Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Review for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of September 1st – September 30th, 2025: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa

Executive Summary

Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization with its home base in Somalia, continues to pose a persistent security threat across the Horn of Africa. The group maintains an enduring insurgency in Somalia while launching sporadic cross-border attacks in Kenya, primarily as retaliation against Nairobi’s contribution of troops under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Throughout September 2025, the militant group sustained its campaign of violence, recording 52 terrorist incidents, a figure that closely mirrors the operational tempo observed in July and August 2025, when the group averaged slightly above 50 attacks each month. This consistent frequency underscores Al-Shabaab’s resilience and adaptability despite sustained counterterrorism operations targeting its leadership, logistics, and recruitment structures.

The data reveals that Somalia remains the principal theater of Al-Shabaab operations, accounting for the vast majority of attacks during the month under review. Recurrent hotspots include Lower Shabelle, Bay, Gedo, Bakool, Hiran, and Middle Shabelle regions—areas long recognized as Al-Shabaab strongholds due to limited government control and difficult terrain favorable to guerrilla warfare. Mogadishu, the Somali capital, continued to experience frequent IED explosions and targeted assassinations, illustrating the insurgents’ ability to penetrate urban security layers. In contrast, Kenya witnessed a handful of cross-border attacks, particularly in Mandera, Lamu, and Garissa counties, where militants exploited porous borders and weak local intelligence networks to stage ambushes and assaults on security installations.

A review of the September 2025 events reveals a heavy concentration of attacks in Lower Shabelle and Bay regions, both witnessing multiple incidents including ambushes, IED detonations, and direct assaults on Somali National Army (SNA) bases. Locations such as Afgooye, Baidoa, Qoryoley, and Janale featured repeatedly in operational reports, marking them as persistent conflict zones. In Kenya, Lamu County—specifically Mangai and Hagrdir areas—experienced repeated engagements, demonstrating the group’s continued intent to destabilize coastal and border regions through guerrilla raids. The recurrence of attacks in these particular areas illustrates the militant network’s familiarity with terrain, strong intelligence on target vulnerabilities, and logistical depth that enables repetitive operations.

In terms of attack methodology, Al-Shabaab continues to rely heavily on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as its weapon of choice, both for ambushes and assassinations. Nearly half of the September incidents involved IED detonations targeting Somali National Army patrols, government convoys, and police units. These were often complemented by coordinated small-arms fire, a tactic designed to maximize casualties and confusion following an initial explosion. Armed assaults and ambushes constituted another significant share of attacks, primarily directed against AUSSOM forces, Somali government troops, and occasionally, Ethiopian and Ugandan contingents.

The group also demonstrated a sustained campaign of targeted assassinations against Somali government officials, intelligence officers, and local elders collaborating with federal forces. The killings in Garbaharey (Gedo), Golweyn (Lower Shabelle), and Mogadishu suburbs highlight Al-Shabaab’s reliance on localized terror to suppress dissent and maintain influence within communities. The use of grenades and small firearms in urban assassinations complements the broader IED and ambush strategy, reflecting the group’s tactical flexibility across different operational environments. Furthermore, symbolic attacks such as the claimed strike on U.S. personnel at Kismayo Airport underline Al-Shabaab’s continuing propaganda-driven approach aimed at international attention and morale boosting among its ranks.

The September 2025 attack pattern reinforces Al-Shabaab’s strategic adaptability, its deep entrenchment in southern and central Somalia, and its ability to execute low-cost, high-impact operations across a broad geographic area. Despite consistent counterterrorism pressure, the group’s sustained operational tempo across successive months highlights enduring weaknesses in state control, intelligence coordination, and border security. The continued reliance on IEDs, assassinations, and guerrilla-style ambushes demonstrates a well-entrenched asymmetric warfare strategy designed to outlast and exhaust conventional military responses, keeping Al-Shabaab a persistent threat to both Somalia and Kenya’s internal security.

Terrorist Events – September 2025.

1. September 30, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somali government official, Abdi Fari, in Garbahare, Gedo, Somalia.
2. September 30, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants led armed assaults on Ugandan army forces in Danow and Ambreeso, near Qoryoley and Baraawe, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
3. September 29, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants conducted an armed assault on Ugandan army forces in Janale, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
4. September 29, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Somali security forces in Afgooye and Buulo Mareer, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
5. September 28, 2025 — Al-Shabaab’s Zakat Office distributed 2,000 heads of livestock across several districts in Lower Shabelle State, Somalia.
6. September 27, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali militia members with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
7. September 24, 2025 — Al-Shabaab forces operating in the Bay region launched a heavy roadside attack on SNA troops departing Buurhakaba district, inflicting heavy casualties including six fatalities and several injuries.
8. September 24, 2025 — A special operation conducted by Al-Shabaab combatants in Golweyn, Lower Shabelle, resulted in the assassination of a government official.
9. September 24, 2025 — Al-Shabaab Mujahideen forces operating in the Bakool region carried out a planned ambush on Somali government troops near Hudur district. Four soldiers from the South-West regional administration were killed in the assault.
10. September 21, 2025 — Al-Shabaab fighters operating in the Lower Juba region conducted an operation near Afmadow, killing a Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) soldier.
11. September 20, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali militia forces in Huriwa, Mogadishu, Somalia.
12. September 20, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants led an armed assault on Kenyan army forces in Mangai, Lamu County, Kenya.
13. September 18, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants carried out an armed assault on Ugandan army forces in Janale, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
14. September 18, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali militia forces in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia.
15. September 17, 2025 — A roadside bomb targeted a convoy of a Kenyan security official in Lafey, Mandera, northern Kenya, resulting in serious injuries.
16. September 17, 2025 — A hand grenade explosion targeted a security checkpoint near the Luga-Baxsi area in Baidoa.
17. September 16, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali militia forces in Hiilweyne, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.
18. September 16, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants conducted an armed assault on Somali govt forces near Ooddo, Lower Juba, Somalia.
19. September 16, 2025 — An explosion carried out by Al-Shabaab in Kismayo, capital of Lower Juba, targeted the residence of a senior National Security Agency (NSA) official. Additional casualties were reported.
20. September 15, 2025 — Al-Shabaab’s explosion brigade detonated a heavy explosive device in Baidoa, targeting the residence of a South West Police officer, resulting in casualties.
21. September 15, 2025 — Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an operation on the outskirts of Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, targeting a Somali security checkpoint. One officer was seriously injured, and military equipment was looted.
22. September 15, 2025 — In Gedo region, Al-Shabaab launched a direct assault on the African Union–Ethiopian forces’ base at Baardheere Airport.
23. September 14, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants conducted armed assaults on Ethiopian army forces in Dinsoor and Qansaxdheere, Bay, Somalia.
24. September 14, 2025 — Heavy clashes erupted between government forces and Al-Shabaab militants in Nuur Dugle village, Middle Shabelle. Casualty details remain unconfirmed.
25. September 14, 2025 — An improvised explosive device (IED) targeted a military vehicle in Daarusalaam district, Mogadishu, injuring a woman and two children passing nearby.
26. September 14, 2025 — Al-Shabaab launched an organized armed attack on an SNA base in Awdinle, Baidoa, Bay region.
27. September 13, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali militia forces in Mogadishu, Somalia.
28. September 13, 2025 — An improvised explosive device (IED) struck a Somali military vehicle in Garasbaaley district, Mogadishu, injuring at least four soldiers.
29. September 13, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somali militia officer in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
30. September 13, 2025 — Al-Shabaab forces conducted a planned attack targeting Ethiopian forces in Diinsoor district, Bay region, Somalia. Casualties remain unconfirmed.
31. September 13, 2025 — Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a direct gun battle with Somali National Army troops at a military camp in El-Hindi, Qansaxdheere district, Bay region, Somalia.
32. September 13, 2025 — Al-Shabaab forces operating near Kambooni, Lower Juba, engaged Somali government troops in heavy fighting, injuring two soldiers.
33. September 12, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants briefly captured Ceeldheer town, Galguduud region, seizing a cache of weapons and military vehicles.
34. September 11, 2025 — Al-Shabaab combatants conducted a planned operation near Idow Dhigaal, on the outskirts of Baidoa, killing a Somali government soldier and looting his AK-47 rifle.
35. September 10, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a government militiaman in Ailsha area of Mogadishu, Somalia.
36. September 10, 2025 — A special operation by Al-Shabaab near Elasha-Biyaha, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, resulted in the killing of a Somali government soldier.
37. September 9, 2025 — Al-Shabaab targeted a convoy of U.S.-trained Danab SNA troops with an explosion near Barire while en route from Baledogle. One soldier was killed, and two others were injured.
38. September 8, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Somali forces in Afgooye and Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
39. September 8, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Somali special forces in Barire, near Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, killing three soldiers and injuring two others.
40. September 8, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a Somali militia checkpoint in Yaqshid district, Mogadishu, injuring four soldiers.
41. September 7, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants operating in Lower Shabelle carried out an explosive attack on an SNA post in Afgooye, killing three soldiers and wounding two others.
42. September 6, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali military checkpoint on the outskirts of Bardera, Gedo, Somalia.
43. September 6, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants launched an armed assault on Somali military barracks in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
44. September 6, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali military checkpoint near Hagar Dir area, Garissa County, Kenya.
45. September 5, 2025 — Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack targeting U.S. military personnel stationed at Kismayo Airport, Lower Juba, Somalia, stating it was retaliation for the Gaza war.
46. September 5, 2025 — Al-Shabaab conducted an explosive operation in Baidoa, Bay region, targeting Somali National Army troops, causing casualties.
47. September 3, 2025 — An explosion in Barawe, Lower Shabelle, destroyed a government official’s vehicle, injuring the officer as he prepared to start his workday.
48. September 2, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants killed an Ethiopian soldier and seized his sniper rifle in the suburbs of Luuq, Gedo, Somalia.
49. September 2, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Somali forces in Merca, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
50. September 1, 2025 — Al-Shabaab militants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Somali security forces in Baidoa, Bay, Somalia.
51. September 1, 2025 — Al-Shabaab carried out an explosion in Danow, Lower Shabelle, targeting Somali government troops and inflicting casualties.
52. September 1, 2025 — Al-Shabaab carried out an explosion in Baidoa, Bay region, targeting the residence of departmental governor Abdirahman Weerish. Casualties remain unconfirmed.

Analysis, Observation & Insights

Al-Shabaab’s continued campaign of violence across Somalia and Kenya during September 2025 highlights a concerning surge in militant activity, particularly within Somalia, where the group maintains its operational headquarters in Jilib, Middle Jubba. The organization’s persistent capability to launch near-daily attacks underscores its entrenched command structure, deep-rooted recruitment networks, and operational sophistication. Despite intensified counterterrorism efforts by the Somali National Army (SNA), the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and allied partners, the group managed to sustain a high tempo of operations, demonstrating strategic resilience and adaptability under pressure. The surge in Somalia’s southern and central regions signals Al-Shabaab’s attempt to reclaim influence over territories previously contested by government forces, thereby destabilizing ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

The key targets of Al-Shabaab’s operations throughout September were government security installations, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and Somali National Army units. These assaults often involved improvised explosive devices (IEDs) followed by direct armed engagements aimed at overwhelming lightly defended positions. The group’s repeated attacks on AUSSOM contingents in Janale, Qoryoley, and Baidoa—particularly those involving Ugandan and Ethiopian forces—suggest a deliberate strategy to erode regional confidence in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, government officials and local administrators remained prime targets for assassination operations, especially in Gedo, Lower Shabelle, and Mogadishu. Civilian populations, unfortunately, continue to bear the brunt of Al-Shabaab’s terror campaign, suffering heavy casualties from indiscriminate roadside bombings and explosive attacks on public routes and residential areas.

A critical factor sustaining Al-Shabaab’s insurgency is the socio-economic fragility of communities across southern Somalia. Chronic poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education and social services have created fertile recruitment grounds for the group. Many rural populations, disillusioned by weak governance and corruption, are easily manipulated by Al-Shabaab’s ideological and financial incentives. In Kenya’s northeastern border regions, similar socio-economic conditions—compounded by marginalization and insecurity—facilitate recruitment and radicalization. The group has strategically exploited these vulnerabilities to infiltrate communities, embedding itself through a combination of coercion, social service provision, and indoctrination, thereby maintaining a continuous flow of new combatants and local informants.

Al-Shabaab has morphed into a more decentralized and adaptive insurgent network, refining its training programs and enhancing its propaganda capabilities. Recruits are increasingly trained in asymmetric warfare, explosives handling, and tactical ambush operations within camps in Jilib and the surrounding Middle Jubba region. Parallel to battlefield evolution, the group has invested heavily in media propaganda, using online platforms and local clerics to spread extremist narratives that justify attacks and discredit government efforts. This dual evolution—military and ideological—has allowed the organization to regenerate its ranks, maintain morale, and project strength despite mounting counterterrorism pressure.

In Kenya, the attack pattern remains sporadic but deliberate, with operations largely concentrated along the border prefectures of Mandera, Lamu, and Garissa counties. These assaults, though fewer in number compared to Somalia, reflect a tactical intention to stretch Kenyan security forces thin and instill fear within border communities. Cross-border incursions and improvised explosive attacks on patrol vehicles remain common, often intended to disrupt surveillance and counterterrorism patrols. Al-Shabaab’s operational focus in these areas underscores the group’s strategy of maintaining a manageable level of threat in Kenya to deter further involvement in Somalia’s stabilization efforts while keeping its broader East African jihadist agenda alive.

Looking ahead, forecast scenarios for both Somalia and Kenya point toward sustained volatility. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab is likely to maintain its momentum, intensifying attacks against SNA and AUSSOM positions as the peacekeeping mission gradually transitions out. The group’s territorial ambitions in Bay, Lower Shabelle, and Gedo suggest continued contestation for control, while urban centers like Mogadishu remain at risk of periodic bombings and assassinations. In Kenya, the threat will persist along the northeastern and coastal borders, with potential spikes in attacks during the coming festive season. Without significant improvement in socio-economic conditions, intelligence coordination, and regional cooperation, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency will continue to evolve—posing a long-term asymmetric threat to the stability and security of the Horn of Africa.