somali militia soldiers were taken by Al-Shabaab as prisoners of war in Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
26. June 16, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on a Somali forces convoy in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
27. June 16, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants launched an armed assault and IED double tap attack on Somali and Ugandan army forces in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
28. June 15, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants carried out a similar assault and IED double tap attack on Ugandan and Somali soldiers in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
29. June 15, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somali militia forces in Tarda, Hiran, Somalia.
30. June 14, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED on a police station in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia.
31. June 13, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia forces near Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
32. June 12, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Somali police forces in Baidoa, Bay State, Somalia.
33. June 12, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia forces near Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
34. June 12, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somali security forces in the Tabila neighborhood of Mogadishu, Somalia.
35. June 12, 2025: Fighting was reported between Al-Shabaab militants and local government forces in the Mooro-Erri area, near Moqokori town in eastern Hiran region.
36. June 11, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Somali Danab Brigade soldiers in Adale, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.
37. June 11, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a Kenyan army convoy near Alunga, Mandera County, Kenya.
38. June 11, 2025: Suspected Al-Shabaab militants reportedly threw a hand grenade at a security checkpoint in the Berdaale neighborhood, near the Cunaay intersection in Baidoa, Bay region.
39. June 10, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somali intelligence officer in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle District, Somalia.
40. June 9, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia and army forces in Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
41. June 9, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Kenyan army soldiers in Halango, Mandera County, Kenya.
42. June 6, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Somalian militia members in El-Hariri, Hiran, Somalia.
43. June 5, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali forces gathering with an IED, destroying a motorcycle and inflicting losses in Dagmada Daynile, Mogadishu, Somalia.
44. June 5, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants launched a sweeping attack resulting in the full takeover of a village in Moqokori, Hiran, Somalia.
45. June 5, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants launched an attack against the Halane International Military Base in Mogadishu, Somalia.
46. June 5, 2025: Several mortar shells were fired in Mogadishu, reportedly targeting the Aden Adde International Airport.
47. June 4, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali forces military base, inflicting losses, in Wajid, Bakool, Somalia.
48. June 4, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants reportedly seized Ceelhareeri village, located in eastern Hiran region, near the town of Moqokori.
49. June 3, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a Kenyan forces military convoy, inflicting serious losses among troops, in Fafi, Garissa, Kenya.
50. June 3, 2025: Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali forces gathering with an IED, inflicting losses in Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
51. June 2, 2025: Al-Shabaab seized Hawaadley Town following the withdrawal of Burundian forces. The group also claimed to have fired at an AU military helicopter.

Analysis, Observation & Insights

In June 2025, Al-Shabaab combatants escalated their violent campaign across Somalia and northeastern Kenya, conducting over 50 documented attacks—36 in Somalia and 15 in Kenya. The group primarily targeted government security forces, local allied militias, and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) personnel. These attacks demonstrate the group’s continued operational capability and its intent to disrupt counterterrorism operations, reclaim lost territory, and undermine public confidence in state security apparatus. Notably, Al-Shabaab fighters displayed tactical coordination in launching ambushes, planting IEDs, and conducting frontal assaults, especially in regions like Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and parts of southern Somalia.

A closer analysis reveals a strategic shift in the group’s tactics. In Somalia, the combatants intensified their pressure on strategic military routes and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), including attacks on positions in Ceelqooxle, Moqokori, and Mahas. The release of propaganda materials following some of these operations—such as graphic images and battlefield claims—highlighted the psychological warfare element in Al-Shabaab’s approach. In Kenya, attacks remained concentrated along the Lamu-Garissa-Mandera axis, where road ambushes and IED blasts targeted police patrols and military convoys. The use of rudimentary explosive devices and small arms indicates a low-cost yet high-impact insurgency approach, which continues to strain local law enforcement efforts and national security budgets.

Security analysts are raising concerns as Al-Shabaab continues its unchallenged advance in eastern Hiran, capturing the villages of Xagare and Gumarre without resistance following the retreat of Macaawisley forces to Moqokori. The militants are reportedly closing in on Moqokori from both Yasooman and Adan Yabaal, employing a pincer movement similar to the strategy used in their previous assault on Ceel Qoxle. Experts warn that the Federal Government’s military strategy is collapsing under pressure, exposing a dangerous lack of battlefield agility and coordination. Without urgent tactical intervention, Moqokori may be the next domino to fall.

The situation reflects a stark contrast between the Federal Government’s media narratives and the grim reality on the ground. While officials in Mogadishu focus on public relations, Al-Shabaab is securing real territorial gains. Analysts argue that the loss of Moqokori would not be just another tactical setback but a significant turning point in the conflict for control of central Somalia, signaling the growing momentum of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence.

Al-Shabaab has escalated its propaganda campaign by releasing graphic images from the recent clashes in Ceelqooxle, aiming to project dominance and intimidate both government forces and civilians. The photos, widely circulated on pro-militant platforms, serve as psychological warfare—amplifying the perception of strength following the confirmed fall of Ceelqooxle to the group. More than a battlefield update, the move is a calculated propaganda tactic designed to exploit government setbacks, demoralize allied militias, and rally support among Al-Shabaab’s ranks as it intensifies its expansion across central Somalia.

During the month under review, Al-Shabaab militants seemed to have tightened their grip on critical routes southwest of Mogadishu, maintaining control of three out of four strategic bridges—Bariire, Sabiid/Caanoole, and Awdheegle—posing a renewed threat to the capital’s security. Despite joint efforts by Somali government forces and African Union troops to reclaim these vital crossings, recent operations, including a major offensive at the Bariire Bridge, have failed due to the group’s fortified positions and underground defenses. Similar missions targeting the Sabiid and Caanoole bridges near Afgoye have also been unsuccessful, underscoring the militants’ entrenched presence. The continued occupation of the Awdheegle bridge further exposes Mogadishu’s vulnerability and reflects the broader security challenges in the region.

In conclusion, the pattern of attacks in June 2025 underscores a few key insights. First, Al-Shabaab is increasingly exploiting ungoverned spaces, porous borders, and community-level vulnerabilities to expand its influence and evade direct confrontation. Second, the group’s resilience points to enduring logistical and recruitment networks, possibly supported by external financiers or internal sympathizers. Finally, despite national and regional counterterrorism strategies, the lack of consistent joint operations, weak intelligence coordination, and overstretched security forces continue to hinder a sustainable rollback of Al-Shabaab’s threat. The month’s attacks are a reminder that addressing the insurgency requires not only military might but also governance reform, deradicalization efforts, and transnational cooperation.