Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for the Months of January and February 2026

Across January and February 2026, Islamic State affiliates in East and Central Africa sustained coordinated but differentiated insurgent campaigns, reflecting localized adaptations to pressure while maintaining strategic coherence within the broader network. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, ISCAP emerged as the most operationally aggressive actor, executing a high-frequency campaign of assaults, ambushes, and systematic civilian targeting across North Kivu and Ituri. Its persistent use of extreme violence, combined with repeated attacks along key corridors, underscores a shift toward territorial entrenchment and psychological dominance.

In Mozambique, ISM maintained a fluid and mobile insurgency centered in Cabo Delgado, balancing direct engagements with Mozambican and Rwandan forces alongside asymmetric tactics such as mortars, ambushes, and logistical raids. The group’s continued reliance on coastal resupply routes and opportunistic attacks against civilians and commercial assets highlights a resilient, decentralized structure capable of sustaining operations without fixed control of territory.

In Somalia, ISS activity remained comparatively contained but consistent, characterized by repeated IED attacks in Puntland’s Bari region. The pattern indicates a deliberate strategy of attrition and survival, with the group leveraging terrain familiarity and maintaining links to transnational recruitment networks while gradually reconstituting its operational capacity following sustained counterterrorism pressure.

Overall, the regional threat landscape reflects a persistent and adaptive Islamic State presence, with each affiliate calibrating its tactics to local conditions while contributing to a broader pattern of protracted insurgency, localized destabilization, and sustained pressure on state security structures.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 22^nd Feb– Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants led an armed assault on a Christian trade caravan and Mozambican Army Forces near Congresso in Macomia District.
• 23^rd Feb- ISM militants captured an executed 2 Christians near Congresso area in Macomia district.
•  24^th Feb- ISM militants conducted and armed assault against the Mozambican and Rwandan Forces in Congresso area of Macomia district.
• 16^TH Feb- ISM militants fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the FADM base at Anga, less than 3 km southeast of the town’s airport.
• 14^th Feb- ISM militants arrived at Palma’s Quifuqui island, where they took supplies before moving to Maculo on the mainland, north of MDP, for yet more supplies.
• 14^th Feb- several Mozambican soldiers were injured following an attack by ISM near Catupa area in Macomia.
• 10^th Feb- ISM militants conducted and armed assault against civilian population in Catupa area of Macomia district.
• 08^th Feb- ISM militants conducted and armed assault against Mozambican troops in Namabo area of Macomia district.
• 06^th Feb– ISM militants conducted and armed assault against Mozambican forces in Namabo area of Macomia district.
• 02^nd Feb- A group of ISM militants stopped vehicles owned by two Macomia businessmen near Manica, approximately 6 km from Mucojo on the Macomia-Mucojo road robbing them.
• 02^nd Feb- ISM militants conducted and armed assault against Mozambican Armed forces in Namabo and Catupa areas in Macomia district.
• 30^th Jan- a group of ISM militants entered Nanquidunga village, south of MDP town, where they took food but harmed neither people nor property.
• 30^th Jan- Naval patrol clashed with ISM near Muissune Island; next day ISM attacked Mozambican positions in Catupa forest, claiming nine killed while security forces reported five militants killed.
• 23^rd Jan- ISM terrorists fired mortars at Mozambican Armed Forces on Suna Island Nar Mocimboa da Praia (MDP).
• 18^th Jan- ISM insurgents attacked Rwandan positions at Mucojo and Pangane in Macomia district with mortars.
• 18^th Jan- An ISM-launched mortar landed on a civilian compound in Pangane killing one person and injuring another.
• 12^th Jan- ISM militants raided Loque settlement near Olumbi on Palma coast in attempts to resupply fighters, affecting local communities.
• 09^th Jan- ISM fighters captured and beheaded a Mozambican militiaman in Chai area in Macomia District.
• 09^th Jan- a Rwandan military vehicle escorting a commercial convoy was hit by an IED on the N380 near Chitunda, between Macomia and Awasse.

SOMALIA

• 13^th Feb- Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants detonated an IED targeting Puntland Defense forces in Dhasaan, Jalil Valley in Bari Region.
• 26^th Jan- ISS militants detonated an IED targeting Puntland Defense forces in Dhasaan, Jalil Valley in Bari Region.
• 18^th Jan- Puntland published a list of alleged ISS foreign fighters captured in Counterterrorist Operation (CTO), Cal Miskaat Mountains, Bari Region.
• 04^Th Jan- ISS militants detonated an IED targeting Puntland Defense forces in Dhasaan, Jalil Valley in Bari Region.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

• 28^th Feb- Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) conducted an armed assault against Congolese Armed forces in Mashongano in Ituri Province.
• 26^th Feb- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Militia Forces in Igumbo, Lubero District, North-Kivu Province.
• 27^th Feb- ISCAP terrorists captured and beheaded a Christians in Mong area in Ituri.
• 24^th Feb- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Army Forces in Sesa, Ituri.
• 18^th Feb- Several people were killed or injured following an ISCAP attack on Congolese troops near Kasuku in Ituri.
• 18^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded two Christians in Mamove area in North Kivu.
• 17^th Feb– ISCAP militants led an armed assault on the Congolese Armed forces between Oicha and Mamove in North Kivu.
• 14^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded two Christians in near Oicha in North Kivu.
• 14^th Feb- two people were killed and several others injured following and ISCAP attack near Mbau in North Kivu.
• 12^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded two Christians in Mundubiena area in North Kivu.
• 12^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded two Christians in Mundubiena area in North Kivu.
• 12^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded a Christian near Mbau in North Kivu.
• 11^th Feb- several soldiers were injured in an ISCAP attack on Congolese troops near Mbau in North Kivu.
• 10^th Feb- ISCAP militants captured and beheaded at least five Christians in near Mbau area in North Kivu.
• 07^th Feb- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Militia Forces in Ofaye Otto Maber, Ituri Province.
• 07^TH Feb- ISCAP terrorists captured and beheaded two Christian Militiamen in Ofaye Otto Maber in Ituri.
• 06^th Feb- several people were injured in ISCAP attack against Christians in Mambimbi-Isigo in Lubero district in North Kivu.
• 05^TH Feb– ISCAP fighters led an armed assault on populations in Oicha, North Kivu.
• 03^rd Feb- ISCAP militants ambushed Christian militiamen between Mamove and Oicha, North Kivu province.
• 03^rd Feb– ISCAP militants captured and beheaded several Christians near Oicha in North Kivu.
• 03^rd Feb- ISCAP militants ambushed Christian militiamen between Mamove and Oicha, North Kivu province.
• 02^nd FEB– ISCAP militants captured and beheaded two Christian militiamen in Kantin, Lubero District, North Kivu.
• 31^ST Jan– ISCAP terrorists captured and executed Congolese militia forces in Kamboa area in Lubero district, North Kivu.
• 1^st Feb- ISCAP fighters captured and beheaded an innocent civilian in Shani, Ituri province.

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

D.R. CONGO

The security environment in eastern DRC deteriorated markedly over January and February 2026, as the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) sustained a high operational tempo across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. The frequency, distribution, and sequencing of attacks point to a coordinated campaign rather than sporadic insurgent activity. ISCAP demonstrated the ability to strike repeatedly within short intervals, often revisiting the same localities, which underscores both operational endurance and the absence of a sustained state security footprint in contested areas. This pattern reflects a shift toward persistent territorial contestation, where the group is not merely conducting raids but actively challenging state authority and freedom of movement.

A defining feature of this period has been the systematic use of extreme violence, particularly beheadings targeting Christians and local militia elements. These acts go beyond brutality for its own sake and form part of a calculated psychological warfare strategy. By publicly executing civilians and militia members, ISCAP is reinforcing a climate of fear designed to fracture community cohesion, deter collaboration with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and delegitimize local defense structures. The repeated targeting of religious identity also signals an effort to entrench sectarian narratives, which risks transforming localized insecurity into broader communal conflict dynamics that are harder to contain.

Geographically, the concentration of incidents along the Oicha–Mamove–Mbau axis in North Kivu reveals a critical insurgent corridor that is increasingly under ISCAP influence. The consistency of attacks in this zone suggests the presence of established supply lines, intelligence networks, and safe havens that allow militants to maneuver with relative ease. This corridor likely functions as both a logistical backbone and an operational staging ground, enabling the group to project force into surrounding areas while maintaining resilience against counteroffensives. The inability of FARDC to disrupt this axis highlights structural gaps in territorial control, surveillance, and rapid response capabilities.

At the tactical level, ISCAP’s engagements with FARDC indicate growing confidence and adaptability. The group has executed ambushes, direct assaults, and harassment attacks against military positions, often inflicting casualties and forcing defensive postures. This evolution suggests improvements in coordination, reconnaissance, and possibly command-and-control structures. It also exposes persistent weaknesses within FARDC, including limited intelligence penetration, inadequate force protection measures, and challenges in holding recaptured ground. The recurrence of attacks in previously contested locations reinforces the assessment that military gains remain temporary, with insurgents able to withdraw and re-infiltrate at will. The expansion of attack patterns into Ituri Province further signals an intent to widen the conflict theatre. While North Kivu remains the epicenter, increased activity in Ituri indicates a strategic push to stretch security forces and exploit existing intercommunal tensions. This expansion raises the risk of a broader destabilization, as ISCAP leverages local grievances and fragmented security arrangements to embed itself within new operational environments. The overlap between insurgent violence and pre-existing communal fault lines complicates response efforts, as military solutions alone are unlikely to address the underlying drivers of instability.

Simultaneously, ISCAP’s dual targeting of militia groups and civilian populations illustrates a deliberate effort to dismantle all forms of resistance while asserting parallel authority structures. By neutralizing local militias, the group removes immediate security threats; by terrorizing civilians, it enforces compliance and facilitates resource control, including access to food, recruits, and intelligence. This approach effectively transforms affected areas into coercive spaces where state presence is nominal and insurgent influence is entrenched.

Overall, the January-February 2026 period represents a phase of escalation marked by sustained violence, territorial entrenchment, and psychological domination by ISCAP. The group’s ability to maintain operational momentum across multiple fronts, coupled with its strategic use of terror and geographic expansion, points to a resilient and adaptive insurgency. Without significant improvements in coordinated military operations, intelligence capabilities, and civilian protection mechanisms, the trajectory suggests continued deterioration of the security landscape in eastern DRC, with increasing humanitarian and regional implications.

SOMALIA

The pattern of Islamic State Somalia activity across January and February 2026 indicates a resilient but tactically adaptive insurgent presence concentrated in Puntland’s Bari region, particularly within the Cal Miskaad mountain corridor. The repeated use of improvised explosive devices in Dhasaan across multiple dates reflects a deliberate strategy of area denial and attritional warfare against Puntland Defense Forces, rather than an attempt to seize and hold territory. This suggests that following sustained counterterrorism pressure in 2025, the group has reverted to asymmetric tactics designed to impose persistent security costs while preserving its limited manpower.

January developments point to a more complex operational evolution. The reported capture of foreign fighters during Puntland’s counterterrorism operations reinforces assessments that Islamic State Somalia retains transnational recruitment pipelines, with foreign operatives playing a disproportionate role within the organization’s rank and file. This external dimension continues to differentiate the group from other Somali militant actors and strengthens its integration into the broader Islamic State network. At the same time, there are indications of incremental tactical innovation, suggesting the group is attempting to diversify its operational toolkit despite sustained military pressure.

Operationally, the tempo of attacks in February remains limited but consistent, with repeated strikes in the same geographic zone indicating both constraint and intent. The concentration of attacks in Jalil Valley suggests the group is prioritizing defensible terrain where it can exploit familiarity, concealment, and logistical depth. This localized persistence aligns with a broader shift toward more structured, clustered operations, signaling a gradual transition from sporadic attacks to a more sustained insurgency model. At the strategic level, the group appears to be in a recovery and reconstitution phase rather than expansion. Counterterrorism offensives by Puntland forces significantly degraded its capabilities in 2025, forcing dispersion and tactical recalibration. However, evolving operational conditions have created space for the group to regroup, rebuild cells, and cautiously reinitiate operations after a period of suppression. The group introduces a parallel jihadist axis in the north, forcing Puntland authorities to sustain a dedicated counterterrorism posture that diverts resources from other security priorities. Its role as a financial and logistical node within the wider Islamic State network also elevates its strategic significance beyond its local operational footprint.

Overall, the period reflects a contained but resilient insurgency. Islamic State Somalia is not currently positioned for large-scale territorial gains, but it retains the capability to conduct sustained low-intensity attacks, adapt tactically, and exploit gaps in counterterrorism pressure. This trajectory points toward a protracted insurgent presence that will continue to erode localized security in Puntland while contributing to Somalia’s broader pattern of fragmented and multi-actor instability.

MOZAMBIQUE

The operational environment in Cabo Delgado during January and February 2026 indicates that Islamic State Mozambique has sustained a high operational tempo while avoiding direct attempts to hold major population centers. The group continues to prioritize mobility, dispersal, and opportunistic targeting, enabling it to remain active across Macomia, Palma, and Mocímboa da Praia despite ongoing counterinsurgency pressure.

ISM’s tactics reflect a hybrid insurgency model combining conventional assaults with asymmetric methods. Repeated armed attacks on Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Namabo, Catupa, and Congresso demonstrate the group’s ability to engage security forces directly, while the continued use of IEDs and mortars highlights a gradual expansion of tactical capabilities. The increasing reliance on indirect fire against Rwandan positions suggests a shift toward standoff engagement, likely aimed at reducing exposure to superior ground forces while maintaining pressure on forward operating bases and convoy routes. The frequency of clashes with Rwandan forces points to a deliberate targeting strategy. ISM appears to view Rwandan deployments as a critical obstacle to its freedom of movement, particularly in Macomia district. Attacks on Mucojo, Pangane, and along the N380 corridor indicate an effort to disrupt joint force coordination and raise the operational cost for external intervention. At the same time, the absence of sustained territorial confrontation suggests ISM is avoiding decisive engagements it is unlikely to win.

Logistics and resupply remain central to ISM’s operational resilience. The group’s repeated movements along the Palma coastline and use of offshore islands such as Quifuqui highlight continued exploitation of maritime routes. Raids on coastal settlements and the interception of fishing vessels demonstrate a systematic approach to forced resourcing, allowing the insurgents to sustain operations without fixed supply lines. This pattern reinforces their ability to operate semi-independently across dispersed cells. Civilian targeting and coercion remain embedded in ISM’s strategy. Executions, abductions, and attacks on trade caravans indicate an intent to intimidate local populations while securing compliance and resources. At the same time, selective restraint in certain incidents, such as food looting without violence, suggests the group is calibrating its approach to avoid alienating communities it depends on for survival.

The security situation is further complicated by ISM’s demonstrated ability to re-enter previously contested areas, including Mocímboa da Praia. These incursions suggest that, despite military gains by government and allied forces, insurgents retain latent networks and staging points in surrounding rural areas. This undermines perceptions of full territorial control and indicates a persistent insurgent presence in key corridors.

Overall, the security climate in Mozambique remains fragile and fluid. ISM has not achieved strategic dominance, but it has successfully preserved operational continuity through mobility, decentralized command structures, and adaptive tactics. The group’s ability to sustain attacks across multiple fronts, while leveraging coastal geography and local resource extraction, indicates that the insurgency remains far from containment and is likely to persist as a protracted security challenge.

CONCLUSION

The January to February 2026 period highlights a maturing and regionally entrenched Islamic State insurgency that is neither uniformly expanding nor decisively contained. ISCAP’s escalation in eastern DRC signals the most immediate risk of territorial destabilization, while ISM’s sustained mobility in Mozambique and ISS’s gradual recovery in Somalia point to enduring insurgent resilience across multiple theaters.

A common thread across all three contexts is the reliance on asymmetric warfare, civilian coercion, and exploitation of weak state presence, enabling these groups to preserve operational continuity despite ongoing military pressure. The persistence of cross-border linkages, external recruitment, and adaptive tactics further complicates containment efforts.

Absent significant improvements in coordinated regional counterterrorism operations, intelligence integration, and civilian protection mechanisms, the trajectory points toward prolonged instability. The Islamic State’s affiliates are likely to remain embedded actors within local conflict ecosystems, continuing to erode state authority, exploit governance gaps, and sustain a cycle of insecurity with growing humanitarian and regional implications.