Executive Summary
The Al-Qaeda associated militant group commonly known as Al-Shabaab persistently continues to wage attacks both in Somalia and in neighboring Kenya. The militant group notably continue to primarily target military positions (convoys, patrol units and FOBs), government officials besides civilian targets.
Al-Shabaab is currently the most pressing threat facing the state of Somalia. To further its ambitious agenda, the Somali based terrorist group Al-Shabaab has dedicated substantial time and effort into polishing its unique brand. The group has over the years sharpened its military skills through training and execution of well-coordinated operations.
Notably, Al-Shabaab sharpened skills in promoting their perceived successful operations though its various platforms (Websites, social media and even on radio Andalus), the militant group has been able to gain followers from across the globe. To some audiences, principally Arabic and Somali, a steady rhythm of official statements promotes Al-Shabaab as a government-in-waiting. As the militant group seeks to dominate and govern large parts of Somali territory, they are intent on building an image as a credible and preferable alternative to the Somali government.
In the course of its violent operations on the above-named targets, the Al-Qaeda official branch in East Africa Al-Shabaab determinedly wages attacks using a range of tactics ranging from the use of gunmen, IEDs, drive-by shootings, targeted assassinations, ambushes, and raids, among others. Also, the Islamist militant group is known to use stoning, amputations, and beheadings to punish and intimidate those in its area of control who do not abide by its interpretation of its strict sharia law.
Al-Shabaab remains active, controlling large areas of rural and urban swathes of central and southern Somalia. In past one week, at least 12 attacks were recorded in Kenya and Somalia. with Somalia taking the largest share. A notable surge has been witnessed in the past three weeks of October with an average of an attack or two being recorded on daily basis.
While Somalia remains the epicenter of Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen’s operations in East Africa region, Kenya’s frontier counties, namely, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu remain prone to Al-Shabaab’s persistent attacks. Though no major incident reported on Kenya, especially along the border with Somalia, Lamu coastal county has been targeted a few times in IED and landmines being planted on roads.
However, Kenya’s multi-agencies have been on the lookout and are continually urged to remain vigilant and on high alert especially those assets operating along the volatile border prefectures. All concerned counterterrorism assets to remain on high alert, security to be beefed on all defense outposts along the common border with Somalia, surveillance to be increased to pick on enemy movements and scouting routine to be revised to avoid surprise ambush raids of defense posts in the frontier regions.
AS Recently Claimed Attacks: October 14th – October 22nd
Week 3
- On October 15th, Mortar attack targets Ethiopian military base in Somalia’s Wajid town, Bakool region. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack saying it fired at least 10 mortar shells hit the base. Casualties unknown.
- On October 15th, Al-Shabaab from different directions claimed attempted probe on AMISOM military bases operated by Kenyan troops in Kolbiyow and Kuday Island in Jubba region of Somalia. No casualties were reported from the two brief attempted raids.
- On October 16th, An IED explosion claimed by Al-Shabaab killed and wounded officials in Beledweyne vicinity of Hiran region, central Somalia. The blast happened near a police station in Beledweyne town, killing one official, and wounding two police officers.
- On October 16th, Al-Shabaab claimed an ambush raid on AMISOM and Somali troops in general vicinity of Janale, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Initial reports indicate that, Ugandan and SNA troops were caught up in a surprise attack leaving at least five soldiers killed and others wounded.
- On October 17th, another mortar attack hits ENDF base in general area of Awdinle village, Bay region of Somalia. The Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab fighters claimed responsibility for attack, saying it killed more than 10 Ethiopian soldiers.
- On October 18th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for roadside IED blast that targeted AMISOM troops’ convoy in general area of Ras Kamboni, a few kilometers to the Somalia-Kenya border. Al-Shabaab claimed casualties on Kenyan troops.
- On October 18th, Al-Shabaab target Kenyan troops in fresh attacks in coastal Lamu county. Initial reports indicate that a landmine claimed by Al-Shabaab targeted the troops on patrol mission in general Kiunga vicinity. No casualties were reported.
- On October 19th, Al-Shabaab mortar shells target AMISOM military base operated by Ethiopian troops military base in Burhakabo town, Bay region of Somalia, about around 180km south-west country’s capital Mogadishu. No details on casualties were provided.
- On October 19th, Al-Shabaab claimed attempted raid on AMISOM military in Qoqani area of Lower Jubba region operated by Kenyan troops. One soldier reported to have been wounded, while the attempted raid was successfully contained.
- On October 20th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the death of two soldiers in Middle Shabelle region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed an ambush attack on SNA troops in general vicinity of Bal’ad (Balcad) town, about 36 kilometers northeast of the capital city of Mogadishu.
- On October 20th, Al-Shabaab claimed a close gun fight with Somali troops in general area in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle. At least six soldiers were wounded in the attack as per local open sources reports.
Assessments/Observations & Insights
Al-Shabaab has repeatedly carried out complex terrorist attacks against civilian targets, as well as low-scale to brazen large-scale attacks against AMISOM and SNA defense outposts. The terrorist movement has also demonstrated resilience, withstanding losses of senior leaders and military blows without notably losing operational capacity.
The Al-Qaeda associated forces in Somalia have notably in the period under review resumed forays into Kenya, targeting the country’s security assets operating along the border prefectures with Somalia. This development is particularly notable, as kinetic activity by the Islamist militant group has been relatively calm in Kenya in the past couple of months, only with a few low-scale incidents therein.
Its notable that Al-Shabaab in the past one week has persistently targeted the Kenyan troops inside Somalia, operating in sector 2 under the mandate of AMISOM. The militant group has in repeat attacks attempted probing AMISOM operating bases operated by gallant Kenyan troops especially in Kolbiyow, Ras Kamboni, Kuday Island and Qoqani, prefectures in Lower Jubba, southern Somalia.
Attacking Kenya serves an important propaganda purpose for Al-Shabaab. Kenya is a key hub in Africa for diplomatic activity, tourism and business. Besides, Kenya hosts a number of international organisations and Shabaab Mujahideen considers this as part of its overall mission to target these interests linked to Western. The resumption of Kenya attacks this month, has seen the militant group avoid direct armed confrontation with Kenyan troops and instead, the militant group has planted landmines on routes used by the troops as preferred attack type. Al-Shabaab has targeted Kenyan security patrol units in Lamu county using roadside landmines and IEDs.
Al-Shabaab has also notably conducted repeat attacks on FOBs and convoys succeeded in mounting attacks on both SNA and AMISOM targets in Afgoye, Bal’ad, Burhakabo, Awdinle village, Janale, Beledweyne vicinity and Wajid town. These towns and localities are in central and southern parts of Somalia, where Al-Shabaab boasts of having substantial control of swathes.
Terrorist threat levels largely remain skewed towards forward operating bases (military bases) both for local forces and AMISOM troops in the period under review and the trend may escalate in the coming weeks. More than ten Al-Shabaab attacks have been recorded in every week of October so far as shown on the chart below.
Al-Shabaab’s biggest threat to peace in Somalia and the broader East Africa region is their frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), especially vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambush raids and targeted suicide operations. Al-Shabaab’s attacks in recent years increasingly rely on IEDs and VBIEDs, making them the weapon of choice and a modus operandi for the terrorist group. The trend to use explosives and suicide bombing maybe reinforced indiscriminate firing are on notable increase.
Al-Shabaab has continually deployed suicide bombers with the express intention of targeting specific enemies. Resumption of large explosions in the Somalia capital Mogadishu noted. Busy joints such as teashops/restaurants especially in the capital Mogadishu are prone targets of the Islamist militants. In the period under review the Islamist militant’s suicide bomber targeted a busy restaurant in Mogadishu frequented by local youths causing at least six fatalities. Targeted attacks are also being directed on checkpoints manned by Somali security forces within Mogadishu prefectures.
Strategic Intelligence (S.I) assets have continuously warned of increased militant activities especially in southern regions of Somalia, and towards the border flashpoints with Kenya. Though attacks both in Kenya and Somalia notably have been low scale in the first three weeks of October 2021, these militant persistent onslaughts cannot be downplayed or ignored since mostly have been skewed towards military assets (hard targets) and could escalate to large scale.
Al-Shabaab remains resilient despite concerted counterterrorism operation against the Islamist militant group. The Al-Qaeda aligned militant group continues to demonstrate sophisticated organizational planning and execution of attacks. While the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali army have made significant military gains in liberating areas previously under the group’s control, this has brought little overall stability. This is largely because systems of governance and delivery of basic services to citizens have often failed to follow military operations.
In addition, the retaking of major towns by AMISOM and government forces often leaves swathes of rural areas in the control of Al-Shabaab, which in turn shifts strategy to attacking main supply routes, rendering towns isolated. At the same time, the federal government has yet to establish a broad, predictable, and consistent policy framework of governance that appeals to communities.
Conclusion & Recommendations
It will not be easy to defeat Al-Shabaab through military operations alone in the Horn of Africa, Somalia and its neighbors. Although Al-Shabaab is far from the quasi-state it once was, it remains a comparatively well-organised jihadist group.
- Continuous and intensified surveillance both aerial and ground encourage. Scouting several meters away from FOBs/defense posts perimeter encouraged in order to pick on enemy signature when approaching and dealing with them decisively before reaching their target.
- Collaboration with locals is much encouraged. Al-Shabaab operatives and sympathizers are known to embed within the local communities while doing their own surveillance and thus human intelligence (HUMINT) from locals in prone regions and localities is key towards stemming down Al-Shabaab notable successes in their operations. Without public support, even the most sophisticated counter-terrorism effort is doomed to failure.
- In its home-base of Somalia, in the areas it has substantial control, the group is sometimes seen taking up roles that are supposed to be executed by the government thus position itself as an alternative government.
- Al-Shabaab remains now is a viable local actor for the provision of basic services and, in particular, security and justice. To date, national security forces have focused on force alone and have neglected building political consensus and legitimacy within communities they serve. Somalia government should rethink on ways to solve the ever-seen political crisis thus will neutralize Al-Shabaab be seen as an alternative in offering services.
- To thoroughly weaken and ultimately defeat Al-Shabaab, an inclusive security architecture must be developed over the next few years, focusing not just on military strategy but broader accommodation of political and social dynamics, putting in mind the dynamics of clannism. This will need to be done through a consensus-based approach among Somali stakeholders.
- According to intelligence reports deduced from Shabaab defectors, structural conditions, propaganda and threats, and psychosocial and ideological factors remain key motivators to joining the Islamist group, and despite some successes in deradicalisation and amnesty offerings, fundamental civic shortcomings in especially in Somalia and Kenya Al-Shabaab will continue recruiting via various platforms.
- For individual governments in East Africa, it’s important to undertake countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts that addresses the employment of counter-radicalization, counter-messaging, and countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns is an important step in curbing increasing operations of ambushes and suicide bombing. Any attempted intervention that does not address the reasons that young men and women may join Al-Shabaab or any other violent extremist group will remain incomplete.
Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to monitor and track the jihadist activities in East Africa and beyond. The groups capability on carrying out repeat attacks on military, convoys and government officials have sharpened. Thus S.I. reports that, the threat and intent on waging attacks against hard and also on soft targets by the Islamist Al-Shabaab remain unchanged.

































