Executive Summary

The December 2024 counter-terrorism intelligence review for East and Central Africa highlighted heightened activity by Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The period saw a convergence of political instability, insurgent activity, and humanitarian crises that have exacerbated regional insecurity.

In Mozambique, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) sustained its campaign in Cabo Delgado, targeting civilians, Christians, and state forces. Notably, political unrest following disputed elections compounded the volatile environment. In Somalia, Islamic State Somalia (ISS) demonstrated unprecedented operational capacity, launching coordinated suicide and assault operations against Puntland Security Forces. Meanwhile, in the DRC, Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) intensified attacks in Ituri and North Kivu, using extreme violence to instill fear and exploit the region’s resource wealth.

The review underscored the challenges of counter-insurgency efforts, including fragmented military responses, strained regional cooperation, and the exploitation of ungoverned spaces by insurgents. Despite some localized gains, significant gaps in strategy and coordination remain, impeding long-term stabilization efforts.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 25^th Dec- Over 6,000 Prisoners, including Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) Militants, escape from Maputo Central Prison amid election protests in Maputo.
• 11^th Dec- ISM leader, Guilherme was ambushed and killed by Mozambican Security Forces in Ngangolo, Nangande District.
• 11^th Dec- several people were killed or injured after ISM militants attacked Christians on N380 in Mienguleia in Muidumbe districts.
• 8^th Dec– ISM Militants led an armed assault on Christians in Mareria, Meluco District.
• 8^th Dec– ISM militants ambushed and attacked Mozambican Police forces in Muaguide in Meluco district.
• 6^th Dec- several civilians were injured after ISM militants led an armed assault against them in Mungue area in Muidumbe district.
• 4^th Dec– government officials vacate offices after threats from ISM Militants in Mazeze, Chiure District.
• 2^nd Dec- ISM militants led an armed assault on civilians on N380 in Maponha, Ancuabe District.
• 3^rd Dec- 3 Christians were captured and executed by ISM terrorists on N380 on Mieguleia in Muidumbe district.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

• 29^th Dec- one person was captured and beheaded by ISCAP terrorists in Ofaye Otto Maber area in Ituri Province.
• 28^th Dec- sixteen people were captured and beheaded by ISCAP terrorists in Ofaye Otto Maber area in Ituri Province.
• 28^th Dec- ISCAP militants clashed with Wazalendo militia forces in Fangula area in Lubero region, North Kivu.
• 28^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Army Forces in Fangula, Lubero District.
• 28^TH Dec– 8 Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP militants in Maiba, Lubero region in North Kivu.
• 28^th Dec– several people were injured following an ISCAP assault in Senga area of Lubero region.
• 28^TH Dec– 6 Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP militants in Kasanga, Lubero region in North Kivu.
• 27^th Dec– ISCAP Militants Led an Armed Assault on Civilians in Gombeniama, Ituri Province.
• 27^th Dec- ISCAP militants clashed with Wazalendo militia forces in Fangula area in Lubero region, North Kivu.
• 26^th Dec- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault against Congolese military in Kasanga in Lubero region.
• 26^th Dec- several Christians were captured and beheaded by ISCAP in Kaubera area, Lubero Region.
• 24^th DEC– several Christians were captured and beheaded by ISCAP in Robinet area, Lubero Region.
• 23^rd Dec– ISCAP led an armed assault against the military and civilians in Robinet area, Lubero Region.
• 22^nd Dec– ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Kojo, Lubero Region.
• 20^th Dec- ISCAP militants captured and executed Christians on RN4 near Idohu in Ituri
• 19^th Dec– ISCAP captured and beheaded three people in Ombole area in Lubero region.
• 18^th Dec– ISCAP captured and beheaded one person in Ombole area in Lubero region
• 17^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Christians in Ngliza area in Ituri province.
• 16^th Dec- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed several Christians in Ndalya area in Ituri Province.
• 15^th Dec- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed five Christians in Ndalya area in Ituri Province.
• 14^th Dec- Christians in Mabunda area of Lubero region were attacked by ISCAP rebels in an armed assault.
• 13^th Dec- Congolese troops were attacked my ISCAP militants in Umbul in Lubero region.
• 14^th Dec- ISCAP terrorists led an armed assault against Christians in Ndalya area in Ituri Province.
• 14^th Dec- two civilians were captured and beheaded by ISCAP terrorists in Ofaye Otto Maber area in Ituri Province.
• 12^th Dec- three people were captured and beheaded by ISCAP terrorists in Erengeti area in Ituri Province.
• 12^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against civilians in Tshabi region of Ituri province.
• 8^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Army and Militia Forces in Bandulu, Lubero Region.
• 7^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault on civilians leaving several injured in Bandulu, Lubero Region.
• 06^th Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against civilians in Erengeti region of Ituri province.
• 3^rd Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against civilians in Oicha area in Beni region.
• 1^ST Dec- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against civilians in Totolito in North Kivu province.

SOMALIA

• 12^th Dec- Islamic State Somalia (ISM) detonated an IED targeting Somali Police in Daynile District of Mogadishu, killing one and injuring another.
• 31^st Dec- Authorities in the Somali autonomous region of Puntland said eight foreign militants were killed following an attack by Islamic fighters on security forces.
• 31^st Dec- several security forces were killed in the attack that included a suicide attack against a region where the forces were in the Dharjale village in the far eastern highlands of Puntland.

ANALYISIS AND INSIGHTS

MOZAMBIQUE

In December 2024, the security situation in northern Mozambique, particularly in Cabo Delgado, was significantly influenced by Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) activities. The month saw notable insurgent actions, although the ISM’s operational tempo seemed slightly reduced compared to earlier months. Cyclone Chido, which struck in mid-December, compounded the existing instability in the region by displacing thousands of people and hindering both insurgent and state military operations.

ISM’s most significant actions occurred in Muidumbe district, where they launched attacks on 11 and 18 December, targeting the town of Miangelewa and neighboring villages. These attacks were characterized by looting and the displacement of civilians rather than high-intensity combat. The ISM’s continued presence in the region, particularly in Muidumbe, underscores their ability to operate in close proximity to military outposts, including those of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and the Mozambican military (FADM), suggesting a mismatch between the security forces’ strategic positioning and their operational response.

ISM’s pattern of looting, including commandeering agricultural supplies and vehicles, indicates their continued reliance on resource acquisition for survival and operational funding. Local reports confirmed that nearly 7,000 individuals fled the area, intensifying the humanitarian crisis already exacerbated by the cyclone.

In Nangade district, on 11 December, a joint military force comprising the FADM, Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), and local militias successfully ambushed an ISM group. However, the scale of ISM’s operational disruptions was relatively minimal. This ambush represents one of the few direct confrontations between ISM and regional forces, although such clashes remain sporadic across the northern provinces.

ISM also maintained a visible presence in Macomia district, where they had once dominated the coastal areas. Despite a strengthened state security presence, particularly around Quiterajo and Mucojo, ISM continued to engage in sporadic attacks, with one such clash occurring on 4 January. This suggests that while state forces have managed some success in retaking areas, ISM remains resilient, utilizing the dense terrain and shifting local allegiances to persist in harassing state forces.

The rise of instability extended beyond just ISM’s insurgency. Political unrest linked to the December electoral results, particularly following the confirmation of Daniel Chapo’s victory, exacerbated regional volatility. The 23 December announcement triggered widespread demonstrations, particularly in areas with significant opposition support such as Zambezia and Nampula. These protests led to violent clashes with security forces and sporadic looting, further destabilizing an already volatile environment.

In particular, the Naparama, a loosely organized group of youth in Zambezia and Nampula provinces, escalated tensions by engaging in violent acts, including the ambush of police and the destruction of state infrastructure. Although their actions were reportedly not coordinated by opposition leaders like Venâncio Mondlane, they reflected a broader pattern of popular discontent with the political system.

Throughout December, the Frelimo government faced increasing pressure from opposition forces, which not only rallied around political figures like Mondlane but also mobilized against perceived governmental repression. This political violence, coupled with the military pressures from ISM and Naparama, contributed to the multifaceted security challenges in northern Mozambique.

The international response, particularly from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), called for de-escalation, urging all parties to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue. However, the continued insurgency by ISM, along with domestic political tensions, suggests that the path to stability remains uncertain. The combination of insurgency, political violence, and humanitarian distress means that the security situation in Cabo Delgado and surrounding areas will likely remain fragile in the coming months.

SOMALIA

The attack on 31^st December by the Islamic State Somalia (ISS) on a Puntland Security Forces (PSF) base marks a pivotal moment in the region’s ongoing struggle against militancy. This bold offensive, though ultimately unsuccessful, demonstrates a significant evolution in ISS’s operational capacity and intent. While the group has traditionally maintained a defensive posture, this large-scale assault highlights its growing confidence and strength.

The operation, which featured coordinated suicide car bombings followed by an assault team, bore striking similarities to tactics commonly employed by Al Shabaab, ISS’s more dominant rival. This tactical alignment suggests that ISS has not only studied its competitor’s methods but is actively working to emulate them in its quest for influence. Despite the loss of at least 10 fighters, including several foreign operatives, the attack underscores ISS’s willingness to challenge Puntland’s security apparatus directly.

Timing plays a critical role in understanding this offensive. Puntland is preparing for a large-scale military campaign against both ISS and Al Shabaab, targeting their bases in the region’s mountainous terrain. By launching this attack, ISS may have sought to preempt or disrupt these plans, signaling its determination to resist efforts to dislodge it from its strongholds.

This assault is also notable for its scale. It is the most significant ISS operation targeting Puntland since the group’s siege of a Bosaso hotel in 2017. In the years since, ISS has focused on consolidating power, recruiting fighters, and expelling Al Shabaab from key northern positions. With an estimated force of 600–700 fighters, bolstered by foreign recruits, ISS is now demonstrating a capacity for offensive operations that was previously absent.

The implications of this attack extend beyond Puntland. Under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Mu’min, ISS serves as a critical node in the Islamic State’s African operations. Its financial networks generate millions annually through extortion and illegal taxation, funds that support Islamic State affiliates across Africa and the Middle East. A successful Puntland offensive could disrupt these networks, undermining ISS’s ability to sustain its activities and weakening the broader Islamic State infrastructure.

In the grander scheme, the attack highlights the evolving dynamics of militancy in Somalia. As ISS and Al Shabaab compete for dominance, Puntland finds itself at the center of a complex and high-stakes conflict. The coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether Puntland’s security forces can capitalize on their recent success to decisively weaken ISS, or if the group will continue to grow in strength and audacity. Either way, the battle for Puntland’s future carries implications far beyond its borders.

D.R. CONGO

In December 2024, the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu and Ituri provinces experienced a marked deterioration, primarily due to escalated activities by the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP. This group intensified its operations, leading to significant civilian casualties and heightened instability in the region.

Escalation of ISCAP Attacks

Throughout December, ISCAP militants conducted numerous assaults targeting both civilians and military personnel. Notably, on December 3rd, an attack in Tenambo village, North Kivu, resulted in the deaths of at least nine individuals, including children, and the abduction of three others. The assailants also set fire to several homes during this raid. In Ituri province, the group carried out a series of brutal attacks, including the beheading of multiple individuals in the Ofaye Otto Maber area on December 28th and 29th. These incidents underscore the group’s continued use of extreme violence to instill fear and exert control over local populations.

The surge in attacks has had a devastating impact on civilians, leading to increased displacement and humanitarian crises. The United Nations reported that between June and November 2024, over 650 civilians were killed by ISCAP activities. This violence has contributed to the displacement of nearly 7 million people in the region, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation.

Regional Security Dynamics

The security environment in North Kivu has further deteriorated due to recurrent clashes between the M23 rebel group and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). These confrontations have compounded the instability caused by ISCAP activities, creating a complex and volatile security landscape.

The resurgence of the M23 rebel group has exacerbated the security crisis. The M23, alleged to have backing from neighboring Rwanda, has been clashing with FARDC forces in parts of North Kivu. These clashes have diverted military attention and resources away from combating ISCAP, allowing the latter to exploit security gaps. Diplomatic strains between the DRC and Rwanda have deepened, with accusations of cross-border incursions and the supply of arms to rebel factions.

Beyond M23 and ISCAP, local militias such as the Wazalendo fighters have taken up arms, ostensibly to defend communities against external threats. However, these groups often clash with each other and the national army, further complicating the situation. The December 28 clashes between ISCAP and Wazalendo in Fangula, Lubero region, underscore how local militias play a dual role of resistance and destabilization.

The region’s rich mineral deposits, particularly gold and coltan, provide financial lifelines for armed groups. ISCAP and other factions rely on illicit trade networks to fund their activities, making these economic drivers central to the persistence of conflict. Efforts to curb the smuggling of resources across borders remain inadequate.

International and Regional Responses

MONUSCO’s Extended Mandate:
In December 2024, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO until December 2025. Despite longstanding criticisms of its effectiveness, MONUSCO remains a key player in stabilizing the region. The mission has focused on protecting civilians, supporting local governance, and strengthening the FARDC. However, the persistent violence in North Kivu and Ituri has revealed operational and logistical challenges that limit its impact.

Regional Cooperation Initiatives:
Efforts by the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU) to mediate peace and address cross-border tensions have continued. The Nairobi Process, initiated in 2022, has sought to bring regional actors together for dialogue, though progress remains limited. Regional summits in late 2024 have focused on addressing allegations of state-sponsored support to rebel groups, particularly between the DRC and Rwanda, and increasing collaboration to tackle ISCAP.

Bilateral and Multilateral Support:

• The United States and the European Union have provided financial and technical assistance to the DRC for counterterrorism and humanitarian efforts. The U.S., in particular, has sanctioned individuals linked to ISCAP networks and pushed for stronger enforcement of anti-terror financing measures.
• The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has discussed deploying additional forces to bolster the FARDC, complementing the existing presence of EAC regional troops. However, political and logistical disagreements have delayed deployments.
• Uganda’s Role: Uganda continues to play a controversial role, with its forces (UPDF) conducting operations against ISCAP in Ituri and North Kivu under joint agreements with the DRC. While these operations have reportedly disrupted some ISCAP supply chains, they have also led to civilian casualties, fueling local resentment.

Humanitarian Efforts and Advocacy:
International organizations, including the World Food Programme (WFP) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), have scaled up their activities to address the humanitarian fallout from the conflict. In December, the UN called for an additional $200 million to support displaced populations, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri.

The escalating violence in North Kivu and Ituri underscores the complexities of addressing a multifaceted conflict, with both regional and international responses reflecting the challenges of achieving stability. While initiatives such as MONUSCO and regional military deployments seek to mitigate immediate threats from ISCAP and other armed groups, significant barriers remain, including the lack of a unified strategy among neighboring states and the persistence of unresolved political grievances. Key challenges to these responses include:

• Insufficient Coordination: The overlapping mandates of MONUSCO, regional forces, and national armies often lead to confusion and inefficiency, undermining efforts to combat the violence effectively.
• Political Will and Trust Deficit: The strained relations between the DRC and Rwanda have severely hindered regional cooperation, as mutual suspicions continue to overshadow attempts at joint security initiatives.
• Militia Adaptability: Armed groups such as ISCAP remain highly adaptable, exploiting local grievances and ungoverned spaces to persist in their violent campaigns, posing significant challenges to countermeasures.

CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS

The December 2024 intelligence brief highlights the persistent and evolving threat posed by Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These groups continue to exploit governance gaps, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and resource wealth to sustain their operations. The situation remains dire, with escalating violence, displacement, and regional instability undermining efforts to establish peace and security. Addressing this crisis requires a coordinated, multifaceted response that combines military, political, and humanitarian strategies.

To this end, several recommendations emerge as critical priorities:

First, fostering regional cooperation is imperative. Enhanced collaboration between the East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and African Union (AU) can provide a unified framework for tackling insurgencies. This requires not only joint operations and intelligence sharing but also the resolution of political tensions, such as the strained relations between the DRC and Rwanda. Trust-building and diplomatic engagement will be key to achieving a cohesive regional strategy.

Second, improving counter-insurgency capabilities is essential. This includes increasing support for regional and national security forces through targeted training, logistical aid, and operational planning. Counter-terrorism strategies must also adapt to the asymmetric tactics employed by insurgent groups, ensuring that military responses are both proactive and precise.

Third, addressing the root causes of insurgency is vital. Governments must prioritize good governance, economic development, and the provision of essential services to affected communities. Restoring trust between the state and its citizens can weaken the appeal of extremist ideologies and reduce the pool of potential recruits. Humanitarian efforts should also focus on alleviating the suffering of displaced populations and rebuilding communities devastated by conflict.

Fourth, disrupting insurgent financing and recruitment networks is critical. Regional and international stakeholders must target the illicit trade in natural resources, which funds groups like ISCAP in the DRC. In Somalia, countermeasures against illegal taxation and extortion by ISS are equally necessary. Meanwhile, robust counter-propaganda campaigns should challenge extremist narratives and dissuade vulnerable individuals from joining these groups.

Lastly, international support must remain steadfast and coordinated. The United Nations, European Union, and United States, among others, play a crucial role in providing financial, technical, and logistical assistance. Sanctions and anti-terror financing measures targeting insurgent networks should be strengthened, while accountability mechanisms should ensure compliance from all actors involved in counter-terrorism efforts.

In conclusion, the challenges posed by Islamic State affiliates in East and Central Africa demand a holistic and sustained response. By addressing security threats, political grievances, and socioeconomic vulnerabilities in tandem, regional and international stakeholders can pave the way toward stability and resilience. Failure to act cohesively risks deepening the crises and prolonging the suffering of millions across the region.