Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, DR-Congo, Tanzania, Uganda): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists For August 2023

INSIDE:

In August 2023, significant developments occurred in counterterrorism efforts in East and Central Africa, particularly in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia.

In Mozambique, the elimination of ISM leader Bonamade Machude Omar marked a noteworthy development, yet the insurgency remains decentralized and adaptable. High-value ambushes underscore the insurgents’ intelligence capabilities.

In the DRC, ISCAP’s evolving tactics, regional ties, and recruitment efforts pose an escalating threat to stability. The use of sophisticated IEDs and the group’s expansion into new territories exacerbate the challenge. Regional cooperation and security sector reform are essential to address this multifaceted threat.

In Somalia, Islamic State Somalia militants pledged allegiance to the new Caliph Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, indicating their continued presence and alignment with global jihadist movements.

Counterterrorism efforts should prioritize intelligence gathering, community engagement, and regional cooperation to effectively combat these threats while addressing underlying socio-economic factors. A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that combines military action with socio-economic development is crucial for long-term success.

Incident Report:

MOZAMBIQUE

• 23^rd Aug– The Mozambican Ministry of Defense announced the elimination of three ISM commanders including Bonamade Machude Omar the leader of the outfit.
• 22^nd Aug– ISM militants ambushed a Mozambican armed forces patrol unit on the road from Cobre to Quiterajo in Macomia district.
• 16^th Aug- militants targeted a Mozambican Armed Forces Vehicle with an IED on the road from Mbau to Limala in Mocimboa da Praia.
• 15^th Aug- ISM militants ambushed a Mozambican armed forces patrol in the Fifth Congress Village in Macomia district.
• 8^th Aug- militants and Mozambican security forces clashed in Litimanda village in Muidumbe district.
• 14^th Aug- Militants issue a pledge of allegiance (Bay’ah) to Caliph Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. The same was issued in a series of photos.
• 10^th Aug- militants armed assault on Mozambican Armed Forces, killing and wounding at least 17. The attack occurred in Catupa Forest in Macomia District.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

• 9^th Aug– ISCAP pledged allegiance (Bay’ah) to the new Caliph Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi from an unknown location in DRC in a photo released.
• 13^th Aug– 11 Christians were killed after ISCAP militants conducted a nighttime armed assault in Mbau, Beni.
• 13^th Aug– ISCAP led an armed assault on a Christian gathering, killing six and wounding others on the RN4 in Kasindi, Beni.
• 16^th AUG– one car and three motorcycles were set on fire in a new ambush attributed to the ISCAP rebels near Kamungu in Eringeti, Beni territory.
• 21^st Aug- ISCAP militants killed at least 20 Christians in Kisanga on the RN4, North-Kivu Province. This marks the first attack on Kisanga since November 30, 2021.
• 23^rd Aug-ISCAP militants killed five Christians in Luna on the RN4, Ituri Province.
• 24^th Aug- ISCAP militants captured and killed three Christians from Bolimby, Ibanza, and Mangu villages, Ituri Province.
• 24^th Aug- 7 male hostages were beheaded by ISCAP in the village of Katerain, located on the border between the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri.

SOMALIA

• 6^th Aug- Islamic State Somalia (ISS) Militants issued a pledge of allegiance (Bay’ah) to the New Ca Caliph Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.
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MOZAMBIQUE

The death of Bonomade Machude Omar aka Ibn Omar and its impact

The announcement of the death of Ibn Omar marks a significant development in Mozambique’s insurgency. As the leader of the group, his demise removes a key figurehead and military strategist from the insurgency’s ranks, potentially impacting its operations.

While the death of Ibn Omar is a significant development in the Mozambique insurgency, the decentralized nature of the group, their ability to target high-value individuals, and their adaptability in movement pose ongoing challenges for the security forces. The conflict remains complex and ever-evolving, necessitating continued attention and analysis.

Two senior members, Abu Kital and Ali Mahando were also reported killed in the ambush. The deaths have however not shed much light on the leadership of the group. Additionally, a previously unknown commander, ‘Quadrado,’ has emerged and is believed to have taken over the position of Ibn Omar, adding further complexity to the insurgency’s leadership.

ISM Is a Decentralized Insurgency: The insurgency in Mozambique has operated in a decentralized manner, lacking a centralized leadership structure. This has allowed various factions to operate independently in different regions of the province, making it resilient to the removal of a single leader like Ibn Omar.

High-Value Ambushes observed in August: The ambush on August 22nd was a high-stakes operation by the insurgents. It was not only aimed at military personnel but also targeted Major General Tiago Nampelo, the head of the army. This indicates a level of intelligence or insider information possessed by the insurgents, highlighting a significant security challenge faced by Mozambique’s forces.

Shift in Insurgent Movement: The movement of insurgents from the Macomia district to other regions, particularly towards the Mueda district in the northwest, suggests a degree of flexibility in their tactics. This adaptability poses challenges for the Mozambican security forces, as the insurgents continue to relocate and operate in different areas. Mozambique’s insurgency is characterized by complexity and constant change. It is a fluid and dynamic conflict that requires ongoing monitoring to assess its impact on the broader dynamics of the region.

Strategic Insurgent Engagement: Insurgents have been actively engaging with local communities in areas like Pangane. They have offered generous prices for supplies, which is likely a strategic effort to gain the support or at least the neutrality of local populations. Additionally, the insurgents have been emphasizing religious practices and discouraging the consumption of alcoholic beverages, reflecting an attempt to exert ideological influence.

D.R. CONGO

The United Nations report paints a grim picture of the security situation in eastern DRC, with the ISCAP’s recruitment efforts, evolving tactics, and regional ties intensifying the threat to stability and civilian safety in the region. The persistent violence and insecurity underscore the need for sustained international and regional efforts to address this ongoing crisis effectively. According to United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, ISCAP is persistently engaging in recruitment efforts aimed at bolstering its ranks. This recruitment drive signifies the group’s determination to sustain its insurgency in the region.

Ever-evolving mode of operation that emulated the decentralized nature of their counterpart in Mozambique: Despite joint military operations conducted by Congolese and Ugandan armed forces, the ISCAP has proven resilient. These operations have resulted in the destruction of certain ISCAP positions and the neutralization of several of the group’s commanders. However, instead of being eradicated, the ISCAP has fragmented into smaller entities, each operating with an increasingly sophisticated modus operandi. This development poses a significant challenge to efforts aimed at quelling the insurgency, as these smaller entities continue to launch deadly attacks against the civilian population.

Incorporation of IEDs as an attack type: One alarming trend highlighted in the report is the ISCAP’s adoption of more sophisticated and deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs), especially in urban areas. This evolution in tactics underscores the group’s adaptability and its capacity to inflict greater harm. As a result, civilian populations in the territories of Mambasa and Irumu remain at risk, facing the constant threat of ISCAP attacks.

Expansion of Group’s AOR: Furthermore, the report underscores the expansion of the ISCAP’s influence beyond its traditional areas of operation. The group is reportedly spreading north and west into Ituri and south into the territory of Lubero in North Kivu. Additionally, the report highlights the ISCAP’s worrisome regional ties with other terrorist groups, including Daesh (ISIS). This regionalization of the ISCAP’s activities poses a broader security challenge, not only for DRC but for the entire Great Lakes region.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In Mozambique, despite reports of the insurgency recruiting new members and making appearances in various parts of Cabo Delgado, there has been no clear sign of renewed fighting capacity. This suggests that the insurgency is currently in a weakened state, with its operational capabilities diminished. However, it is acknowledged that the death of Ibn Omar, while significant, may not be enough to entirely cripple the insurgency, which remains a persistent challenge in the region.

• Enhance Intelligence and Counterintelligence and Adapting to Changing Tactics: Mozambique’s security forces should prioritize intelligence gathering and counterintelligence efforts to better understand the insurgency’s movements and capabilities. Given the insurgents’ flexibility in tactics and movements, Mozambique’s security forces should adapt their strategies and response mechanisms to effectively counter the ever-evolving threat.
• Addressing Community Engagement and Countering Ideological Influence: Engaging with local communities to counter the insurgents’ attempts to gain support or neutrality through strategic engagement. Community trust and cooperation are essential in efforts to combat the insurgency. This can also be achieved by countering the ideological influence of insurgents by promoting religious tolerance and discouraging extremist beliefs within affected communities
• Regional Cooperation and Monitor Leadership Changes: Strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries and regional organizations to address the cross-border nature of the insurgency and disrupt its activities. Continuously monitor leadership changes within the insurgency and assess their potential impact on the group’s cohesion and operations.

Addressing the ISCAP threat in eastern DRC requires a multifaceted approach that combines security measures with efforts to address underlying socio-economic and political factors contributing to extremism. It also demands sustained international and regional cooperation to effectively combat the insurgency and promote stability in the region.

• Enhance Regional Cooperation and International Support: The international community, including neighboring countries, should strengthen regional cooperation to address the cross-border threat posed by ISCAP. Joint efforts are essential to combat the insurgency effectively. DRC ought to continue to seek international support and cooperation, including intelligence sharing, to track and disrupt the activities of ISCAP and other extremist groups in the region especially seeing as the groups emulate and support each other.
• Security Sector Reform and Community Engagement: DRC should prioritize security sector reform to improve the capacity and effectiveness of its armed forces and security agencies in combating ISCAP. This includes better training, equipment, and coordination among security forces. Additionally, engaging with local communities to build trust and gather intelligence. Empower communities to report suspicious activities and collaborate with security forces in countering radicalization and recruitment efforts.
• Counterterrorism Strategy: Develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that not only focuses on military action but also addresses the root causes of extremism, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education and social services.