Executive Summary
Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen, commonly known as Al-Shabaab continues to wage attacks both within Somalia and in neighboring Kenya. The primary objective of the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab targeting military positions and also on civilians’ targets remains unchanged.
In the course of its violent operations, the Al-Qaeda branch in East Africa Al-Shabaab persistently wages attacks using a range of tactics. These include the use of gunmen, IEDs, drive-by shootings, targeted assassinations, ambushes, and raids, among others.9 In addition, the group is known to use stoning, amputations, and beheadings to punish and intimidate those in its area of control who do not abide by its interpretation of sharia.
While an uphill task, ending the group’s ability to successfully carry out attacks would deal a blow to Al-Shabaab’s capabilities. However, counterterrorism operators need to always rethink strategies, changing on their daily routines and combat strategies as often as possible. Counterterrorism forces will need to make hard targets harder to strike by re-inventing on strategies that will mostly involve locals, human intelligence (HUMINT) driven.
Al-Shabaab’s biggest threat to peace in Somalia is their frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), especially vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambush raids and targeted suicide operations. Al-Shabaab’s attacks in recent years increasingly rely on IEDs and VBIEDs, making them the weapon of choice and a modus operandi for the terrorist group.
Al-Shabaab remains active, controlling large areas of rural and urban swathes of central and southern Somalia. In past one week, at least 8 attacks were recorded, all from across the regions of Somalia. This is though is a slight decrease from the past first 10 ten days of July that recorded about 17 militant operations.
No major incident reported on Kenya, especially the border prefectures with Somalia. However, Kenya’s multi-agencies on security matters urged to remain vigilant. All concerned counterterrorism assets to remain on high alert, security to be beefed on all defense outposts along the common border with Somalia, surveillance to be increased to pick on enemy movements and scouting routine to be revised to avoid surprise ambush raids of defense posts in the frontier regions.
AS Recently Claimed: July 10th – July 17th
- On July 10th, at least 7 people killed and 10 other injured in suicide car bombing that targeted Mogadishu police chief Farhan Mohamud. The bomber, using an explosives-laden vehicle, struck regional police commissioner Farhan Mohamud’s motorcade at a busy intersection in the capital. The police chief survived the assassination attempt claimed by Al-Shabaab.
- On July 11th, bombardment of mortar bombs struck bases housing Somalia’s army and AMISOM-Djiboutian peacekeepers in the town of Bulo-barde in Hiran region. No details on casualties were reported.
- On July 12th, a roadside bomb explosion targeted an AMISOM military convoy carrying Ugandan troops on a road between Bula Mareer and Golweyn in Lower Shabelle region, southern Somalia, killing one soldier, and wounding a Somali translator as per local sources.
- On July 14th, Al-Shabaab claim attack on Jubaland Security Forces (JSF). The militants claimed to have ambushed JSF at Kudha, near Kismayo, Lower Juba region of Somalia. The militants claimed to have killed eight and injured ten other soldiers who were on security patrol convoy.
- On July 14th, Al-Shabaab fighters seized control of Dheg-hayo village near the coastal town of Hobyo in Somalia’s Mudug region after brief clash with Somali federal and regional troops.
- On July 15th, Al-Shabaab fighters attack AMISOM operated military base in Hosingow town in Lower Juba region. No casualties were reported.
- On July 15th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have bombed an AMISOM military base operated by Ethiopian troops in Halgan town in Hiiraan region. No details on casualties were reported in the brief attack.
- On July 16th, Car bomb blast targeted Somalia government troops and regional forces in the outskirt of Ba’adweyne town in Mudug region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it killed 7 soldiers, wounded 8 others and destroyed 4 vehicles. Government officials also claimed that they foiled the attack.
Assessments/Observations & Insights
Nearly a dozen attacks reported all from the regions of the Horn of Africa nation. As per SI. Forecast, threat levels largely remain skewed towards forward operating bases (military bases) both for local forces and AMISOM troops in the period under review.
The militants also in the past few days increased activity targeting on military operating bases especially from across the localities in central Somalia.
Preferred attack types remain the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs (IEDs fitted on vehicles) and landmines/roadside bombs. The trend to use explosives and suicide bombing maybe reinforced indiscriminate firing are on notable increase.
Al-Shabaab has continually deployed suicide bombers with the express intention of targeting specific enemies. Resumption of large explosions in the Somalia capital Mogadishu noted. A blast targeting a teashop killed at least 10 people last week was reported.
Intelligence assets have warned of increased militant activities in Mudug region of Somalia citing the group having established its operations bases in the region. In recent weeks, strategic Ba’adweyn town which is located in Mudug region has been an epicenter of the clashes between the Somali government troops and the Al-Qaeda associated Al-Shabaab militants.
The Al-Qaeda aligned group mostly is carrying operations in areas perceived under its control. At least an attack in recorded in the urban and rural areas in south and central Somalia and persistently, Al-Shabaab operatives carries out frequent operations in the capital Mogadishu.
Engaging in counterintelligence operations and disrupt Al-Shabaab’s suicide bombing training programs is among the key strategies towards degrading the capability of the jihadist group. As such, intelligence gathered from field operations should explicitly seek to collect, centralize, and vigorously exploit battlefield information shedding light on the internal contours of the group’s suicide bombing program, which occurs in their various training and logistical camps.
Al-Shabaab has also sharpened their intelligence ability to track and target visiting officials, government officials, high value targets as well military convoys, and thus gaining greater insight into how it gathers and collects intelligence is paramount and then engaging in counterintelligence campaigns against the group would serve to protect moving targets.
Conclusion & Recommendations
The terrorist war in Somalia and broader East Africa will be a long war. The conflict in the war-torn country is primarily an ideological war, in which the Islamist Al-Shabaab buys people’s patronage. Thus, the solution for such a conflict, therefore, cannot be won sorely by military intervention. Continued cooperation and knowledge-sharing among local and foreign partners especially in the war-torn Somalia remains imperative towards winning this war.
Reliable financing and troop contributions for AMISOM’s operations, intelligence-sharing, and local capacity-building of Somali authorities are equally important citing that they weak forces are poised to take the country’s security once the foreign partner forces exit Somalia.
More military pressure can only sustain progress within durable political settlements and thus to achieve this, more systematic efforts and support should be given to parallel national and local reconciliation processes at all levels of Somali locals who are suffering from the core of bad leadership. The paramount focus should be on addressing local Somali political grievances, tough measures from international community not limited from sanctions should be induced to errant Somalia leadership.
Tapping into the grievances of local communities is what enables Al-Shabaab to remain relevant, viewing itself as alternative government. Also, internal wrangling in Somalia political dynamics and clannism gives Al-Shabaab an opening to exploit divisions in the security and further its violent agenda.
This, it’s important to undertake countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts that addresses the employment of counter-radicalization, counter-messaging, and countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns is an important step in curbing increasing operations of ambushes and suicide bombing. Any attempted intervention that does not address the reasons that young men and women may join Al-Shabaab or any other violent extremist group will remain incomplete.
Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continue to monitor and track the jihadist activities in East Africa and beyond. The groups capability on carrying out repeat attacks on military, convoys and government officials have sharpened. Thus S.I. reports that, the threat and intent on waging attacks against hard and also on soft targets by the Islamist Al-Shabaab remain unchanged.
