Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for the Month of June 2025

Executive Summary

In June 2025, East and Central Africa faced sustained and often intensifying violence from Islamic State affiliates. In Mozambique, ISM carried out a series of coordinated attacks targeting both security forces and civilians in Cabo Delgado, using kidnappings and illegal mining revenues to fund operations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, ISCAP capitalized on reduced military presence caused by FARDC redeployments, carrying out deadly assaults against civilians, miners, and Christian communities while benefiting from significant arms leakages from state stockpiles. Meanwhile, in Somalia, ISS maintained a relentless campaign of ambushes and IED attacks in Puntland, even as government forces reclaimed most former strongholds, revealing the group’s deep-rooted leadership networks and international links.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 27^TH June- Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants led an armed assault against the Mozambican troops in Quiterajo, Macomia district.
• 19^th June- ISM militants captured and executed a Christian in Mihanha in Meluco District.
• 19^th June- ISM terror group led an armed assault on Christians in Congresso area in Macomia District.
• 17^th June- ISM militants erected roadblocks on the N380 highway between Quinto Congresso and Chai in Macomia, extorting ransom payments from motorists, including two truck drivers who were forced to pay 250,000 meticais for their release.
• 15^th June- ISM militants captured and executed a Christian near Miangalewa in Muidumbe district.
• 14^th June- Mozambican troops were attacked by a group of armed ISM militants in Catupa area in Macomia district; one soldier was killed in the attack.
• 14^th June- ISM militants led an armed assault on Christians in Miangalewa, Muidumbe District.
• 12^th June- Insurgents attacked Miangalewa village in Muidumbe, near the Messalo River, killing one person and reportedly stealing two motorbikes, according to Islamic State channels.
• 06^th– 08^th June- ISM insurgents attacked Magaia village, abducting civilians for ransom, looting and burning property, and clashing with the Local Force in fighting that left at least one defender dead and several insurgent casualties unconfirmed.
• 03^rd June- Mozambican forces (FADM) ambushed ISM fighters returning from Niassa near the Messalo River, killing at least 12 insurgents close to the Nairoto gold project in Cabo Delgado.01^st June- Suspected ISM militants abducted a woman and asked her about the village leader in Namuembe, Nangade District.

SOMALIA

• 27th June– Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants ambushed Puntland forces in Ufeyn area in Bari region.
• 24^th June- ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Dhasaq, Jalil Valley, Bari Region.
• 24^Th June– ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Daray-Madobe area in Jalil Valley, Bari Region.
• 21^st June– ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Dhasaq, Jalil Valley, Bari Region.
• 21^st June- ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Daray-Madobe, Jalil Valley, Bari Region.
• 21^st June- ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces El Arare Valley in Bari Region.
• 17^th June- Puntland Forces claimed that ISS Leader Abdul Qadir Mumin had fled Puntland following intensified efforts by the government forces against the terror group.
• 17^th June– Puntland Forces reportedly announced suspension of counter-terrorism-operations (CTO) against ISS in Puntland.
• 16^th June- ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Mirale Valley, Bari Region.
• 16^th June- ISS militants detonated an IED on Puntland Defense Forces in Mirale Valley, Bari Region.
• 16^th June- Puntland Forces detained a Turkish National belonging to ISS terror group who was collecting water in mountains in Bari region.
• 15^th June- ISS militants attacked Puntland soldiers with an IED in the Qurac, Bari region.
• 15^th June- ISS militants ambushed Puntland Defense Forces in Daray-Madobe area in Jalil Valley in Bari.
• 14^th June- Several Puntland Defense forces were injured following a clash with ISS militants in Ufeyn area in Bari region.
• 13 June- ISS Militants clashed with Puntland Defense Forces in the Balidhidin area, Bari Region.
• 13^th June- ISS militants and Puntland Defense Forces clashed between Mirael and Baladi areas in Cal Miskaat Mountains in Puntland.
• 10^th June- ISS fighters ambushed government troops in Dhasaq area located in Jalil Valley in Bari Region.
• 07^th June- ISS militants attacked Puntland soldiers with an IED in the El Arare Valley of Bari region.
• 05^th June- ISS rebels captured and executed a Puntland Defense Force soldier in Jalil Valley in Bari Region.
• 04^th June- ISS militants detonated an IED targeting government troops in Dhasaq Jalil, Valley in Bari Region.
• 06^th June- ISS militants led an armed assault against the Puntland soldiers in Mirale Valley of Bari region.
• 05^th June- ISS militants led an armed assault against the Puntland soldiers in Dhasaq area in Bari region.
• 04^th June- ISS militants ambushed the Puntland soldiers in Dandamale area in Jalil Valley of Bari region.
• 03^rd June- ISS detonated an IED against the Puntland soldiers in Tuur Masale are in Jalil Valley, Bari region.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

• 30^th June- Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) terrorists led an armed assault against Congolese armed forces in Mambasa area in Ituri Province.
• 28^th June- Approximately sixteen bodies belonging to civilians executed by ISCAO rebels over the past four years, were buried in Ndoma Kifrefre, located 12km from Alungupa, in the Ruwenzori sector, Beni territory.
• 26^th June- ISCAP fighters led an armed assault on the militia forces in Luengba area in Ituri Province.
• 15^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christians in Titona area, Lubero District in North Kivu Province.
• 12^th June- At least 30 civilians, mostly artisanal miners, were killed by ISCAP militants in retaliatory attacks on two remote mining sites in North Kivu’s Bapere sector, with some victims hacked to death and others drowning while fleeing across a river.
• 10^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Wazalendo forces in Magelegele area in Lubero District in North Kivu Province.
• 09^th June- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Christiams in Ombole area In Lubero District in North Kivu Province.
• 07^th June- Around 50 artisanal miners were kidnapped by suspected ISCAP militants in Kibinda village, Tshopo province, amid escalating violence and displacement in Bafwasende territory, where both ISCAP fighters fleeing military pressure and a militia led by self-proclaimed General Shokoro are active.
• 03^rd June- two suspected ISCAP terrorists, including a potential female suicide bomber were killed in a blast near the Munyonyo Martyrs Shrine in Munyonyo in Kampala, Uganda.

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

MOZAMBIQUE

In June 2025, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province remained highly unstable as Islamic State-linked insurgents continued to launch frequent attacks against government forces. Despite some military successes by Mozambican troops and their regional allies, militants used ambushes, IEDs, and ransom kidnappings to maintain pressure. Notably, clashes in key districts like Macomia and Montepuez resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, reflecting a persistent and adaptive insurgency.

The humanitarian situation worsened significantly, with civilians suffering from abductions, forced recruitment, and mass displacement. Reports indicate that over 120 children were kidnapped during the month, many forced into labor or armed roles. Displacement has surged, with tens of thousands fleeing their homes, while critical health and water services have been disrupted due to insecurity and funding gaps, increasing the risk of famine and disease.

Strategically, the conflict is expanding geographically, with insurgents extending operations beyond traditional areas and shifting to guerrilla tactics. While government forces have reclaimed some territory, militants’ continued use of asymmetric methods highlights the need for a comprehensive approach. This should combine targeted intelligence operations, enhanced civilian protection, humanitarian support, and regional cooperation to prevent further destabilization and achieve lasting security gains.

June 2025 marked a significant escalation in violence and insurgent activity in northern Mozambique, particularly in Cabo Delgado’s Macomia, Muidumbe, and Meluco districts. Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) demonstrated renewed operational capability, executing attacks on both military and civilian targets with increasing frequency and coordination. Notably, the attack on the Quiterajo army base on June 27 where ISM claimed that 30 soldiers were killed, underlines a concerning shift toward high-impact assaults aimed at weakening state military presence. The ambushes along strategic routes such as the N380 highway and continued assaults on Christian communities highlight ISM’s dual strategy of disrupting military logistics and stoking religious and sectarian fear to assert dominance.

The insurgency’s return to Macomia and its entrenchment in Meluco also reflects strategic maneuvering. With intensified pressure from the Rwanda Defence Force and joint Mozambican operations in traditional hotspots, ISM appears to be exploiting lightly defended regions like Meluco to regroup, fund operations via illegal mining, and expand its logistical routes into Niassa and Ancuabe. The group’s proximity to artisanal mining sites suggests a deepening reliance on illicit mineral trade for financing, complicating the counter-insurgency landscape. Civilian targeting and child abductions underscore the insurgents’ increasingly brutal tactics, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and eroding local trust in government protection.

Amid this security crisis, President Daniel Chapo’s openness to negotiations signals a potential recalibration of strategy. While kinetic operations continue, Chapo’s recognition of the need for dialogue and local intelligence networks, especially around mining zones, indicates a nuanced approach aimed at understanding and undermining ISM’s socio-political foothold. The bolstering of the Local Force, particularly in Mueda, also demonstrates a reliance on community-rooted security structures. However, without a comprehensive civilian protection framework and greater investment in intelligence and rapid response, ISM’s fluid mobility and local exploitation could continue to outpace current state efforts.

D.R. CONGO

Despite tactical gains in decapitating segments of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) leadership, the joint FARDC-UPDF Operation Shujaa has failed to neutralize ISCAP’s operational capacity or curb violence against civilians in eastern DRC, according to a UN Group of Experts report. The redeployment of FARDC units to counter the Rwandan-backed AFC/M23 insurgency has created security vacuums in North Kivu and Ituri, enabling ISCAP to exploit reduced state presence and reassert itself, particularly in Beni, northwest Lubero, and Irumu. The UN report underscores ISCAP’s evolving insurgent tactics; marked by mobility, multi-front attacks, and continued engagement with local militias such as the Mai-Mai FPP/AP, and highlights direct operational links to Daesh, including over 127 claimed attacks, many orchestrated by sanctioned commander Ahmad Mahmood Hassan (aka Abwakasi) in the Bapere sector.

In Ituri, violence persists as CODECO and Zaire militias continue reprisal attacks, while new armed groups led by convicted warlords Innocent Kaina and Thomas Lubanga further destabilize the region. Lubanga’s launch of the Convention for the Popular Revolution reflects a troubling politicization of armed actors. ISCAP has shifted tactics, reducing attack frequency but increasing lethality and seeking local support to finance operations. MONUSCO is advancing protection, reintegration, and justice efforts, but the re-emergence of war criminals as militia leaders underscores the fragility of disarmament and governance efforts.

Of grave concern is the finding that 50% of recovered ISCAP weapons originated from FARDC stockpiles, illustrating critical deficiencies in arms control and base security. In response, Kinshasa and Kampala revised their bilateral framework in June 2025 to expand Shujaa operations into Mambasa and other volatile Ituri zones, sustain joint intelligence capabilities, and secure strategic infrastructure, signaling a strategic recalibration rather than an exit strategy from a protracted counterinsurgency theater.

The revised memorandum signed on June 20, 2025, in Kinshasa between FARDC and UPDF was welcomed by local leaders and communities in Beni, North Kivu, as a critical move toward ending ADF violence and restoring stability. The agreement expands joint operations into key conflict zones, including Mambasa, Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi, and Aru, targeting both ADF and other armed groups. While the initiative was praised, Beni officials urged for more targeted and sustained military deployments, particularly in Beni-Mbau and Ruwenzori, and advocated for permanent UPDF bases to enhance civilian military coordination and secure long-term peace.

In June 2025, the security landscape in eastern DRC deteriorated sharply, marked by a resurgence of ISCAP operations across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces, despite prior leadership decapitations under the FARDC-UPDF-led Operation Shujaa. ISCAP’s adaptive insurgency which is characterized by reduced attack frequency but increased lethality, targeting civilians, artisanal miners, and Christian communities; exploits growing security vacuums created by FARDC redeployments to counter M23 advances. The UN’s revelation that half of ISCAP’s recovered weapons stem from FARDC stockpiles highlights endemic arms control failures. ISCAP’s operational reach, bolstered by ties to Daesh and local militias, underscores its embeddedness in the region’s conflict ecosystem. Meanwhile, overlapping violence from CODECO, Zaire, and newly armed factions led by warlords like Lubanga compounds instability. The June 20 revision of the FARDC-UPDF framework, expanding joint operations into volatile zones such as Mambasa and Djugu, signals a necessary strategic recalibration, but local leaders’ calls for permanent UPDF bases and targeted deployments underscore the urgency for sustainable, community-anchored counterinsurgency mechanisms.

SOMALIA

Throughout June 2025, the security situation in Somalia, particularly in the Puntland region, remained highly volatile due to persistent and sophisticated attacks by Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants. The month was marked by frequent ambushes, IED detonations, and armed clashes concentrated in the Bari region, specifically within key areas like Jalil Valley, Mirale Valley, and the Cal Miskaad Mountains. These attacks illustrate ISS’s continued operational capacity despite sustained counterterrorism efforts, underscoring their resilience and adaptive tactics, including the extensive use of improvised explosive devices to target Puntland Defense Forces repeatedly.

A significant development occurred mid-month when Puntland forces claimed to have driven ISS leader Abdulkadir Mumin out of his mountainous stronghold, reclaiming nearly all of the group’s previous territory. However, this tactical victory is tempered by strategic challenges highlighted by Mumin’s escape, which points to sophisticated escape routes and external support networks enabling ISS leadership to evade capture. The sustained presence of deputy leader Abdirahman Faahiye Isse Mahmoud, alongside the capture of a foreign fighter, signals that ISS maintains a robust command structure and international connections. This suggests that ISS is not only a local insurgency but also a node in a wider transnational jihadist network, complicating counterterrorism operations.

Going forward, Puntland’s suspension of overt counterterrorism operations in mid-June may indicate a shift towards more intelligence-driven and surgical targeting strategies in Phase Four of Operation Hillaac. To consolidate gains and prevent ISS resurgence, authorities must focus on dismantling ISS’s leadership, disrupting foreign fighter influx, and interdicting cross-border militant movements. Without addressing these structural vulnerabilities, Puntland risks cyclical insecurity despite territorial recoveries. The situation remains a critical test of Somalia’s broader counterterrorism capabilities and regional cooperation frameworks essential for long-term stabilization.

The leader of ISIS in Somalia, Abdulkadir Mumin, was report to have escaped the Cal-Miskaad mountains as Puntland forces reclaim 98 percent of the group’s former stronghold. This development, while a tactical victory for Puntland’s Operation Hillaac, highlights deeper strategic concerns for Somalia’s long-term counterterrorism posture. Mumin’s escape, despite heavy military pressure and international intelligence support, suggests the presence of well-established escape networks and possible external facilitation. The continued hiding of his deputy, Abdirahman Faahiye Isse Mahmoud, reinforces the group’s capacity to maintain operational leadership under pressure. Furthermore, the capture of a white European ISIS fighter confirms the group’s transnational reach and points to an active foreign fighter pipeline into Somalia. As Puntland launches Phase Four of the operation, the focus must shift toward sustained intelligence-led targeting of leadership figures, containment of cross-border militant movement, and disruption of external recruitment and financing networks. Without these efforts, territorial gains may prove temporary in the face of a mobile and globally linked insurgency.

CONCLUSION

The events of June 2025 demonstrate that Islamic State affiliates in East and Central Africa are not only persisting but evolving in ways that challenge conventional counterterrorism approaches. In Mozambique, ISM’s intensified assaults in Cabo Delgado, combined with systematic targeting of Christian communities and strategic kidnappings, reveal a sophisticated strategy to finance operations through ransom payments and illicit resource extraction from mining zones. This shift toward integrating criminal economies with ideological violence underscores the group’s adaptability and its ability to embed itself within local grievances and economic vulnerabilities.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, ISCAP’s resurgence despite leadership decapitations highlights structural challenges that go beyond battlefield tactics. The redeployment of FARDC units to confront the M23 insurgency created exploitable security vacuums, while the troubling revelation that half of ISCAP’s recovered weapons originated from government stockpiles points to critical failures in arms management and military governance. ISCAP’s collaboration with local militias and its ties to Daesh illustrate its hybrid insurgency model that blends local dynamics with transnational jihadist networks, complicating both operational response and political resolution.

In Somalia, ISS has proven equally resilient. The reported escape of leader Abdulkadir Mumin and the continued presence of deputy leadership figures suggest a robust command structure capable of withstanding tactical losses. The capture of a foreign fighter further signals that ISS remains connected to wider international jihadist recruitment pipelines, shifting the threat from a localized insurgency to a regional and potentially global security concern. Puntland’s decision to suspend overt counterterrorism operations and pivot toward intelligence-led targeting reflects a recognition that defeating ISS requires dismantling leadership networks and external supply chains rather than merely regaining territory.

Collectively, these trends highlight that Islamic State affiliates in the region are pursuing multi-layered strategies that exploit governance gaps, local conflicts, and economic vulnerabilities while drawing legitimacy and resources from broader transnational networks. Lasting security will require regional governments to move beyond reactive military campaigns and adopt a comprehensive approach that integrates robust intelligence cooperation, strengthened arms control and border security, and community-focused initiatives that address the root causes of radicalization. Sustained investment in local resilience, accountability, and inclusive governance will be essential to break the cycle of adaptation and resurgence that has kept these groups operational despite significant tactical setbacks.