Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists in August 2024

Executive Summary

The month of August 2024 witnessed a significant surge in militant activities by Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia. These groups—Islamic State Mozambique (ISM), Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), and Islamic State Somalia (ISS)—have demonstrated increased sophistication in their operations, posing severe challenges to regional stability. The situation underscores the growing threat posed by these insurgent groups as they adapt to evolving military strategies and exploit regional vulnerabilities.

In Mozambique, ISM has intensified its activities, particularly in Cabo Delgado province, despite international military efforts to curb the insurgency. August saw a series of IED attacks targeting both Mozambican and Rwandan forces, signaling a tactical shift towards asymmetric warfare. The withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops has left a security vacuum that ISM is exploiting. The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) have responded by increasing aerial operations, but this strategy carries the risk of civilian casualties and may only offer temporary reprieve unless accompanied by sustained ground operations and infrastructure rebuilding.

ISCAP has escalated its operations in the DRC, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. The group’s attacks have grown in frequency and brutality, with over 500 civilians killed in the past two months. ISCAP’s leader, Musa Baluku, was reportedly sighted in the region, indicating his direct involvement in orchestrating the violence. The group’s expansion into new territories, such as Tshopo Province, suggests a broader strategic intent to destabilize the region further. The failure of national and international forces to effectively contain ISCAP has led to increased civilian unrest, particularly in North Kivu, where protests against the ineffectiveness of local militias have paralyzed socio-economic activities.

In Somalia, ISS has re-emerged as a significant threat, particularly in the Puntland region. The group has expanded its economic activities, including extortion, to fund its operations. Despite surviving a U.S. airstrike, ISS leader Abdiqadir Mumin continues to lead the group’s efforts to control strategic areas. The rivalry between ISS and al-Shabaab for dominance in Puntland underscores the volatile security environment, with both groups vying for control over vital territories. The potential for external support to these groups, particularly from Yemeni Houthis, adds another layer of complexity to the conflict.

Mozambique

• 1^st Aug- ISM militants clashed with security forces in Darumba area in Macomia district in Cabo Delgado.
• 1^st Aug- Militants clashed with Rwandan Naval Forces in Crimize region in Macomia district.
• 07^th Aug- ISM terrorists detonated an IED targeting Rwandan and Mozambican forces between Mbau and Chinda in Mocimboa da Praia.

• 09^th Aug- ISM terrorists detonated an IED targeting Rwandan forces between Chinda and Xitaxi in Muidumbe district.
•  12^th Aug- ISM militants detonated an IED targeting a Mozambican police vehicle between Chitunda and Xitaxi in Cabo Delgado.
• 15^TH Aug- Rwandan troops launched a major offensive against ISM strongholds in Mucojo area in Macomia district.

• 22^nd Aug- ISM militants detonated an IED targeting a truck between Chitunda and Mungui in Cabo Delgado.
• 20^TH Aug- ISM terrorists attacked civilians in Mbau area in Mocimboa da Praia (MDP).
• 20^th Aug- Islamic State also claimed that insurgents burned five houses in Mbau, Mocimboa district.
• 22^nd Aug- ISM published a video of an IED which reportedly exploded on a Christian truck between the villages of Antadora and Chinda in MDP.
• 22^nd Aug- a truck triggered an IED on the road between the villages of Mungwe and Chitunda in Muidumbe district. The truck was travelling from MDP to Pemba

SOMALIA

• 05^th Aug– Security forces in Puntland arrested Two Islamic State Somalia (ISS) and recovered weapons in Bosaso City.

D.R. CONGO

• 28^th Aug- several civilians were injured following an armed assault against them in Bududiya area in Lubero region in North Kivu Province.
• 27^th Aug- several civilians were injured following an armed assault against them in Bududiya area in Lubero region in North Kivu Province.
• 27^th Aug- ISCAP Militants attacked the Congolese militia forces in Bumuzika in Tshopo Province.
• 26^th Aug- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault on the Congolese Army Forces and Civilians along RN4 in Bahaha area or Ituri province at least 6 people were killed.
• 25^th Aug- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault on civilians on RN4 in Basia between Beni and Mbau areas in North Kivu.
• 23^rd Aug- A Ugandan military base in Nakasongola District in Uganda was attacked by armed ISCAP militants. The group claimed attack.
• 19^th Aug- ISCAP clashed with a Congolese Militia Forces Patrol, near Ndimo (RN4) in Ituri Province. Ndimo, is situated along the RN4 which is a deadly stretch of road continues to be a focal point of violence for ISCAP attacks.
• 18^th Aug- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault against Congolese armed troops In Mandela near Mwinyi In Lubero region in North Kivu.
• 18^th Aug- ISCAP conducted an armed assault on Congolese Militia Forces as well as an Arson attack of over 150 Christian Homes, in and near Esege in Lubero Region.
• 15^th Aug- Several civilians were killed and wounded following an ISCAP attack in Kwame and Masana areas near Biakato in Ituri.
• 15^th Aug– ISCAP militants led ad armed assaults against Congolese militia forces in Esege area in Lubero region in North Kivu Province.
• 15^th Aug– Five Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP Near Ndimo area in in Ituri Province.
• 14^th Aug– ISCAP militants a Congolese Army Barracks located between Mambasa and Komanda along the RN4 in Ituri province.
• 12^th Aug- ISCAP militants launched an attack on the Congolese troops On RN44 in Biakato in Ituri province.
• 10^th Aug- ISCAP terrorists conducted an attack against pro-government militia forces and civilians in Mbalimbangwa in Tshopo Province.
• 10^th Aug– ISCAP militants led an armed attack on Christians in Mamove village in Beni territory, North Kivu.
• 6^th Aug– ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Civilians in Minamaimbu area in Lubero region.
• 5^th Aug- Congolese militais forces clashed with ISCAP terrorists in Bandulu area in Lubero region.

• 5^th Aug- ISCAP militants attacked Christians in Itembo area in Lubero region in North Kivu.
• 4^th Aug- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Congolese Army and Militia forces in Bandulu area in Lubero Region.
• 2^nd Aug- ISCAP militants clashed with Congolese and Uganda armed forces in Mumbe area in Beni region.
• 1^st Aug- ISCAP terrorists captured and executed two Christians in Idohu region of Ituri province.

Analysis, Insights and Conclusion

The operational landscape in Central and East Africa is marked by the strategic expansion and intensification of activities by Islamic State affiliates, particularly ISCAP in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), ISM in Mozambique, and ISS in Somalia. Here’s a detailed analysis:

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Operational Expansion and Intensification:

• Geographical Spread: ISCAP has broadened its reach beyond its traditional strongholds in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, expanding into new areas like Tshopo Province. This move reflects a calculated effort to extend their influence and capitalize on regional vulnerabilities.
• Increased Attack Frequency and Lethality: Throughout August 2024, the frequency and deadliness of attacks surged, targeting both civilian populations and military forces. These well-coordinated attacks indicate a significant enhancement in ISCAP’s operational capabilities.
• Targeting of Civilians and Infrastructure: ISCAP’s deliberate attacks on civilians, including brutal killings and the burning of homes, are aimed at sowing fear, disrupting socio-economic activities, and eroding public confidence in government protection.

Leadership and Organizational Dynamics:

• Presence of Musa Baluku: Reports of ISCAP leader Musa Baluku being present during attacks in Oicha city suggest direct leadership involvement in frontline operations, potentially boosting militant morale and effectiveness.
• Adaptive Tactics: ISCAP has shown tactical adaptability, targeting both military and civilian entities, exploiting local grievances, and taking advantage of security gaps left by the state’s insufficient presence and response.

Security and Humanitarian Implications:

• Humanitarian Crisis: The escalation in violence has worsened the humanitarian situation, leading to mass displacements, disruption of economic activities, and increased vulnerability among civilians.
• Civil Unrest and Protests: In regions like Manguredjipa, civilian protests demanding better security and the withdrawal of ineffective local militias underscore the growing distrust in the current security frameworks.

Counterterrorism Efforts and Challenges:

• Joint Military Operations: While Congolese and Ugandan forces have undertaken joint operations, they face challenges in countering ISCAP’s dispersed and adaptive tactics.
• International Support and Coordination: There is a critical need for heightened international support, including intelligence sharing, logistical aid, and humanitarian assistance, to strengthen local capacities and address the underlying causes of instability.

Mozambique

Tactical Shifts by ISM:

• Increased Use of IEDs: ISM has escalated its use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Cabo Delgado province, targeting both military and civilian vehicles. This shift towards asymmetric warfare highlights ISM’s adaptation to increased military pressure and aims to maximize disruption with limited resources.
• Temporary Reduction in Direct Attacks: A noticeable decrease in direct confrontations suggests that ISM may be regrouping or recalibrating its strategy in response to intensified counterinsurgency operations.

Enhanced Counterinsurgency Operations:

• Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) Engagement: The RDF has intensified its operations, including the deployment of helicopters for aerial assaults against ISM positions, marking a significant escalation in counterterrorism efforts.
• Operational Risks and Considerations: The increased use of air power introduces risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties, necessitating precise intelligence and coordination to maintain public support and operational legitimacy.

Regional and International Collaboration:

• Joint Military Exercises: The “Peace Unity-2024” drills involving China, Tanzania, and Mozambique underscore strengthened regional cooperation and capacity-building aimed at enhancing counterterrorism readiness and maritime security.

Socio-Political Implications:

• Displacement and Economic Disruption: Ongoing instability has caused significant civilian displacement and economic disruption, particularly in resource-rich regions vital to Mozambique’s economic prospects.
• Reconstruction and Stability Efforts: Military success must be paired with robust reconstruction efforts, governance reforms, and community engagement to secure long-term peace and prevent insurgent resurgence.

Somalia

ISS Resurgence and Activities:

• Increased Armed and Economic Activities: Since May 2024, ISS has ramped up its operations, including armed assaults and expanded extortion schemes, primarily in Puntland and surrounding regions.
• Leadership Resilience: Despite surviving targeted U.S. airstrikes, ISS leader Abdiqadir Mumin remains active, providing continuity and strategic direction to the group’s operations.
• Competition with Al-Shabaab: ISS continues to vie for territory and influence with Al-Shabaab, particularly around strategic locations like Bosaso and Qandala, highlighting a fragmented but persistent militant landscape.

Counterterrorism Efforts:

• Puntland Security Operations: Local security forces, including the Puntland Maritime Police Force and Intelligence Security Agency, have conducted successful operations, leading to arrests and the seizure of weapons, demonstrating ongoing efforts to curb ISS activities.
• External Support and Challenges: While international counterterrorism support is critical, ISS’s adaptability and local entrenchment pose enduring challenges to stabilization efforts.

Regional Security Dynamics:

• Transnational Threats: ISS’s connections with external actors, such as the Houthi rebels, underline the transnational nature of the threat and the need for comprehensive regional security strategies.

Socio-Economic Factors:

• Exploitation of Local Grievances: ISS exploits local socio-economic disparities, governance gaps, and clan dynamics to recruit and sustain operations, emphasizing the importance of addressing the underlying conditions conducive to extremism.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The developments in August 2024 highlight the persistent and evolving threats posed by Islamic State affiliates across Central and East Africa. ISCAP’s expansion in the DRC, ISM’s tactical shifts in Mozambique, and ISS’s activities in Somalia underscore the need for comprehensive, multifaceted response strategies that combine military action with socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

Recommendations:

1. Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Strengthen regional and international collaboration to effectively anticipate and disrupt insurgent operations.
2. Integrated Military Strategies: Combine aerial assaults with coordinated ground operations to ensure thorough clearance of insurgent strongholds while minimizing civilian harm.
3. Community Engagement: Develop programs that involve local communities in security planning, fostering trust and cooperation between civilians and security forces.
4. Addressing Root Causes: Invest in socio-economic development initiatives aimed at reducing poverty, unemployment, and political marginalization, which are key drivers of extremist recruitment.
5. Capacity Building: Provide training and resources to local security forces to improve their operational effectiveness, human rights compliance, and resilience against insurgent tactics.
6. Humanitarian Assistance: Boost support for humanitarian organizations to address the immediate needs arising from displacement and violence, ensuring that aid reaches affected populations swiftly.
7. Monitoring and Evaluation: Implement robust mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts and adapt strategies based on the evolving threat landscape and on-the-ground realities.
8. Diplomatic Efforts: Engage in proactive diplomacy to resolve regional conflicts that insurgent groups exploit, promoting broader stability and cooperation.