The Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab remains the current and the most pressing security threat of facing Somalia and other East African countries.
Since 2014, the security situation in Somalia has shown worrying signs of deterioration. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly carried out complex and deadly terrorist attacks against civilian targets, as well as brazen large-scale attacks against Somali army and AMISOM outposts. The militant group has over the years demonstrated resilience, withstanding losses of senior leaders and military blows without notably losing operational capacity.
In the month of June, Al-Shabaab recorded 77 attacks, in July, the Islamist militant group claimed at least 54 attacks in Somalia and six others in Kenya, totaling to 60 attacks in both East African countries. In August, the attacks rose to 70. In September, there was a slight decline of terror events recorded as compared to August whereby 65 attacks were recorded for both Kenya and Somalia.
It is notable that Al-Shabaab controls about a fifth of Somalia territory with relentless efforts to establish control beyond central and southern Somalia theaters which for now remains the group’s main operational areas. Out of these recorded attacks, Mogadishu has taken the largest share. Al-Shabaab has conducted and claimed at least 17 attacks in the capital Mogadishu. These attacks have notably been low-scale and hardly have they captured local and international headlines.
One notable attack by claimed by Al-Shabaab was conducted Thursday, October 1st. A female suicide bomber killed a senior intelligence official after blowing herself up in capital Mogadishu. Female jihadists are rare but pose a high threat if the Somali based Shabaab will continue deploying them into carrying out attacks. In July 24th, a blind female suicide bomber killed Mogadishu mayor Abdirahman Yarisow and other top officials in a suicide attack that tore through the municipal government headquarters in the capital Mogadishu.
Its notable, Al-Shabaab capability to conduct spectacular attacks, such as car bombs, RCIEDs and suicide missions in the capital Mogadishu have significantly diminished but are resuming with low intensity attacks. In the capital, Al-Shabaab has also concentrated on targeted assassinations of government officials.
In southern Somalia, Lower Shabelle has witnessed the largest number of attacks in theater. Al-Shabaab has claimed at least 12 attacks from across the localities of Lower Shabelle with Bay and Lower Juba targeted with 8 and 6 attacks respectively. In this region the Islamist militants have been favored by the terrain and thick vegetation thus, the group has been able to target security forces by planting IEDs, landmines on roads majorly used by the troops. The militants also have increased guerilla ambush attacks on troop’s convoys as well as their military bases.
Southern Somalia which covers Gedo, Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba and Middle Juba have witnessed persistent militant’s activities. Al-Shabaab has also increased tempo in its activity in central regions of Somalia especially in Hiran, Mudug and Galgaduud regions where the militant group has recorded several attacks in the month of September. These attacks have been targeted on AMISOM bases operated by Ethiopian troops as well as their convoys. In Hiran, Al-Shabaab has perfected guerilla ambushes on security troops. Repeated attacks have been recorded on Ethiopian troops which have become a constant target of Al-Shabaab. The Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab also mounted attacks on military bases belonging to SNA and Djiboutian troops in Beledweyne town in what is seen as repeat attacks.
In northeastern Kenyan counties, the Somali-based militants strategically continue to target critical infrastructures, especially telecommunication BTS masts, in a move that geared towards paralyzing communication within the region, hence giving them ample time to accomplish their attack missions. In the month of September, the Islamists militants had very incidents in northeastern prefectures of Kenya. In one incident, the militants while laying IEDs detonated and killed themselves. In a recent event in Alungu-Lafey of Mandera, the militants staged an ambush on security patrol team which responded killing five militants. However, militant’s movements continue to be reported close to proximity with water points along the border stretches with Somalia and thus possible attacks cannot be ruled out at undisclosed times and locations.
Al-Shabaab Tactical Strategy
- Notably the group’s military strategy has morphed over the years. In most of the group’s recent raids, Al-Shabaab continue to employ a strategy that combines high-profile operations against civilian targets, classic guerrilla warfare and surprise mass attacks on vulnerable AMISOM positions.
- The attacks against civilians seek to exhaust external support for Somalia, often targeting hotels frequented by Somali security forces and foreign troops.
- Current attacks employ classic guerrilla tactics, favoring Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), ambushes on convoys and patrols, hit-and-run-attacks, the use of group’s assassins to conduct targeted assassination of individual government officials from the SNA, AMISOM or their coalition partners have increased.
- Executions of alleged spies, sorcerers and rapists have also been recorded. These executions are conducted mostly in a public square in order to instill fear to locals, sending signals that the locals should desist from collaborating with security forces or face the same fate.
- Al-Shabaab has also sustained a modus operandi of launching persistent and targeted attacks on military targets, a tactic/strategy from which the militant group has largely abstained despite converted military pressures from local and coalition partners forces. The militant group has been able to identify vulnerability of relatively small and isolated Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and thus has continuously tried to probe them repeatedly.
- The militant group media wing has flourished in the recent years. The group has been able to release propaganda videos, infographics of their current and previous operations. This tactic usually is intended to send symbolic messages to masses especially in Somalia where in these videos, the militants hoisting their black flags portrays as if they are in-charge and in control.
- Though, militants in battle and missions also have suffered, meaning the group militant strengths and numbers are still coming down, the group has adopted a small unit tactic being deployed to minimize casualties on their side as well minimize movement detection and vulnerable of airstrikes which in the several occasions targeted militant’s gatherings and training camps.
Assessment/Observation
The group’s attacks trend-line indicates that the Islamist militant group is carrying at least an attack in a day, but multiple attacks are recorded on weekends (Saturdays and Sundays). In the month of July, the group has conducting an average of two attacks Somalia targeting SNA troops and AMISOM troops. Its notable, Al-Shabaab claimed at least 21 attacks in total on SNA and Somali Police and 14 attacks on AMISOM troops from across the Somali regions.
IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs remains the militant’s attacks types. However, ambushes and use of mortar are increasing in on military bases. Assassinations have also been witnessed on targeted local government officials especially in the capital Mogadishu. A number of targeted shootings, amputations and executions also witnessed on individuals mostly charged at the Al-Shabaab’s courts, (Those accused of stealing, rape, sorcery and spying for security assets).
Security and Intelligence assets in the East African region faces a huge and challenging task ahead citing the persistent, steady jihadist’s activities. The increased enemy activity will subsequently and adversely affect individual country’s security and stability. It is primary security and intelligence services to capitalize heavily in countering the return of violent extremism and terrorism to ensure the terror groups do not outbid them.
The divisions within al-Shabaab have been witnessed in a number of times amongst key ranking leaders. This could also be exploited. Since the group is typically repressive towards its fighters, programmes welcoming defectors in return for intelligence collaboration and using their stories to counter al-Shabaab propaganda have great potential.
Undermining of the militant group’s relations with some clans could be made possible, especially as clan organised militias/vigilantes popularly known as Ma’awisely have been seen revolting against the group’s demands for zakat payments in a number of Somalia regions. These group’s especially in central region of Somalia have recently vowed not to relent in fighting the enemy who is taking up their livestock forcibly.
Conclusion
However, while Al-Shabaab may be resurgent and somewhat devised, morphed militarily, the militant group is also critically reliant on its resilience to persevere in the conflict, since it remains badly outgunned in regular warfare and has overtime lost quite a huge number of it foot soldiers in battle zones and inside their camps.
The situation in Somalia still remains very fluid and thus even as the coalition troops, especially AMISOM is anticipated to withdraw by possibly end 2021, questions still lingers whether the Somali National Army will be ready to take up the county’s security mantle. Consequently, the dynamic of the Somali war will be decided by the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy approach chosen and, ultimately, whether a viable SNA can be made a realm while the war-torn country still enjoys robust foreign-coalition partner troop’s support.
Strategic Intelligence (S.I) continues to track and monitor the Islamist militant’s activity in the Horn of Africa region and warns of unchanged militant’s upsurge. The militant’s intentions to strike on hard targets (security forces) in Somalia and in Kenya remains the militant’s ultimate goal. Joint CT and COIN actors not to relent on mounting concerted military pressuring on the Islamists groups in an effort to guard counter-terrorism gains so far made in the East Africa region.
