Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Review for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of December 1st – December 31st, 2025: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

The Al-Shabaab insurgency in East Africa demonstrated a marked increase in operational tempo in December 2025, conducting over 50 recorded attacks across Somalia and Kenya. The group, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, sustained a campaign largely targeting military assets, forward operating bases (FOBs), security convoys, infrastructure, government installations, and civilians. This surge reflects its continued capability to execute coordinated, asymmetric warfare despite sustained counterterrorism pressure, reinforcing assessments that it remains the primary security threat in the region.

A review of the December incidents indicates that direct assaults on military positions and FOBs formed a core operational pattern. In Somalia, repeated attacks were recorded on bases in Lower Shabelle (Janale, Qoryooley, Danow), Bay (Baidoa, Buurhakaba, Dinsoor), and Middle Shabelle (Warsheek)—areas historically characterized by insurgent–government contestation. These assaults often involved multi-directional infantry attacks, sometimes preceded by explosions, aimed at overwhelming defensive positions. This aligns with established Al-Shabaab doctrine, which prioritizes complex attacks combining shock action and sustained ground engagement to inflict attrition on Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union forces.

The use of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained the dominant tactic across both Somalia and Kenya. The group deployed roadside bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), and suicide devices targeting convoys, checkpoints, and urban installations. In Kenya, particularly along the Garissa–Mandera–Lamu corridor, IED attacks on patrols and convoys were the primary method of engagement, consistent with long-term patterns of cross-border insurgency. In Somalia, explosive attacks were frequently integrated into broader operations, including strikes on Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo, demonstrating the group’s ability to project force into both rural and urban theaters.

Geographically, Lower Shabelle, Bay, Banadir (Mogadishu), and Lower Jubba emerged as the most heavily targeted regions in Somalia, each recording multiple attacks within short intervals. Lower Shabelle in particular experienced clustered operations, including repeated assaults on AU and SNA positions in Janale, Qoryooley, and surrounding areas—indicating its status as a key insurgent stronghold and logistical corridor. In Kenya, attacks were concentrated in Lamu and Garissa counties, with occasional incidents in border-adjacent zones, reflecting the group’s strategy of maintaining pressure along porous الحدود while avoiding deep inland engagement.

The weapons systems employed highlight Al-Shabaab’s reliance on low-cost, high-impact tools. These included IEDs, small arms (AK-pattern rifles), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, and artillery-style indirect fire. Ambushes and hit-and-run attacks were frequently executed using small arms combined with explosives to maximize casualties before withdrawal. The use of artillery and coordinated bombardment in areas such as Kismayo and Jalalaqsi further demonstrates a level of tactical sophistication and battlefield adaptation beyond simple guerrilla warfare.

In terms of impact, significant fatalities and injuries were recorded in multiple regions, particularly in Middle Shabelle (Warsheek), Lower Shabelle, Bay, and Hiran, where high-casualty engagements against military forces were reported. Kenya also recorded injuries among security personnel, especially in Lamu and Garissa, where roadside bombings and ambushes remain prevalent. Broader data shows that military and security forces remain the primary targets, though civilians continue to account for a substantial share of casualties in Al-Shabaab operations.

Overall, the December 2025 attack pattern underscores that Al-Shabaab retains operational resilience, geographic reach, and tactical diversity, enabling it to sustain a high tempo of attacks exceeding 50 incidents within a single month. The group’s continued focus on military attrition, disruption of infrastructure, and psychological impact operations signals an enduring insurgency capable of adapting to evolving counterterrorism dynamics across both Somalia and Kenya.

Terrorist Events December 2025

1. Dec 31, 2025: In Gedo, Al-Shabaab militants carried out an explosive attack in Baardheere targeting government troops conducting search operations, resulting in casualties.
2. Dec 31, 2025: In Kismayo (Lower Jubba), Al-Shabaab militants conducted an explosive attack in the Afmadow area targeting Jubbaland security forces, with confirmed casualties.
3. Dec 30, 2025: In Beledweyne (Hiran), Al-Shabaab militants launched a heavy assault on the Lamagalaay camp, targeting pro-government forces and causing losses.
4. Dec 30, 2025: In Beledweyne (Hiran), Al-Shabaab militants attacked the Baadaha government camp, resulting in casualties and damage.
5. Dec 29, 2025: On the outskirts of Warsheek (Middle Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants engaged government forces in heavy fighting, killing 11 soldiers and injuring 13 others.
6. Dec 28, 2025: Near Xudur (Bakool), Al-Shabaab militants attacked government troops conducting operations, killing seven soldiers.
7. Dec 27, 2025: In Janaale (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants assaulted a military base operated by pro-government forces.
8. Dec 27, 2025: Near Baidoa (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a camp in the Bur-Jeed area targeting militia positions.
9. Dec 26, 2025: In Lamu (Kenya), Al-Shabaab militants detonated an explosive device targeting Kenyan security personnel traveling between Komole and Kiunga, causing injuries.
10. Dec 26, 2025: In Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab militants carried out an explosive attack targeting government troops traveling between Wanlaweyn and Warmaxan, resulting in casualties.
11. Dec 25, 2025: Near Bushka (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants detonated an explosion targeting a vehicle carrying government troops, killing at least five soldiers and injuring six others.
12. Dec 25, 2025: In Yaqshid district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants targeted a government security center with an explosive device.
13. Dec 25, 2025: On the outskirts of Baidoa (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a checkpoint, killing two soldiers and seizing weapons.
14. Dec 24, 2025: Near Warsheek (Middle Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a government camp, killing eight soldiers and injuring four.
15. Dec 24, 2025: In Lamu (Kenya), Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a convoy of Kenyan security personnel between Mangai and Ijara.
16. Dec 23, 2025: In Ceelasha Biyaha (near Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants carried out an explosion targeting government troops, causing casualties.
17. Dec 23, 2025: In Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab militants attacked joint Somali and African Union forces near Laanta Buure, resulting in losses.
18. Dec 20, 2025: Near Kismayo (Lower Jubba), Al-Shabaab militants ambushed pro-government militia forces in Yoontoy.
19. Dec 19, 2025: Around Afgooye (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants carried out armed assaults on militia forces.
20. Dec 18, 2025: In Balcad and Beledweyne (Middle Shabelle and Hiran), Al-Shabaab militants assassinated an intelligence officer and detonated an IED targeting police forces.
21. Dec 18, 2025: In Amuma (Garissa, Kenya), Al-Shabaab militants attacked Kenyan army forces.
22. Dec 18, 2025: In Nuur Dugle (Middle Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked militia forces and temporarily took control of the area.
23. Dec 17, 2025: Near Bura (Garissa, Kenya), Al-Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Kenyan army forces.
24. Dec 17, 2025: In Dinsoor (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants attacked an Ethiopian military base.
25. Dec 16, 2025: In Dayniile district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants detonated an explosive device targeting a polling station.
26. Dec 16, 2025: On the outskirts of Kismayo, Al-Shabaab militants engaged in heavy fighting and explosions targeting government troops, causing significant losses.
27. Dec 15, 2025: In Baidoa (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants carried out bomb attacks targeting government troops.
28. Dec 15, 2025: In the Barujed area (Baidoa), Al-Shabaab militants launched a direct attack on a government base.
29. Dec 14, 2025: In Qansaxdheere (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a government camp, injuring one soldier.
30. Dec 14, 2025: In Banadir region, Al-Shabaab militants bombed the Hiilweyne camp along the Mogadishu–Balcad road.
31. Dec 14, 2025: Near Kismayo (Lower Jubba), Al-Shabaab militants shelled a government convoy using artillery.
32. Dec 13, 2025: In Dayniile district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants targeted a military post with an explosive device.
33. Dec 12, 2025: In Buurhakaba (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants engaged in heavy combat with government forces at a military base.
34. Dec 11, 2025: In Kaaraan district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a military vehicle, killing two soldiers and injuring three.
35. Dec 11, 2025: In Heliwaa district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants attacked security checkpoints; no casualties were reported.
36. Dec 10, 2025: In Yaqshid district (Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab militants carried out an IED attack on a military position, injuring one soldier.
37. Dec 10, 2025: In Kismayo (Lower Jubba), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a Jubbaland security forces center, causing casualties.
38. Dec 10, 2025: In Qoryooley (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a joint African Union and Somali military base, leading to heavy fighting.
39. Dec 9, 2025: In Banadir region, Al-Shabaab militants carried out a suicide attack on a government military camp.
40. Dec 9, 2025: Near Afgooye (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants bombed a military convoy, causing casualties.
41. Dec 9, 2025: In Janaale (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked African Union forces, triggering intense clashes.
42. Dec 9, 2025: In Qoryooley (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked an African Union military camp, leading to heavy fighting.
43. Dec 9, 2025: In Danow (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants ambushed African Union troops, resulting in prolonged gunfire exchanges.
44. Dec 8, 2025: In Baidoa (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants carried out a bomb attack targeting a regional government official.
45. Dec 8, 2025: In Makuudo (near Baidoa), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a military camp, leading to heavy fighting.
46. Dec 7, 2025: In Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab militants ambushed African Union troops between Number 60 and Buufow, injuring three soldiers.
47. Dec 7, 2025: Near Yaaq Bariweyne (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants attacked a checkpoint, killing two soldiers and looting weapons.
48. Dec 7, 2025: In Afgooye (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a police officer.
49. Dec 6, 2025: Near Kismayo, Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a military convoy between Bulo Gaduud and Yoontoy.
50. Dec 6, 2025: In Beledweyne (Hiran), Al-Shabaab militants bombed a police station, causing casualties.
51. Dec 6, 2025: In Jalalaqsi (Hiran), Al-Shabaab militants shelled a Djiboutian military base, causing casualties among African Union troops.
52. Dec 5, 2025: Near Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab militants detonated an explosive device at a checkpoint, killing one soldier and injuring another.
53. Dec 3, 2025: In Dinsoor (Bay), Al-Shabaab militants attacked an Ethiopian military base, killing two soldiers and injuring one.
54. Dec 3, 2025: Near Kismayo Lower Juba, Al-Shabaab militants carried out an explosion injuring six soldiers and damaging a vehicle.
55. Dec 2, 2025: In Bulomareer (Lower Shabelle), Al-Shabaab militants killed a government soldier and seized his weapon.

    

Analysis, Observation & Insights

The December 2025 attack data demonstrates that Al-Shabaab maintained a high operational tempo with over 50 attacks, reflecting strong insurgent resilience and sustained command-and-control capability. The pattern of attacks shows a deliberate focus on military degradation, with the majority targeting Somali National Army (SNA), African Union forces, and Kenyan security personnel. This indicates a continued strategic objective of eroding state security presence while maintaining territorial influence, particularly in rural and semi-urban zones.

A key operational pattern observed is the frequent use of complex and coordinated attacks, combining IED detonations with follow-on ground assaults. In regions such as Lower Shabelle (Janale, Qoryooley, Danow) and Bay (Baidoa, Dinsoor), militants repeatedly launched direct assaults on forward operating bases (FOBs), often supported by indirect fire and ambush tactics. These attacks were designed to overwhelm defensive positions, inflict maximum casualties, and seize weapons—highlighting a shift from opportunistic attacks to structured battlefield engagements.

In terms of lethality, the most deadly attack types were large-scale ground assaults on military camps and ambushes on convoys, particularly in Middle Shabelle (Warsheek) and Lower Shabelle. These engagements resulted in the highest reported fatalities due to prolonged firefights and the use of multiple weapon systems. However, the most preferred and most frequently used tactic remained IED attacks, especially roadside bombs targeting troop movements in both Somalia and Kenya. These attacks are low-cost, effective, and reduce exposure of militants to direct confrontation.

Geographically, Lower Shabelle, Bay, Banadir (Mogadishu), and Lower Jubba emerged as persistent hotspots, each recording multiple attacks within short timeframes. Lower Shabelle stands out as the epicenter of sustained insurgent operations, with repeated strikes on AU and SNA positions, suggesting strong militant entrenchment and logistical networks. In Kenya, attacks were largely concentrated in Lamu and Garissa counties, reinforcing a pattern of cross-border insurgency focused on security patrols and transport routes, rather than urban centers.

Observations also indicate that military and security forces were the primary targets, accounting for the majority of fatalities and injuries. High-casualty incidents in Warsheek, Baidoa, and Kismayo underscore the group’s intent to inflict attrition on government forces. At the same time, attacks on infrastructure such as roads, markets, and polling stations demonstrate a secondary objective of undermining governance, economic activity, and public confidence, particularly in contested regions.

Looking ahead, the forecast for subsequent months suggests that Al-Shabaab is likely to sustain or increase its attack tempo, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Bay, and Middle Shabelle, where it retains operational depth. In Kenya, Lamu and Garissa will remain vulnerable to IED attacks and ambushes targeting security forces. The group is expected to continue relying on IEDs as its primary tactic, while periodically launching high-impact assaults on military bases to maintain psychological pressure. Overall, the trend points to a prolonged insurgency with adaptive tactics, requiring sustained counterterrorism pressure and improved regional coordination to contain the threat.