Event Summary
2 People were killed inside a vehicle they were travelling in on 28th December 2015 by Kenya army (KDF) personnel after the driver of the vehicle defied orders to stop in Mandera
(Mandera is the capital of Mandera County in the former North Eastern Province of Kenya. It is situated at around 3°55′N 41°50′E / 3.917°N 41.833°E, near the borders with Somalia and Ethiopia).
Examples of Related Incidents
On 3 October 2015, 42 people were killed and over 30 were injured when a United States Air Force AC-130U gunship attacked the Kunduz Trauma Centre operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders in the city of Kunduz, in Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan.
On 21st of December 2015, a suicide bomber on a motorbike carried out an attack on a joint patrol of Afghan and coalition forces at about 1:30 p.m. in the Bajawri area of Bagram district. In the attack 6 US soldiers serving under NATO were killed.
Other Examples: Throughout 2015, AMISOM troops operating in Somalia suffered causalities after Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen terrorists used ‘suicide vehicle bound improvised devices’ to attack their bases and convoys in theater.
Analysis
The Kenya army and other independent sources report that the vehicle was speeding and indiscriminately overtook the army convoy.
It obstructed the army personnel vehicles which were in formation and patrol (active theater operations).
This prompted the army officers to open fire and neutralize the suspects (note that; the use of the term suspects is justified due to two aspects noted in the incident);
1.) Speeding vehicle overtaking and obstructing an army patrol convoy
2.) They type of vehicle, the time of the incident, position of the army troops at the time, and the imminent threats posed by Al-Shabaab militants.
The strategy of an SVBIED attack against Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) by Shebaab has never succeeded in Somalia for a number of stringent and classified measures/strategies put in-place by the army military intelligence.
However, the theater (Somalia) is much different from Kenya, hence an SVBIED attack against army troops in active mode must be preempted swiftly upon slightest detection.
The above 2 factors provides evidence of detection and subsequent neutralization of a threat that bears aspects of an SVBIED attack. Besides these SVBIED detection points, intelligence reports from the Kenya Intelligence Service and other foreign services warn of SVBIED attacks against the Kenya Army (KDF).
As such the Kenya Army has instructed its personnel to be vigilant and extra alert to preempt/neutralize such threats upon detection.
Military and counter terrorism experts agree that an officer must be extremely decisive after detection of an ambush. There are no 2 ways about it. The solution is immediate neutralization of the threat.
In the event it was indeed an SVBIED, officers would have been killed in the middle of a town. It’d have been a severe blow to the country. Did the army have other choices apart from opening fire after detecting hostility and an immediate threat against the troops?
However, civilians must be warned against conducting in susceptible and hostile manners. Government should raise public awareness to reduce risk of conflict between civilians and security personnel on high alert.
