The Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab continues to stage attacks from across the regions of Somalia despite concerted counterterrorism (CT) operations from the Somali national army (SNA) supported by allied partners (AMISOM and U.S.). This militant group despite dozens of air raids and ground offensives the CT actors in Somalia, the group has remained resilient and has not been dislodged from about a fifth of Somalia territory that still remains under its control.
Various assessment reports by security experts at Strategic Intelligence (S.I) have shown Al-Shabab’s territorial control is fluid. The Al-Shabaab militant group typically leaves an area ahead of many offensives targeting their bases and later comes back and recaptures the same territories.
Its worrying even as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is scheduled to exit from the battle-zone of Somalia probably by the end of 2021, its notable from various assessments on SNA’s capabilities that when this anticipated AMISOM exit from Somalia comes, the national army is far from taking the mantle of the country’s security.
Somali National Army despite AMISOM and other foreign militaries efforts to train them remains a weak army, vulnerable and incapable of battling and defeating Al-Shabaab Islamists on their own. Joint counterterrorism efforts have seen large swathes of Somali being liberated from Al-Shabaab, but again the government forces have been unable to maintain control of those territories.
There are a number of challenges that have been assessed at why Somali security apparatus are unable to take control of their country’s security besides dislodging Al-Shabaab.
- Somalia national army is weak in terms of combat capabilities. Besides the national army is poorly equipped making it hard to have capabilities to eliminate Al-Shabaab.
- The national army and the Somali’s intelligence agency, NISA have been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab operatives. Al-Shabaab has planted spies in Somali’s security agencies and thus why most of CT operations against them have previously failed, or have achieved minimum results.
- Another challenge is from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Mogadishu has been on regional politics with other Regional States such as Jubaland administration, Puntland, Somaliland the expense of the country’s security and instead of prioritizing on building a strong national army.
- U.S. government recently stopped funding SNA salaries citing immense corruption and financial impropriety. The recent mutiny by FGS soldiers over unpaid salaries is a pointer to a disjointed and demoralized force with weak command and control among the rank and file.
- Somalia is engulfed with clan politics which frequently perpetuate fighting between local militias in some regions, which in turn gives Al-Shabaab the maneuverability and space they need to spread and establish more territories across Somalia.
- Administrations which have occupied Mogadishu have up-to now failed to dry up the Al-Shabaab’s sources of funding in order to limit its capabilities and activities in Somalia and the broader region.
- The rampant corruption in the institutions of the Somali state, have especially been extended to the military and spy agency, NISA which allows Al-Shabaab to penetrate those institutions and recruit officials.
- The militant group has been able to solicit funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, taxation of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora, thus the group has been able to sustain its operations and smuggling of superior weaponry than SNA.
With these notable challenges and without external military support, SNA does not stand a chance of eliminating Al-Shabaab which with no doubt has morphed in terms of military capabilities and strategies sustaining insurgency in Somalia and in northern Kenya for more than a decade.
