Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for the Month of February 2025

Executive Summary

In February 2025, Islamic State-affiliated groups in East and Central Africa maintained a high operational tempo, launching multiple attacks across Mozambique, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

In Mozambique, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants carried out coordinated assaults targeting both security forces and Christian civilians, particularly in Macomia, Montepuez, and Mocimboa da Praia districts. Key incidents included an IED attack on security forces in Nagulue (Macomia) and the execution of civilians in Muidumbe. The Mozambican military suffered setbacks, as evidenced by ISM’s successful capture of weapons during an attack on a security outpost in Bilibiza (Quissanga). Despite ongoing Rwandan military patrols limiting ISM’s movements, the group demonstrated resilience by shifting operations to less secure regions.

In Somalia, Islamic State Somalia (ISS) intensified attacks in Puntland, targeting security forces with IEDs, rocket strikes, and a complex suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) operation against Puntland Forces HQ in Haraaryo. ISS faced significant losses from U.S. airstrikes, which eliminated senior leaders such as Ahmed Maeleninine and bomb maker Godka Kunle. However, Puntland’s strained relations with the Mogadishu government risk hampering a unified counterterrorism strategy. Additionally, the arrest of an alleged IS sympathizer in Minnesota highlights the ongoing global recruitment efforts by ISS.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) escalated its insurgency in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. Executions of Christian civilians were a recurring pattern, particularly along RN4 in Ituri, where multiple targeted killings were recorded. The group also conducted direct attacks on Congolese security forces in Lubero and Wazalendo militia in Matuna. The increased frequency of attacks in February, especially in previously dormant areas like Ndimo, indicates ISCAP’s renewed focus on asserting territorial influence.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 20^th Feb- ISM militants led an armed assault on Mozambican army forces in Bilibiza in Quissanga district.
• 17^th Feb- A Christian was captured and executed by ISM terrorists in Chitunda in Muidumbe district.
• 10^th Feb- an IED was detonated by ISM militants targeting Mozambican forces in Nagulue area in Macomia district.
• 06^th Feb- several civilians and militia forces were attacked by ISM terrorists in Litandacua in Macomia district.
• 03^rd Feb- ISM rebels led an armed assault against Christians in Nikokwe area in Montepuez district.
• 02^nd Feb- ISM militants launched an armed attack on Mozambican army forces and Christian civilians in Mitope, located in the Mocimboa da Praia.

SOMALIA

• 20^th Feb- Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants and Puntland forces in Qurac Village in Bari region where several casualties were reported.
• 16^th Feb- US Airstrike eliminated 16 ISS militants along with bomb Maker Godka Kunle, Bari region.
• 13^TH Feb- a US airstrike in the Cal Miskaat Mountains, Bari, successfully eliminated Ahmed Maeleninine, a key leader of ISS along with 13 other militants.
• 12^TH Feb- ISS militants launched an SVBIED attack followed by an Inghimasi raid on Puntland Forces HQ in Haraaryo, Bari.
• 10^th Feb- ISS Militants fired rockets targeting Puntland security forces in Dharin in Bari Region.
• 10^th Feb- a Puntland forces explosives specialist dies while defusing an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by ISS militants in Bari.
• 09^th Feb– a Ugandan citizen was arrested amid the crackdown on foreigners allegedly joining ISS in Somalia.
• 08^th Feb– ISS detonated two IEDs targeting the Puntland forces convoy neat Tuur Masale in Bari region.
• 06^th Feb- ISS Militants fired rockets targeting Puntland security forces in Dharin in Bari Region.
• 05^th Feb- Puntland forces reported that at least 40 ISM terrorists were killed and several hideouts in Cal Miskaat Mountains.
• 04^th Feb- ISS Militants engaged in combat with Puntland forces in the Toga Jaceel Valley, northwest of Tuur Masale in the Bari Region of Puntland.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

• 22^nd Feb- ISCAP militants captured and executed a Christian on RN4 in Luna,Ituri province.
• 22^nd Feb- several civilians were injured following an attack by ISCAP in Kokola are in North Kivu.
• 17^th Feb- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault in Congolese troops in Mukundu in Lubero district, North Kivu.
• 15^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and executed a Christian near Idohu in Ituri province.
• 14^th Feb- ISCAP militants ambushed Wazalendo militia forces in Matuna area in Lubero district.
• 11^th Feb- ISCAP terrorists lead an armed assault against civilians in Manuya area in Lubero.
• 08^th Feb- several Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP near Mavivi in North Kivu.
• 07^th Feb- several civilians were injured following an armed attack by ISCAP im Taboura near Mavivi in North Kivu.
• 07^th Feb- ISCAP conducted an attack against Christians on the RN4 in Ituri Province.
• 06^th Feb- two people were captured and executed by ISCAP near Erengeti in Ituri province.
• 06^th Feb- three Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP near Idohu area in Ituri province.
• 04^th Feb- Several civilians were injured in an ISCAP attack in Idohu, Ituri.
• 02^nd Feb- ISCAP militants captured and executed a Christian in Ndimo in Ituri province.
• 02^nd Feb- Following months of silence ISCAP resumed attacks in Ndimo, Ituri province.
• 01^st Feb- ISCAP militants captured and executed a Christian in Ofaye Otto Maber, Ituri Province.

INSIGHTS AND ANALYSIS

Somalia

The recent offensives by Puntland security forces against Islamic State (IS) militants in Somalia marks a significant shift in the fight against extremism in the region. The capture of 250 square kilometers, including key IS bases, highlights Puntland’s determination to dismantle the group’s stronghold in the Golis Mountains. This offensive has been complemented by U.S. airstrikes, signaling increased international interest in neutralizing IS in Somalia. However, Puntland’s strained relations with the federal government in Mogadishu raise concerns about the lack of coordination in counterterrorism efforts, potentially hindering broader security strategies.

The rise of IS in Puntland, fueled by foreign fighters and revenue from local extortion, underscores its growing global importance within the IS network. Despite being smaller than al-Shabaab, IS in Somalia has managed to establish itself as a resilient force, capitalizing on local instability. Puntland’s appeal for international military assistance, including counter-drone technology and mine-resistant equipment, reflects the challenges of combating an insurgency in rugged terrain. This request also suggests that Puntland seeks direct international partnerships, bypassing the Somali federal government, which some analysts argue has lost credibility as a counterterrorism ally.

Meanwhile, the arrest of Abdisatar Ahmed Hassan in Minnesota highlights the persistent threat of IS-inspired radicalization abroad. Hassan’s multiple attempts to join IS, social media activity, and possession of IS symbols demonstrate the organization’s ongoing ability to recruit sympathizers outside Somalia. His case serves as a reminder of the need for continued vigilance and cooperation between domestic and international security agencies to disrupt recruitment networks and prevent further radicalization. Taken together, these developments emphasize the transnational nature of IS’s threat and the necessity for coordinated global counterterrorism efforts.

The joint military operation by Somalia, the United States, and the UAE against ISIS in Puntland underscores the intensifying counterterrorism efforts following a deadly ISIS assault on a Puntland military base. The large-scale attack, which killed nearly 100 people, including 27 Puntland soldiers, demonstrated ISIS’s continued operational capabilities despite recent losses. Puntland forces, forewarned by intelligence, successfully repelled the attack, killing at least 70 militants, though the actual toll may be higher due to the group’s use of caves for concealment. The engagement highlights the ongoing strategic battle in the Cal Miskaad mountains and the increasing reliance on international military cooperation to combat ISIS’s persistent threat in Somalia.

Mozambique

The security situation in Cabo Delgado has worsened with the return of Islamic State-linked militants (ISM) to Macomia district. After previous attacks in Montepuez and Meluco, insurgents have refocused their operations along the N380 highway, where they have carried out multiple assaults. In early February, they attacked villages in Meluco, including Namagico and Minhanha, where they looted food, burned homes, and killed civilians. The violence escalated in Macomia, with attacks on Litamanda and Chai met by resistance from local security forces. Despite some setbacks, insurgents regrouped and struck Nkoe, further demonstrating their ability to sustain operations in the region. Reports suggest that they are moving stolen supplies through the Catupa forest to support fighters along the Macomia coast, where their presence has been reduced due to Rwandan military patrols.

Beyond Macomia, insurgent activity has spread from Quissanga in the south to Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe in the north. In Quissanga, militants launched an attack on February 20, overrunning a lightly defended FADM outpost in Bilibiza, killing two soldiers, and seizing weapons and ammunition. Islamic State claimed responsibility, sharing images of their attack and the captured stockpile, highlighting the Mozambican military’s vulnerabilities. In Mocímboa da Praia, insurgents attempted to raid the village of Mbau on February 13 but were repelled by residents, one of whom killed an attacker. Meanwhile, in Muidumbe, IS claimed responsibility for the killing of a civilian near Chitunda on February 17, demonstrating the group’s continued presence in multiple districts.

The latest UN report on ISM highlights the group’s resilience despite counterinsurgency efforts. It estimates the militants’ strength at 200 to 300 fighters, with a notable presence of child soldiers. The report acknowledges heavy losses from Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) operations but questions the long-term impact, as ISM continues to launch attacks. Hunger within the group has driven an increase in looting, although data does not indicate a significant shift in their overall tactics. The decentralized command structure remains a challenge for counterterrorism efforts, with limited intelligence on emerging leaders. As the insurgency persists, security forces face ongoing difficulties in neutralizing the group while ensuring civilian safety in affected areas.

D.R CONGO

In February 2025, ISCAP intensified its insurgency in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, carrying out a series of targeted executions, armed assaults, and attacks on civilians. The group exhibited a clear pattern of religiously motivated violence, capturing and executing multiple Christians, particularly along the RN4 highway in Ituri and near key population centers in North Kivu. This resurgence of activity, especially in Ndimo, suggests a deliberate effort to reassert control over strategic areas after a period of relative silence. The persistent execution of civilians, particularly those identified as Christians, underscores ISCAP’s ongoing sectarian strategy aimed at instilling fear and asserting ideological dominance.

In Ituri province, ISCAP operations were heavily concentrated along major transit routes, where militants ambushed and executed civilians while also conducting armed attacks on villages. The executions near Ofaye Otto Maber, Ndimo, Idohu, and Erengeti reflect an escalation in targeted killings, while assaults in Luna and other localities injured multiple civilians. The sustained focus on this region highlights ISCAP’s ability to strike at will, disrupting local communities and exerting pressure on both security forces and civilians. Despite military efforts to curb their activities, ISCAP continues to exploit weaknesses in state security, using ambush tactics and hit-and-run attacks to maintain operational momentum.

In North Kivu, ISCAP ramped up attacks on both security forces and civilians, particularly in Lubero and Beni territories. The group ambushed Wazalendo militia forces and engaged Congolese troops in Mukundu, demonstrating its capability to challenge both state and non-state actors. At the same time, civilians in Kokola, Mavivi, and surrounding areas faced indiscriminate attacks, with multiple people injured. ISCAP’s ability to coordinate multiple assaults across different locations suggests a high level of mobility and tactical adaptability. The group remains an enduring security threat, leveraging its knowledge of the terrain and local vulnerabilities to sustain its insurgency despite military pressure.

CONCLUSION

February 2025 demonstrated that despite sustained counterterrorism efforts, Islamic State affiliates in East and Central Africa remain highly adaptive and capable of striking both military and civilian targets.

In Mozambique, ISM’s resilience is evident in its ability to relocate and sustain attacks despite ongoing counterinsurgency operations. The group’s reliance on looted supplies and a decentralized command structure suggests that eliminating key leaders alone may not neutralize the threat. Mozambique’s security forces must prioritize intelligence-driven operations and strengthen coordination with international partners.

In Somalia, ISS is under increasing pressure from Puntland forces and U.S. airstrikes, yet its ability to execute complex attacks underscores its operational sophistication. Puntland’s growing reliance on international military assistance highlights the Somali federal government’s waning influence in counterterrorism efforts. A fragmented counterterrorism approach could allow ISS to exploit existing political divisions and continue its insurgency.

In the DRC, ISCAP’s increased attacks in Ituri and North Kivu indicate a resurgence following months of relative silence. The group’s continued focus on targeting Christians points to a deliberate strategy of sectarian violence aimed at exerting ideological dominance. The mobility of ISCAP militants and their ability to operate across wide areas despite military operations suggest persistent security weaknesses that Congolese forces must urgently address through enhanced coordination and proactive engagement.

Across all three regions, the Islamic State’s ability to sustain operations, adapt to counterterrorism measures, and exploit governance weaknesses presents an ongoing threat. A unified, intelligence-led regional strategy, coupled with strengthened international military collaboration, remains essential to curbing the group’s influence and preventing further territorial gains.