The Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab continues to mount attacks in East Africa region. The Islamist militant group notably has especially targeted Somalia and Kenya in those attacks exploiting this period when the two East African countries are battling with global Covid-19 pandemic.
Apart from demonstrating its capability to conduct attacks, adapt and weather convectional military operations, Al-Shabaab militant group has morphed in both its strategy and tactical capabilities to either match or outmatch military assets and sociopolitical pressure.
In the month of July, Al-Shabaab militant group claimed at least 54 attacks in Somalia and six others in Kenya, totaling to 60 attacks in both East African countries. This is a slight decline of terror events recorded as compared to June whereby 77 attacks were recorded for both Kenya and Somalia.
It is notable that Al-Shabaab controls about a fifth of Somalia territory with relentless efforts to establish control beyond central and southern Somalia theaters which for now remains the group’s main operational areas. Out of these recorded attacks, Mogadishu has taken the largest share. Al-Shabaab has conducted and claimed at least 17 attacks in the capital Mogadishu with 17 deaths and 50 being wounded. These attacks have notably been low-scale and hardly have they captured local and international headlines.
However, one attack could have made headlines after Al-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted the convoy of Somalia Chief of Defense Forces, General Odawa Yusuf Rage near Mogadishu’s Tarabunka junction. Barely three days after, the militants in a targeted mission attempted to assassinate Deputy of Somali Security Minister, Abdinasir Said Muse near Taleh junction in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.
Its notable, Al-Shabaab capability to conduct spectacular attacks, such as car bombs, RCIEDs and suicide missions in the capital Mogadishu have significantly diminished but are resuming with low intensity attacks. In the capital, Al-Shabaab has also concentrated on targeted assassinations of government officials.
In southern Somalia, Lower Shabelle has witnessed the largest number of attacks in theater. Al-Shabaab has claimed at least 12 attacks from across the localities of Lower Shabelle with Bay and Lower Juba targeted with 8 and 6 attacks respectively. In this region the Islamist militants have been favored by the terrain and thick vegetation thus, the group has been able to target security forces by planting IEDs, landmines on roads majorly used by the troops. The militants also have increased guerilla ambush attacks on troop’s convoys as well as their military bases.
Southern Somalia which covers Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba and Middle Juba have witnessed increased militant activity. The militants through their pro-media wing have claimed at least 30 attacks in these localities and towns of southern Somalia. However, assessment reports by security experts at Strategic Intelligence (S.I) have shown Al-Shabab’s territorial control is fluid.
Al-Shabaab militant group typically leaves an area ahead of many offensives targeting their bases and later comes back and recaptures the same territories. Additionally, Somali security forces have also been unable to maintain control of these territories, bringing into question of SNA preparedness to take over the mantle of Somalia’s security in the event foreign troops exits Somalia.
Al-Shabaab has also increased activity in central regions of Somalia especially in Hiran regions where the militant group has recorded at least five attacks. These attacks have been targeted on AMISOM bases operated by Ethiopian troops as well as their convoys. In Hiran, Al-Shabaab has perfected guerilla ambushes on security troops. Repeated attacks have been recorded on Ethiopian troops which have become a constant target of Al-Shabaab. The Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Shabaab has also mounted attacks on military bases belonging to SNA and Djiboutian troops in Beledweyne town.
Beledweyne, a city in central Somalia has witnessed increased militant’s activity. It is strategically located in the Beledweyne District and it is the capital of the Hiran province. The town is strategically situated in the Shebelle Valley near the Ethiopia border, some 210 miles north of Mogadishu and is a hub of a number of economic activities, thus Al-Shabaab remains keen on attempting to take control.
In northeastern Kenyan counties, the Somali-based militants strategically continue to target critical infrastructures, especially telecommunication BTS masts, in a move that geared towards paralyzing communication within the region, hence giving them ample time to accomplish their attack missions. In the month of July, the Islamists militants conducted at least six attacks in Mandera and Garissa counties. Increased militant’s movements have been reported close to proximity with water points.
Assessment/Observations
The group’s attacks trend-line indicates that the Islamist militant group is carrying at least an attack in a day, but multiple attacks are recorded on weekends (Saturdays and Sundays). In the month of July, the group has conducting an average of two attacks Somalia targeting SNA troops and AMISOM troops. Its notable, Al-Shabaab claimed at least 21 attacks in total on SNA and Somali Police and 14 attacks on AMISOM troops from across the Somali regions.
IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs remains the militant’s attacks types. However, ambushes and use of mortar are increasing in on military bases. Assassinations have also been witnessed on targeted local government officials especially in the capital Mogadishu. A number of targeting shootings, amputations and executions also witnessed on individuals mostly charged at the Al-Shabaab’s courts, (Those accused of stealing, rape and spying for security assets).
The Somali extremists, concentrated it attacks on Somali security forces, their bases, AMISOM FOBs and convoys in a number of theaters in Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Hiran, regions of Somalia. There has been a spike in number of executions and targeted assassinations in Mogadishu and its environs. The militant group also claimed one attack Galgadud and another attack in Bari region of the semi-autonomous Puntland State.
This trend where Al-Shabaab has increased activity of FOBs and troop’s convoys is worrisome as it could easily excite the group’s cells not only in Somalia but also those operating along northeastern and coastal prefectures of Kenya. What is more worrying is that the resurgence may possibly activate fanatical grassroots jihadists who are not only ideologically inspired but with medium militant capabilities such as those operating in the vast Boni forest, Lamu county, Kenya.
Kenya’s Force Investigation Teams (FITs) throughout June and July have reported of increased Al-Shabaab movements close to proximities of Kenya-Somalia border. Increased presence near the Kenya border with Somalia might have been caused by the factor that Somalia and northeastern prefectures of Kenya are experiencing dry weather and as such militants have been sighted in areas with water points. It’s an observation that in the coming days, Al-Shabaab possibly will establish makeshift camps proximal to water points, a wake-up call to CT-actors to mapped these areas accordingly.
As the Somali-based militant group continue to posture and demonstrate its capability to mount attacks across the country and beyond, it’s noteworthy that the Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab is deploying small units, heavily armed to carry on attacks. The military strategy is aimed at achieving their goal of mounting attacks with casualties and at the same time minimizing casualty risks from their side. Also, smaller units are able to get to their target’s locations without much detection or suspicion from security assets and now with steadily resumption of suicide and martyrdom missions, more fatalities cannot be ruled out.
Security and Intelligence assets in the East African region faces a huge and challenging task ahead, citing the persistent and steady jihadist’s activities. The increased enemy activity will subsequently and adversely affect individual country’s security and stability. It is primary objective of the security and intelligence services to capitalize heavily on countering the return of violent extremism and terrorism to ensure the terror groups do not outbid them.
