Event Summary: On the night of Monday the 25th of May 2015, Somalia-based terrorists Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen laid an ambush on a Kenya Police patrol unit at Yumbis area of Garissa County in NEP Kenya
The terrorists first used an improvised landmine to destroy a police vehicle with 4 police officers.
The police unit called for reinforcements from Dadaab and Alinjugur.
The police units from Dadaab and Alinjugur were attacked by the gunmen on their way to the conflict theater.
An exchange of fire and subsequent destruction of 2 police Toyota Land-cruisers ensued.
A Police officer succumbed to gunshots and another was critically injured. 4 other were admitted to hospital with gunshots wounds that were not critical.
Analysis of the Yumbis Attack Event
Kenya’s Inspector General of Police, Joseph Boinett issued a final report concluding all officers were accounted for following the ambush by the terrorists.
The Police Chief further clarified that two vehicles were burned by the militants, but no civilians were affected.
Combat Capability
There are interesting aspects of the attack. One notable aspect is the capability of the police to neutralize the threat posed by the highly trained militants.
It shows the Kenya Police are well trained in combat. Al-Shabaab militia as such is no match to the Kenyan police.
Tactical Knowledge
The police units were able to quickly disembark upon attack, organized themselves, deployed, and attacked the enemies swiftly.
This is a very important element of well trained police tasked to combat armed criminals.
The strategy employed by the terrorists was two-phased. The first phase was to distress the first patrol unit and force it to make distressed calls for urgent reinforcement.
Al-Shabaab had hoped the police reinforcements would come in poorly prepared and briefed. Also, they hoped the reinforcements would be in vulnerable formations.
Bad battlefield formations often allow enemies to quickly exploit the weakness and subsequently weaken and destroy combatants through both fire-power and tactical advantage.
The police overcame the ambush regardless of the terrorists firepower and tactical advantage.
The police also defeated the attackers who had already made formations aimed at neutralizing the police tactical and combat capability.
OSINT Summary on the Yumbis Attack
The Yumbis terror attack failed. The terrorists were no match to the police officers who had less firepower and lesser tactical advantage.
Al-Shabaab fighters fled to nearby forests. This shows they have no military capability. Such attacks are indicative of groups morphing into bandits and armed robbers.
The attackers opted to use media to spread falsehood. The information was widely shared by anti-government bloggers who most journalists misconstrue for credible sources of information. This could have been a win for the terrorists.
The actual Yumbis Attack reports from both civilians and the government sources discredited Al-Shabaab and both local and international media reports.
It further confirms the Al-Shabaab is fragmented and deeply divided to an extent there is no central command to relay actual information within the terror outfit.
So why send police, with light weapons to rescue their colleagues from AS attack who are heavily armed? Why didnt the police Hq give them air escort with the military YY, and the base is just within Garissa? Cant we have lessons learnt, especially from Baragoi an entire platoon of Police force was ambushed and butchered? Why do we have always repeated mistakes? I dont buy that
I am really glad to hear that the actual casualties were far fewer than those earlier reported. But your post is an obvious attempt to put a positive spin on the true circumstances surrounding this event. No little wonder the public places so much more trust in the private media. Going by the recent massacres of our police forces, I don’t blame the members of this ambushed unit from running into cover to save their own lives. The lack of accurate updates for so many hours on this incident points to a state of operational shambles. Does it mean there were no hand held communication devices for them to use to update their commanders on the situation? Our police officers are obviously operating under very poor conditions. Thank god they were able to save themselves. The loss of a couple of land cruisers is a small price to pay for their lives.
I like the conclusions you arrive at following the analysis above. It means Kenya police has stopped sending young-inexperienced recruits into the battlefield.